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A bstract
Government spending has several components. The government buys intermediate goods 
and services from the private sector, it invests in infrastructure, it hires workers and 
pays them a wage and it also makes transfer and interest payments. While most of 
the theoretical papers studying the effects of government spending focus on purchases of 
intermediate goods and services, the main objective of this thesis is to examine two other 
types of expenditure.
The first part studies the effects of public sector employment and wages through the 
labour market and their role over the business cycles in a model with search and matching 
frictions. The first conclusion is that different components of spending can potentially 
have distinct macroeconomic effects. The second conclusion is that government wages 
are an important element to achieve efficiency in the labour market. High wages induce 
too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs and raise private sector wages, 
which lowers job creation in the private sector and raises unemployment. Throughout 
the business cycle it is optimal to have procyclical public sector wages.
The second part is devoted to the study of the role of public sector capital and its 
interaction with the determination of labour and profit taxation. Over the past 30 years 
in developed countries we have observed a decline in the corporate tax rate and public 
investment offset by an increase in the labour income tax and government consumption. 
I study these trends in an optimal dynamic taxation model where the government also 
chooses how to allocate spending between government consumption and investment in 
public capital. I find tha t the government’s decision of how to allocate spending is not 
independent of the decision of how to raise taxes. I then discuss several hypotheses that 
are consistent with the observed trends.
The last part of the thesis gathers two empirical essays on labour market flows and 
on the determinants of sovereign debt ratings.
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Chapter 1
Foreword
Macroeconomics has traditionally been a divided field. Yet after the Rational Expectations 
revolution led by Lucas, Sargent, Kydland and Prescott and the posterior developments of 
New-Keynesian models, a new consensus has emerged. As pointed out in recent papers by 
prominent macroeconomists -  for example Mankiw (2006), Blanchard (2008) or Woodford 
(2009) -  this consensus is settled on two pillars: on the one hand the adoption of the 
methodological tools of Real Business Cycle models, namely the explicit microfoundations 
and the role of rational expectations; on the other hand the acknowledgment of the role 
of monetary policy in managing fluctuations in demand and controlling inflation.
In this synthesis there is hardly any room for fiscal policy. This lack of interest in 
fiscal policy was driven by the belief that the role of demand management should be 
assigned to the Central Bank and that the governments should do as little as possible. 
This point was well emphasised by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman in a recent 
lecture at the London School of Economics.
Even among the Saltwater economists there was certainly a loss of focus on 
things that have turned out to be terribly important right now. And just to 
say: fiscal policy. (...) How much work have we done on fiscal policy? (...) 
Between 1985 and 2000 there are about 7000 NBER working papers released, 
of which 5 said anything in their title or abstract about fiscal policy. (...) The 
whole discussion of fiscal policy essentially disappeared from Macroeconomics.
(Paul Krugman, 10th of June 2009, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures)
The objective of this thesis is to study the effects of government spending. However, 
it does not focus on the demand channels. Instead, its contribution is to analyse the 
effects of the different components of spending. Most of the theoretical papers studying 
government spending focus mainly on one of them: purchases of intermediate goods and 
services. For example, Barro (1990) studies the effects of spending in an endogenous 
growth model. Baxter and King (1993) examine their effects in a Neo-Classical setting,
15
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Linnemann and Schabert (2003) extend it to the New Keynesian model and Galf, Lopez- 
Salido, and Valles (2007) introduce rule-of-thumb agents. All these papers share the 
approach of considering government spending as goods bought from the private sector. 
However, this simplification is too restrictive. Government spending has several other 
components. The government hires workers and pays them a wage, it invests in roads, 
bridges, infrastructure and it also does transfer and interest payments. Figure 1.1 shows 
the evolution of each component of government spending in the United States. As we 
can see, purchases of intermediate goods and services correspond only to 20 percent of 
the total spending.
The main hypothesis of this thesis is tha t the different components of spending have 
distinct impacts on the economy, even in the absence of nominal rigidities. So it is 
im portant to understand what distinguishes each type of expenditure and examine their 
role in achieving efficient outcomes. The first part of the thesis deals with the effects 
of public sector employment and wages through the labour market and their role over 
the business cycles. The second part is devoted to the study of the role of public sector 
capital and its interaction with the determination of labour and profit taxation.
Part I studies the effects of public sector employment and wages. The public sector 
wage bill represents 30 percent of total government expenditure in the United States. 
Furthermore, around 16 percent of all employees are working in the public sector. Given 
its size, it seems natural tha t part of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy occurs 
through the labour market. Chapter 2 sets up a comprehensive yet simple framework 
to study the macroeconomic effects of public sector employment and wages, and the 
optimal policy over the business cycle. As the focus of the chapter is to study public 
sector employment and wages, it seems im portant to leave the assumption of frictionless 
labour markets and attem pt a more realistic setting. I build a dynamic stochastic general
Figure 1.1: Government expenditure and its components (United States)
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equilibrium model with search and matching frictions along the lines of Pissarides (2000) 
with both public and private sectors.
The main positive conclusion is that the response of the labour market variables to 
fiscal shocks depends on the type of shock considered. A reduction of separations lowers 
unemployment, an increase in wages raises it, while hiring more people can increase or 
decrease unemployment. All shocks raise the wages and crowd out employment in the 
private sector contrary to shocks in purchases of private goods and services.
The main normative conclusion is that the government’s wage policy plays a key 
role in attaining the efficient allocation. In steady-state, high wages induce too many 
unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, which lowers job creation in the private 
sector and raises unemployment. If wages are too low, the government faces recruitment 
problems. Over the business cycle public sector wages should follow the wages in the 
private sector. Otherwise, in recessions too many people queue for public sector jobs and 
in expansions few people apply for them. An acyclical public sector wage policy increases 
the volatility of business cycles.
I test the empirical validity of the model in two ways. First, still in Chapter 2, using 
quarterly data I employ Bayesian methods to estimate the model for the United States 
between 1948 and 2007. I find evidence that the share of unemployed searching for public 
sector jobs fluctuates over the business cycle and that the government follows a slightly 
procyclical wage policy.
Chapter 3 tests the model in an alternative way. First, it presents an empirical study 
on the interaction between public and private sector wage growth for the OECD countries. 
I have found that in the OECD countries public sector wage growth is driven by expected 
private sector wage growth, as well as by fiscal conditions. Regarding the private sector 
wage growth, I find tha t it is influenced by market variables but also by expected public 
sector wage growth. I then extend the baseline model to include exogenous growth in the 
private sector technology and distortionary taxation. I check the validity of the model 
by running the same regressions on simulated data, where I find very similar coefficients.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the interactions between the revenue and 
the expenditure side of fiscal policy. Over the past 30 years, most developed countries 
have experienced opposite trends in several government instruments. On the taxation 
side, while statutory corporate tax rate has declined, the marginal labour-income tax has 
steadily risen. On the expenditure side, public investment has declined sharply at the 
same time as government consumption increased. I argue that these trends are related.
Chapter 4 studies this issue in the context of an optimal dynamic taxation model 
where the government chooses labour income and profit taxes, as well as decides how
17
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to allocate spending between government consumption and investment in public capital. 
Public capital is an input of the production function, so it generates economic rents for 
the firm, rents that can be captured by profit taxation. This creates an interdependency 
between the government’s decisions of how to raise revenue and how to allocate spending. 
When public capital stock is higher, there are more rents for the firms so the optimal 
profit tax is higher. Also, if the taxes are higher, particularly the profit tax, the return 
of public investment in the form of future revenues is higher, so it is optimal for the 
government to increase investment relative to consumption. One important implication 
of the interdependence of the two sides of the government problem is that any exogenous 
factor affecting one of the instruments will have repercussions on the optimal choice of 
the other three instruments.
In light of the model, I discuss three possible explanations for the trends in the fiscal 
instruments. One hypothesis is that public capital has become a less important input 
in the production function. The second explanation is that we are simply observing the 
transition to the steady state, starting from a low level of public capital. The third 
explanation is that globalization has simultaneously put a downward pressure on profit 
taxation (through international tax competition) and increasing pressure in government 
consumption (through the demand for public transfers).
Chapter 5 explores in detail the last of these hypotheses. It argues that international 
tax competition, an exogenous event that drives the profit tax rate down, has contributed 
to the decline of public investment and the consequent reduction of the supply of public 
capital. To illustrate this, I set up a simpler model with the same properties as the one in 
Chapter 4 adding an element of tax competition. I then estimate two policy functions for 
18 OECD countries. I find that corporate tax rate and public investment are endogenous 
and that 20 percentage points decline in the corporate tax rate, driven by competition, 
reduces public investment by 0.5 to 0.9 percent of GDP.
Finally, Part III gathers two empirical essays. In Chapter 6, I study the main facts of 
the UK labour market worker gross flows using survey data. I document the properties of 
the flows and transition probabilities between employment, unemployment and inactiv­
ity from several angles. I examine conditional transition probabilities, job-to-job flows, 
employment separations by reason, flows between inactivity and the labour force, flows 
by education and the differences between the public and the private sector. Although 
this chapter is not directly related to the main topic of this thesis, I use the information 
summarised in it in Chapter 3.
Chapter 7 analyses the determinants of sovereign debt ratings. Given the recent 
worries about sovereign default in several developed countries (The Economist 2010a, 
2010b), it seems important to understand which variables the rating agencies look at
18
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when deciding on a country’s rating. The main interest in the context of this thesis 
is to find how government variables, such as fiscal balance or government debt, can 
affect a country’s rating. The main contribution of this chapter is technical. Using 
linear and ordered response models, I employ a specification that allows the distinction 
between short and long-run effects of macroeconomic and fiscal variables on a country’s 
rating. The results show that four core variables have a consistent short-run impact on 
sovereign ratings: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, the public debt level 
and government balance. Government effectiveness is found to be an important long-run 
determinant.
This thesis uses a wide range of research approaches. Chapters 2 and 4 use recursive 
macroeconomic methods and focus mainly on how the government can achieve optimality, 
which allows us to draw normative conclusions. Chapters 3 and 5 set variants of the 
baseline models, in order to draw some positive conclusions and guide the empirical 
study. Most of the empirical work in the thesis uses a panel of OECD countries for a 
period of 40 years. Panel data methods are also used in Chapter 7. On the other hand, 
Chapter 6 applies a more descriptive approach to micro data. Each of these chapters 
is self-contained. Each one has a detailed introduction tha t includes a discussion of the 
relevant literature and of its main contributions. In the conclusion of every chapter there 
is a summary of the main findings and its implications both for research and for economic 
policy. Chapter 8 suggests some of the potential areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal policy and the labour market: 
the effects of public sector  
em ploym ent and wages
2.1 Introduction
If you seek advice from a macroeconomist on how to model government consumption, you 
are likely to hear: government consumption should be modelled as goods bought from the 
private sector.1 However, the main component of government consumption is compen­
sation to employees. As shown in Table 2.1, in most OECD countries the public sector 
wage bill represents between 50 to 60 percent of government consumption expenditures. 
Government employment is an important aspect of fiscal policy, but it is also a sizable 
element of the labour market. In OECD economies, between 10 to 30 percent of all em­
ployees are working in the public sector. Given its relevance, it seems plausible that part 
of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy occurs through the labour market.
The level of employment and wages in the public sector are relevant, not just because 
of their weight in the economy or in the government budget, but also because they 
play an important role over the business cycle. Since 2004, the Internet search engine 
Google releases a weekly index of keyword searches. Figure 2.1 shows the growth rate 
of keyword searches of “J 0 &5 ” and “ Government jobs” for the United States, relative 
to the previous year. From August 2008, as the recession worsened, the number of 
searches for jobs has increased dramatically, but it is clear that since February 2009,
LAt least this is the approach taken by most articles that study the aggregate effects of government 
spending. Barro (1990) studies the effects of productive and unproductive spending in an endogenous 
growth model. Baxter and King (1993) examine their effects in a Neo-Classical setting, Linnemann 
and Schabert (2003) extends it to the New Keynesian model and Gall, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) 
introduces rule of thumb agents. All these papers share the feature of considering government spending 
as goods bought from the private sector.
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people are turning more towards government jobs. The difference between the growth 
rates is around 20 percentage points. Repeating the exercise for the United Kingdom 
gives a similar picture. Indeed, the change in the searching patterns of the unemployed 
has gained such proportions that it has been noticed by the press. The following quote 
is particularly insightful regarding its causes:
Wall Street may be losing its luster for new U.S. college graduates who are 
increasingly looking to the government for jobs that enrich their social con­
science, if not their wallet. In the boom years, New York’s financial center 
lured many of the brightest young stars with the promise of high salaries and 
bonuses. But the financial crisis has tainted the image of big banks, and 
with fewer financial jobs available, Uncle Sam may be reaping the benefit. 
(Reuters, 11th of June 2009)
The quote hints that in the current recession more people are searching for public sec­
tor jobs for two reasons. First, as the wages in the private sector have fallen, more people 
are turning to the public sector where the wages are insulated from the market forces. 
Second, there are less jobs available in the private sector relative to the public sector. 
Indeed, as shown in the fourth column of Table 2.1, in all but one country, public sector 
employment goes up during recessions. These two facts suggest that government employ­
ment and wages are important elements in explaining the business cycle fluctuations of 
unemployment.
Compared to the theoretical research that focusses on government spending as buying 
part of the production of the economy, the literature that studies the effects of public 
sector employment and wages is scarce. Finn (1998) finds that in an RBC model with 
a perfectly competitive labour market, contrary to government purchases of goods and 
services, the purchase of hours reduces output, employment and investment in the pri­
vate sector. Cavallo (2005) extends the model to include capital adjustment cost and 
exogenous growth in technology and Pappa (2009) to allow for nominal rigidities. Both 
conclude that private sector hours and output go down and real wages go up after an 
increase in government hours. Ardagna (2007) study the issue in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with a unionised labour market. In her setting, an increase in public 
sector employment, wages or unemployment benefits, raises the wage in the private sector 
and thus unemployment. Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002) in a partial equilibrium 
version find that, if public sector wages are low, an increase in public sector employment 
can reduce unemployment.
Looking at this issue in a frictionless labour market framework might be a useful 
starting point, but as Figure 2.1 shows clearly, to fully understand the transmission
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Table 2.1: Public sector and the labour market
Public wage bill Public Employment Unemployment Correlation
(% gov. consumption) (% total employment) rate M )
Australia 52.2% 14.1% 6.3% 0.51
Austria 53.4% 13.1% 4.7% 0.34
Belgium 53.8% 17.9% 6.9% 0.91
Canada 59.8% 20.5% 6.8% 0.55
Denmark 67.8% 30.5% 4.4% 0.78
Finland 63.2% 24.8% 9.9% 0.76
France 58.4% 22.5% 9.4% 0.95
Germany 41.5% 11.6% 7.5% 0.82
Iceland 60.0% 19.0% 2.3% 0.74
Ireland 57.0% 12.7% 4.3% 0.84
Italy 55.6% 16.9% 10.7% -0.40
Japan 37.7% 8.4% 4.7% 0.35
Luxembourg 49.1% 15.0% 2.6% 0.88
Netherlands 42.2% 10.9% 2.6% 0.80
Norway 63.1% 33.6% 3.4% 0.82
Portugal 72.8% 14.3% 4.0% 0.22
Spain 59.2% 14.1% 11.4% 0.13
Sweden 59.2% 31.1% 4.7% 0.33
United Kingdom 53.3% 18.0% 5.5% 0.19
United States 66.5% 15.2% 4.1% 0.66
Average 56.3% 18.2% 5.9% 0.49
Note: Public wage bill, public employment and unemployment rate refer to the year 2000. The correlation 
between public sector employment and the unemployment rate is computed from quarterly data (1970 to 
2007). Source: OECD.
Figure 2.1: Growth rate of Google keyword searches in the United States 
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Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the 
same four weeks in the previous year.
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mechanisms of fiscal policy through the labour market it is crucial to model the existing 
search and matching frictions. There have been some attem pts to do it. According to 
Holmlund and Linden (1993), an increase in public employment has a direct negative 
effect in unemployment but crowds out private employment due to an increase in wages. 
But, for all realistic calibrations, the direct effect of reducing unemployment is stronger 
than the indirect effect through wages. Quadrini and Trigari (2007) examine the impact 
of public sector employment on business cycle volatility and find tha t the presence of the 
public sector increases the volatility of both private and total employment. Horner, Ngai, 
and Olivetti (2007) study the effect of turbulence on unemployment when the wages in 
the public sector are insulated. They conclude that an increase in turbulence induces 
more unemployed, who are risk averse, to search for jobs in public companies, resulting 
in higher aggregate unemployment than if the companies were privately managed.
The aim of this work is to provide a comprehensive, yet simple, framework to study 
the macroeconomic effects of public sector employment and wages, and their role over 
the business cycle. I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search 
and matching frictions along the lines of Pissarides (2000) with both public and private 
sectors. The model shares several features with Quadrini and Trigari (2007). One of its 
main difficulties is the calibration of the friction parameters in the public sector. In order 
to do it accurately, I explore information from several sources from the United States and 
the United Kingdom.
As the first stage, I solve the social planner’s problem to find the constrained efficient 
allocation. I then solve the decentralized equilibrium and determine the public sector 
wage consistent with the optimal steady-state allocation. The optimal wage premium 
depends mainly on the differences of the labour market frictions parameters of the public 
sector relative to the private sector. For the chosen calibration, the optimal wage is 3 
percent lower than in the private sector. If the government sets a higher wage, it induces 
too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs and raises private sector wages, 
thus reducing private sector job creation and increasing unemployment. Conversely, if it 
sets a lower wage, few unemployed want a public sector job and the government faces 
recruitment problems.
I also examine the properties of the model when subject to technology shocks. The 
optimal government policy consists of a countercyclical vacancy posting and a procyclical 
wage. If the public sector wages are acyclical, in recessions they become more attractive 
relative to the wages in the private sector, inducing more unemployed to queue for public 
sector jobs. This further dampens job creation in the private sector and amplifies the 
business cycle. Deviations from the optimal policy can entail significant welfare losses. 
If, for instance, the public sector wage does not respond to the cycle, unemployment
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volatility doubles relative to the scenario under optimal policy.
The model allows us to disaggregate fiscal shocks into wage and employment shocks 
and the latter into separation and hiring shocks. The response to the three shocks varies. 
Paying more to public sector workers raises unemployment through two channels. On the 
one hand, more unemployed direct their search towards the public sector. On the other 
hand, as it increases the value of unemployment, it spills over to private sector wages. 
These two channels are also in place under a separation or hiring shock, but they are 
offset by the direct effect of increasing public sector employment. In general, reducing 
separations always lowers unemployment, but increasing hiring can have opposite effects 
on unemployment, depending on the steady-state level of public sector wages. If the wages 
are high, when the government opens new vacancies it induces many more unemployed 
to search for these new jobs, enhancing the crowding out effect in the private sector and 
raising unemployment.
The opposite effects of the different components of fiscal policy is one of the key results 
of the paper. The extensive empirical literature tha t evaluates the macroeconomic effects 
of government spending tends to find mixed effects on private consumption, real wage or 
private employment.2 As a consequence, the center of the debate has been on the technical 
methodology, particularly on the identification of fiscal shocks. I argue that the mixed 
evidence might be more related to the data, rather than the methodological strategy 
used. Fiscal shocks can have distinct effects depending on the type of expenditure we are 
considering: employment, wages, purchases of privately produced goods or government 
investment. By including all components together, some in particular or using different 
samples in which the composition of spending has changed, we cannot expect to identify 
properly one type of fiscal shock. This hypothesis is consistent with evidence from Caldara 
and Kamps (2008) who, using the same variables and sample, conclude that alternative 
identification strategies yield similar results.
The argument tha t the various types of spending can have mixed macroeconomic ef­
fects is not new. In their seminal paper, Baxter and King (1993) find that government 
investment has different quantitative and qualitative effects than government consump­
tion because it affects the marginal productivity of factors. As mentioned above, Finn 
(1998) find that, contrary to government purchases of goods and services, an increase in 
government hours reduces output, employment and investment in the private sector. I 
show that if we disaggregate employment compensation into employment and into per- 
employee wage, they can have opposite effects on unemployment. To strengthen my 
argument, I do a simple extension to the model, replacing public sector employment 
with services bought directly from the private sector. In such an economy, increases in
2See Caldara and Kamps (2008) for an overview.
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the government purchase of goods lowers the wage and raises employment in the private 
sector, contrary to shocks in employment and wages.
Some of the model’s results are driven by the assumption that the unemployed direct 
their search towards the private or the public sector. The purpose of the rest of the 
paper is to argue tha t this is a relevant mechanism. First, I review the evidence from 
microeconometric studies on public sector wages that suggest that individuals self-select 
into the private or public sector based on the expected wage differential. Then, I employ 
Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the model for the United States, between 
1948 and 2007, using quarterly data on: government employment and wages, private 
sector wages, unemployment rate, job-separation and job-finding rates. I find evidence 
that the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs fluctuates over the business 
cycle. Additionally, the government follows a countercyclical vacancy and a slightly 
procyclical wage policy.
2.2 M odel
2.2.1 G eneral se ttin g
The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with public and private 
sectors. The only rigidities present in the model are due to search and matching frictions. 
Public sector variables are denoted by the superscript g while private sector variables are 
denoted by p. Time is denoted by t =  0 ,1 ,2 ,...
The labour force consists of many individuals j  E [0, 1]. Part of them are unemployed 
(i^), while the remaining are working either in the public (If) or in the private (If) sectors.
1 =  If +  If +  ut . (2 -1 )
Total employment is denoted by lt . The presence of search and matching frictions 
in the labour market prevents some unemployed from finding jobs. The evolution of 
employment in both sectors depends on the number of new matches m f  and m f and on 
the separations. In each period, jobs are destroyed at constant fraction A*, potentially 
different across sectors.
l t+i =  (1 -  +  m l  i =  P, 9 • (2-2)
The new matches are determined by two Cobb-Douglas matching functions:
m l =  A u \ y \ v \ ) l^ \  i= p ,g .  (2.3)
I assume the unemployed choose which sector they want to search in, so u\ represents
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the number of unemployed searching in sector i. The vacancies in each sector are denoted 
by v\. The parameter rf is the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment and 
the matching efficiency. An important part of the analysis focuses on the behaviour of
U9the share of unemployed searching for a public sector job, defined as: st = ■£.
From the matching functions we can define the probabilities of vacancies being filled 
q\, the job-finding rates conditional on searching in a particular sector p\, and the uncon­
ditional job-finding rates f\:
i m t i m t ri  m \ •
Qt =  — , p t =  f t  =  — i i  =  p , g -
v \  U \  U t
The assumption of directed search implies that the number of vacancies posted in one 
sector only affects contemporarily the probability of filling a vacancy in the other sector 
through the endogenous reaction of st .
2.2.2 H ouseholds
In the presence of unemployment risk we would observe consumption differences across 
different individuals. Following Merz (1995), I assume all the income of the members 
is pooled so the private consumption is equalised across members. The household is 
infinitely-lived and has preferences over private consumption goods, q , and public goods 
gt . It also has utility from unemployment i'(wt), which captures leisure and home pro­
duction. oo
E t Y ^ ^ i c u g t )  +  v(ut)\, (2.4)
t=0
where /? 6  (0, 1) is the discount factor. The budget constraint in period t is given by:
Q +  B t =  (1 -f rt-x)B t- i  +  wf/f +  Wtlgt +  n*, (2.5)
where r t~i is the real interest rate from period t — 1 to t and B t- i  are the holdings of 
one period bonds. w\l\ is the total wage income from the members working in sector i. 
Finally, n* encompasses the lump sum taxes that finance the government’s wage bill and
possible transfers from the private sector firms. I assume there are no unemployment
benefits.
The household chooses ct to maximize the expected utility subject to the sequence of 
budget constraints, taking the public goods as given. The solution is the Euler equation:
uc{cu gt) = (3{l + rt)Et [uc(ct+i,g t+i)\. (2.6)
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2.2.3 Workers
The value of each member to the household depends on their current state. The value of 
being employed in sector i is given by:
w ; = w\ + E t(W ( 1  -  A4)W?+1 +  A% +1l  i = p,g, (2.7)
where (3t,t+k = Pk stochastic discount factor. The value of being employed
in a sector depends on the current wage, as well as, the continuation value of the job that 
depends on the separation probability. Under the assumption of directed search, the 
unemployed are searching for a job either in the private or in the public sector, with 
value functions given by:
u i = Vf Ut\  + E A ,t+ i b W +1 +  (1 -  pIW ,+i], i = p,g.  (2 .8 )
^c(Q) 9t)
Beside the marginal utility from unemployment, the value of being unemployed and 
searching in a particular sector, depends on the probabilities of finding a job and the 
value of working in that sector. Optimality implies that there are movements between 
the two segments that guarantee that there is no additional gain of searching in one sector 
vis-a-vis the other:
Uf =  Ui =  Ut. (2.9)
This equality determines the share of unemployed searching in each sector. We can
fP-Mmfo i + no*
mlEt\W?+ l - V M } mst Et[Wi+ l - U t+1]
(1 - * )  ~  s t ’
which implicitly defines st . An increase in the value of being employed in the public 
sector, driven either by an increase in the wage or by a decrease in the separation rate,
raises st , until there is no extra gain from searching in that sector. Under the directed
search assumption the public sector wage plays a key role in determining st . If the search 
was random between sectors, the public sector wage would not affect any variable of the 
model.
2.2.4 P rivate sector firms
The representative firm hires labour to produce the private consumption goods. The 
production function is linear in labour, but part of the resources produced have to be 
used to pay the cost of posting vacancies
yt = avtlpt - ^ v ^ .  (2.11)
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At time £, the level of employment is predetermined and the firm can only control the 
number of vacancies it posts. The value of opening a vacancy is given by:
v, = m , t+1l £ j t+1 +  (1  -  <g)VM ] -  (2 .1 2 )
where Jt is the value of a job for the firm, given by:
Jt = at ~  wt T EtPi,t+i[(l ~  ^p)Jt+i]- (2.13)
Free entry guarantees that the value of posting a vacancy is zero (V* =  0), so we can 
combine the two equations into:
J  =  Et0t,t+1[a?+l -  < +1 +  (1  -  ) ? ) £ - ] .  (2.14)
Qt Qt+i
The condition states that the expected cost of hiring a worker must equal its expected 
return. The benefit of hiring an extra worker is the discounted value of the expected 
difference between its marginal productivity and its wage, plus the continuation value,
knowing that with a probability \ p the match is destroyed.
Finally, I consider the private sector wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between 
workers and firms. The sharing rule is given by:
(1 - b ) ( W ? - U t) = bJt. (2.15)
2.2.5 G overnm ent
The government produces its goods using a linear technology on labour. As in the private 
sector, the costs of posting vacancies are deducted from production.
gt =  aflf -  q9v9t . (2.16)
The government collects lump sum taxes to finance the wage bill:
Tt = w flf. (2.17)
The numeraire of this economy is the private consumption good. As the public good 
is not sold, it has no actual price. However, there is an implicit relative price given 
by the marginal rate of substitution. The formulation of the production function (2.16)
implies that the cost of recruiting is given in units of the public good. Alternatively, if
the cost was included in the budget constraint it would be expressed in units of private 
consumption.
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Finally, the government sets a policy for the sequence of vacancies and wage {if, 
wt+i}t^o' I assume it sets the wage one period in advance, at the time it posts the 
vacancies. As st is determined based on the expected future wages in the two sectors, the 
current public sector wage does not affect any variable in the model. There is no time 
inconsistency problem because, as taxes are lump sum, the government does not gain 
from setting a current wage different than promised. Throughout the paper I contrast 
two types of policies: (exogenous policies to help us understand the functioning of the 
model and the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy and the optimal policy - the one 
arising from the social planner’s problem.
2.2.6 D ecentralised  equilibrium
D efin ition  1  A decentralised equilibrium is a sequence of prices {rt , tuf } ^ D such that, 
given a sequence of government vacancies and wages {uf, wf+1} ^ 0, the household chooses 
a sequence of consumption {c*}£l0, and the fraction of unemployed members searching 
in the public sector st and firms choose private sector vacancies uf, such that: (i) the 
household maximises its lifetime utility; (ii) the share of unemployed searching in the 
public sector is such that the values of searching in the two sectors equalise (equation 2.10); 
(Hi) private sector vacancies satisfy the free entry condition (2 .14); (iv) the private wage 
w% solves the bargaining condition (2.15); (v) the private goods market clears: ct = yt; 
and (vi) the lump sum taxes rt are chosen to balance the government budget (equation 
2.17).
2.2.7 Social p lanner’s solution
As a benchmark for analysis, I consider the constrained efficient solution. The social 
planner’s problem is to maximize the consumers lifetime utility (2.4) subject to the labour 
market and technology constraints (2.1-2.3, 2.11 and 2.16). The first-order conditions are 
given by:
?  a i? r “ c ( c ‘+ i ' S i + l ) r / ,  " u (« < + l)  ^  » ? V <+1 n
^ = .. \ K1 - Tr ) K + 1 -----------—\) + (! - A )~3------7T~Z—yr~J)>Qt uc\cti9t) uc[ct+h 9t+l) Qt+ 1 (1 st+l)ut+l
(2.18)
4  =  p E t{ Us[Ct; u9 t+ l)  [(1—7?g)(af+1--------------------) +  ( i  -  A»)- 4 -  - ( 2 . 1 9 )
9t ug{ct,gt) + ug{ct+u g t+i) q3t + 1 st+1ut+i
ug(ct,gt)<;9v?r)9 =  uc{ct, g t^ tfr jP  . .
(1 -T}9)st (1 -  rjP)(l -  st) ’
Conditions 2.18 and 2.19 describe the optimal private and public sector vacancies.
On the left hand side we have the expected cost of hiring an extra worker. The right 
hand side gives us the marginal social benefit of hiring an additional worker. It consists 
of its expected marginal productivity minus the utility cost of working, weighted by
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the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, plus the continuation value. The last 
element that enters with a negative sign reflects the fact tha t hiring an additional worker 
makes it harder for both sectors to recruit a worker in the future.
The optimal split of the unemployed between sectors, pinned down in (2.20), depends 
on the marginal utility of consumption of both goods, on the number of vacancies and 
their cost, and on the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in both sectors.
2.3 Calibration
To solve the model, I assume a CES utility function in logs, which allows us to address 
different elasticities of substitution between the two consumption goods. The utility of 
unemployment is linear.
u(ct,gt) = —ln[c] +  C9t\, v{ut) = X^t- 
7
The model is calibrated to match the US economy at a quarterly frequency. The first 
graph in Figure 2.2 shows the government employment in the United States since 1947. 
Under the baseline calibration, the steady-state vacancies in the public sector are such 
that public sector employment corresponds to the sample average i.e. 16 percent of total 
employment.
The second graph shows the monthly separation rate for the two sectors, taken from 
the Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The separation rate in the 
private sector is almost 3 times higher than in the government: 4.3 against 1.5 percent. 
The last graph plots the new hires of each sector as a share on the total unemployed, a 
proxy for the job-finding rate. The probability of finding a job in the government sector 
is only 4.5 percent compared with 62.5 percent in the private sector. To retrieve the 
quarterly separation rate, I first calculate the aggregate monthly separation rate (0.038) 
and job-finding rate (0.67). I then compute the quarterly transition probabilities, allowing 
for multiple transitions within the quarter.3 I find that an employed person has a 5.3 
percent probability of being unemployed in the following quarter. I fix the separation 
rate in the private and public sectors at 0.06 and 0.03. These values imply an aggregate 
separation rate close to 0.053 while preserving the difference between the two sectors.
To estimate the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, I regress for each sector 
the log of the job-finding rate (the ratio between hires in tha t sector and unemployment) 
on the log of tightness (the ratio between job openings in tha t sector and unemployment).
3I compute these probabilities using the following formulas:
A? =  (Am) ( / m)(Am) +  (Am)( l -  / m)(l -  f m ) +  (1 -  Am)( l -  Am)(Am) +  (1 -  Am)(Am)(l -  f m ),
! q =  ( / m)(Am) ( / m) +  ( / m)( l  -  Am)( l -  Am) +  (1 -  f m ) (  1 -  +  (1 -  / m) ( / m)( 1 -  A™).
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Figure 2.2: Evidence for the United States
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Note: The government employment series is taken from the Current Employment S tatistics survey (Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics). The grey bars indicate the NBER recession dates. The job-separation and 
job-finding rates are calculated from the Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey.
The estimated coefficients are 0.63 for the private sector and 0.79 for the public sector 
which suggest that vacancies are more important determinants of matches in the public 
sector.4 I set the public sector matching elasticity with respect to unemployment, 77s, at 
0.2 and r f  at 0.5, slightly higher than the estimated value but in line with estimates from 
the literature (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).
A recent paper by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2009) provides some insights 
into the duration of vacancies by sector. They use JOLTS data to study the behaviour 
of vacancies and hiring. After adjusting the data, they estimate that the duration of a 
vacancy is 30 days for the government and 20 days for the private sector. I calibrate the 
matching efficiency /T to reproduce these numbers (q9 =  3.9 and q9 = 2.5).
The United Kingdom has a unique source of data on recruitment costs. Every year, the 
Chartered Institute of Personal Development carries out a survey of recruitment practices 
of around 800 organizations from different sectors: manufacturing and production, private 
sector services, public sector services and voluntary, community and not-for-profit (CIPD 
(2009)). The costs of recruiting a worker, which encompass advertising and agency costs, 
are for the median firm around £4000, corresponding to roughly 8  weeks of the median 
income in the United Kingdom. On average, these costs are 40 percent lower in the public 
sector.5 I take these values as indicative that the cost per hire is lower in the public sector. 
I consider the cost of posting a vacancy to be 2 in the private sector and 1.1 in the 
public sector. Given that the duration of a vacancy is higher in the public sector, these 
values imply that the average cost of recruiting expressed in the same units is 15 percent 
lower than in the private sector. Under this calibration, the sum of recruitment costs is
4Strictly speaking, these regressions are only correct if the share of unemployed searching in the 
public sector is constant. However, in Section 2.8 I estimate the structural model and find similar values.
5Also, the median firm takes 12 weeks to recruit a new worker while in the public sector it takes 30
percent longer. See appendix for the disaggregated values. Another study by the National Audit Office
(2009) that analyses the recruitment practices in the central government finds that it takes 16 weeks to
recruit a new worker, costing between £1600 and £2200, which is consistent with the CIPD study.
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close to 3 percent of the total labour costs, value found in Russo, Hassink, and Gorter 
(2005). It also implies that the cost of recruiting per hire equals to around 5 to 7 weeks 
of wages, which is consistent with the evidence for the United Kingdom and with the 
study by Boca and Rota (1998).
Estimates of public sector wage premium have proved quite sensitive to the country 
choice, education and sex of a worker or even the sub-sector of the government. The 
survey by Gregory and Borland (1999) places the premium between 0 and 10 percent. I 
set it close to the lower bound, at 2 percent (7r = ^  = 1.02).
The empirical evidence relative to the substitution elasticity between private and 
government consumption is not conclusive. Evans and Karras (1998) find that private 
consumption is complement to military expenditure and substitute to non-military ex­
penditure. Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) disaggregate expenditure into “public goods” 
(defence, public order, and justice) and “merit goods” (health, education, and other ser­
vices). They find tha t “public goods” are substitutes and “merit goods” are complements 
to private consumption. As it is hard to select one value for 7 , I consider an elasticity 
of substitution of 1 ( 7  =  0.0). In Section 2.7 I discuss the cases where the goods are 
substitutes ( 7  =  0.5) and complements ( 7  =  —0.5). The parameter £, that reflects the 
preference for government services, is chosen such that the optimal level of public sector 
employment is 0.15.
For the model to satisfy the Hosios condition in the private sector, the worker’s share in 
the Nash bargaining is set at 0.5. The value of leisure in the utility function is calibrated, 
such tha t the unemployment rate in steady-state is 0.06 and implies an outside option 
equivalent to 42 percent of the average wage. Technology in both sectors is normalised 
to 1 and the discount factor is set at 0.99. Table 2.2 summarises the baseline calibration 
and the implied steady-state values for some of the variables.
Table 2.2: Baseline calibration
P aram eters
dP 1 7f 0.5 2.0 /jP 1.71 Xp 0.06 I9 0.15
a9 1 T)9 0 . 2 1.1 [i9 1.97 X9 0.03 7r 1 .0 2
7 0 c 0.18 X 0.46 (3 0.99 b 0.5
S tea d y -sta te  variables
u 0.06 qg 2.5 f g 0.075 p9 0.37 s 0 . 2 0
^PyP^gyQ^L
53 wlll 0.029
lp 0.79 3.9 f p 0.79 p 9  0.99 ^ 0.42 W 9 - UW P - U 2.69
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2.4 A ttaining the steady-state constrained efficient 
allocation
The constrained efficient steady-state allocation consists of a triplet of {vp, v9, 5 }. In 
order to achieve it, the government can post the optimal number of vacancies directly, 
but it still has to induce an optimal share of the unemployed searching for public sector 
jobs. The government can do so by choosing an appropriate level of the public sector 
wage.
P ro p o sitio n  1 I f  the government sets the optimal level of public sector vacancies and 
sets a wage such that the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs is optimal 
then, if the bargaining power of the workers is equal to the matching elasticity with respect 
to unemployment in the private sector (b = r f) , the steady-state level of vacancies in the 
private sector is optimal.
The proof is in the Appendix. In a one-sector model, a firm’s vacancy posting be­
haviour entails a positive and a negative externality: it increases the probability of an 
unemployed finding a job but reduces the other firms’ probability of filling a vacancy. 
The decentralised equilibrium is efficient if the share of the surplus of a match that goes 
to the firm (1 — b) is equal to the importance of vacancies in the matching process ( l —rf), 
in what is usually called the Hosios condition. When we include the public sector, be­
sides the externalities of public sector vacancies there are also the ones arising from the 
directed search. If more unemployed search in the public sector, the probability of filling 
a vacancy is higher in the public sector but lower for private sector firms. W hat this 
proposition states is that if the government is able to internalise the externalities in v9, 
w9, the vacancies in the private sector will also be efficient, provided that the Hosios 
condition is satisfied.
Let us assume the government sets its wage as a premium over the private sector 
wage: id9 = irwp. Even though we cannot get an analytical solution for the optimal wage 
ratio, we can find it numerically. Under the baseline calibration the optimal public sector 
wage is 3% lower than in the private sector. This value depends mainly on the difference 
between the friction parameters in the public and private sectors. Figure 2.3 shows how 
the optimal wage ratio varies with the parameters of the public sector.6
When the cost of posting vacancies is lower or when the matching depends more on 
vacancies (lower r]9), it is more efficient to have more vacancies and fewer unemployed 
searching in the public sector. In order to induce it, the government should pay less to 
its workers. When the separation rate decreases or the matching becomes more efficient,
6The Appendix shows how the optimal share of unemployed searching in the two sectors, unemploy­
ment rate and wages in the two sectors vary with the parameters.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal steady-state public-private wage ratio
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more unemployed turn into the public sector, but it is optimal to have fewer. The private 
incentive is not efficient and, thus, the government should offer lower wages to correct it.
The optimal wage ratio does not depend on the coefficients of the utility function:
7  and (, but it depends on the disutility of working (x) and on the productivity of the 
public sector. Higher \ > raises the value of employment in the private sector relative to 
the public sector, because people are more likely to have another spell of unemployment 
there. As it induces more unemployed to search in the private sector, the government 
needs to offer higher wages to offset it. If government jobs are less productive, the relative 
cost of posting vacancies is higher because the marginal utility of public sector goods goes 
up. Although the social planner wants fewer government jobs, it prefers the new matches 
to be driven by the unemployment side, which requires higher public sector wages.
To investigate the consequences of paying more to public sector employees, I compare 
the unemployment rate and households’ welfare when the public sector wage is optimal 
(a gap of 3 percent) with the baseline case (a premium of 2 percent). The unemployment 
rate which was calibrated to 6  percent in the baseline steady-state, falls to 5 percent 
when the government sets the optimal wage. This happens because many unemployed 
that were queuing for public sector jobs, now find it more attractive to search in the 
private sector (from 20 to 3 percent), boosting job creation. The public sector wage is 
an important determinant of equilibrium unemployment. In terms of welfare, moving to 
the optimal wage generates a gain of 0 .6  percent of steady-state consumption.
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2.5 The effects of fiscal shocks
In this framework there are several fiscal shocks. We can distinguish shocks to wages from 
shocks to employment. Furthermore, an employment shock can be driven by hirings or 
by separations. We can represent the fiscal shocks as:
ln(Af) =  \n(X9) +  e[, wgt =  w9, v f =  v9\
\n(vf) =  ln(u5) +  €t, w f = w9\ 
ln(iu?) =  ln(u;5) +  ef, If = I9.
The shocks e\ follow and AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.8. We 
start from the baseline steady-state. I assume that, under a hiring shock, the government 
holds the public sector wage constant, while under a wage shock it maintains the level 
of employment constant.7 Finally, under the separation shock, I consider that both the 
wage and vacancies are kept at their steady-state level.
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses of the variables to a separation rate and 
a vacancies shock that generate an increase of 6 . 6  percent of public sector employment, 
equivalent to 1 percentage point of the labour force. The peak in government employment 
takes place 10 quarters after the shock. For comparison, I consider a shock to wages of
6 .6  percent. In terms of magnitude, they are equivalent to a fiscal stimulus of 1 percent 
of aggregate income.
Both employment shocks crowd out private sector employment through three chan­
nels. First, as there are fewer unemployed available, the cost of hiring an extra worker 
increases. Second, either because the probability of getting a job is higher or the separa­
tion rate is lower, more unemployed search in the public sector, which further reduces the 
firms’ vacancy-filling probability. Finally, as the overall job-finding probability increases 
so does the value of being unemployed, which raises the private sector wage through the 
wage bargaining.
Now, the question is whether the crowding out of private sector employment is par­
tial, or whether it outweighs the increase in public sector employment and raises unem­
ployment. Following the separation rate shock, the unemployment rate declines by 0.2 
percentage points, but a vacancies shock raises the unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage 
points. There are two explanations for these reversed effects. First, an increase in em­
ployment through hiring induces many more unemployed to look for public sector jobs,
7I could alternatively assume that under the wage shock the vacancies are constant. If the gov­
ernment sets the number of vacancies, as more unemployed search for government jobs, public sector 
employment increases after a wage shock. Under this policy, the shock to wages also incorporates a shock 
to employment. This does not change qualitatively the results.
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Figure 2.4: Response to fiscal shocks (Baseline steady-state)
U nem ploym ent R ate Private  E m ploym ent
o
-0 3
- 0.6
-0.9
-1.2
40 C 5 10 15 20
Quarters
25 30 35 40
S hare  of u n e m ployed  se a rch in g  fo r f
V acanc ies  -  p rivate  se c to r
Private  s e c to r  w age
8
06
0 2
0
-0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0 5 10 25 30 35 40
V acancies -  pub lic  se c to r
Pub lic  Em ploym ent
Public s e c to r  w age
*
Note: Solid line (vacancies shock); dash line (separations shock) and dotted line (wage shock). The 
response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate 
and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points difference 
from the steady-state.
rather than if it is done through retention of workers. Under the hiring shock, the share 
of unemployed searching for public sector jobs goes up by 12  percentage points, but only 
by 2 percentage points following a separation shock. Additionally, the effect of a vacancy 
shock on the private sector wage is four times stronger than the shock to separations.
An increase in the public sector wage reduces private sector employment via two 
channels. On the one hand, the increase of the public sector wage spills over to the private 
sector, with an elasticity of around 0.05. On the other hand, it induces more unemployed 
to search for a job in the public sector, which reduces the probability of filling a vacancy 
for the firms. As a consequence, they posts fewer vacancies and unemployment rises.
All the fiscal shocks raise the private sector wage, even in the presence of a negative 
wealth effect. As they crowd out private production, they raise the marginal utility of 
private consumption lowering the relative value of leisure. The increase in the probability 
of finding a job in the public sector or its value is large enough to offset this effect.
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Figure 2.5: Response of unemployment rate to fiscal shocks (baseline and efficient steady 
state)
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Note: Solid line (efficient steady-state) and dash line (baseline steady-state). The response is in percent­
age points difference from the steady-state.
Figure 2.5 compares the response of the unemployment rate to fiscal shocks when 
we start from the efficient steady-state. With lower steady-state public sector wages, 
a hiring shock reduces unemployment, as opposed to when we start from the baseline 
steady-state. When the government opens new vacancies, if the wage rate is high, many 
more unemployed queue for these positions, thus enhancing the crowding out effect on 
private sector job creation.
The opposite effect of the different types of fiscal shocks on unemployment is an 
important result. The vast literature that tries to understand the effects of government 
spending tends to be inconclusive. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) find that after a 
military expenditure shock (both military purchases and employment) real wages go 
up, but Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) find 
that after a government military purchases shock real wages go down. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), as well as Fatas and Mihov (2001) find that private consumption increases 
after a government consumption shock but Mountford and Uhlig (2008) and Ramey 
(2009) report a negative or zero response. Most of the discussion has focused on the 
technical methodology, particularly on the identification of fiscal shocks. In light of my 
results, I think the contradictory evidence might not due to methodological issues. Fiscal 
policy shocks can have different effects depending on the type of expenditure considered. 
Increasing the wage of all employees by 1 percent is different from increasing employment 
by 1 percent. The model even suggests that the effects of government employment can 
be different, depending if the adjustment takes place through hiring or separations.
2.6 Public  sector policies and the  business cycle
One of the main conclusions of the Real Business Cycle literature is that governments 
should not pursue active business cycle policies. Although the model is, in essence, a 
real business cycle model with only real frictions, the policy prescription is quite differ­
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ent. Let us examine the effects of a 1 percent negative private technology shock on the 
economy, under alternative government policies. I again consider an AR(1) shock with 
autoregressive coefficient of 0.9.
ln(af) =  ln(ap) +  e“.
Figure 2.6 shows the impulse responses, starting from the efficient steady-state, when 
the government follows the optimal rule. I contrast the optimal policy with simple rules 
for vacancies and wage as follows:
log(uf) =  \og{v9) + ipv[\og(v?)-\og(vp)], (2 .2 1 )
log(iuf+1) =  log(iDff) +  V>“ [log(w£) -  log(wp)]. (2 .2 2 )
Existing evidence by Lane (2003) and Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008) suggest 
that public sector wages are less procyclical than private sector wages, particularly in 
the United States .8 For the sake of simplicity, I consider two cases where the public 
sector wage is acyclical =  0). In the first one, the public sector vacancies decline 
proportionally to increases in private sector vacancies (rtpv = — 1). In the second, they are 
acyclical (ijjv = 0 ).
After the negative productivity shock, private sector firms post fewer vacancies, the 
probability of finding a job there falls and the unemployed increase their search for public 
sector jobs. The unemployment rate increases at most by 0.05 percentage points, much 
less than after fiscal shocks. As pointed out by Shimer (2005), search and matching 
models are not able to generate enough fluctuations on unemployment in response to 
technology shocks.
The optimal government policy is to have countercyclical vacancies and procyclical 
wages. The argument for hiring more people in recessions is one of sector reallocation, 
different from the traditional demand argument (bringing to mind the famous metaphor 
of digging holes and covering them). If the private sector has lower productivity, it is 
better for the economy to absorb part of the unused labour force into the public sector. 
If the government jobs were not productive, it would not be optimal to hire anyone in 
the first place.
On the other hand, the public sector wage should follow the decline of the private 
sector wage. In recessions, if the government keeps its wage constant, it becomes more 
attractive relative to the private sector, thus increasing the share of unemployed searching
Additionally, a study by Devereux and Hart (2006) using micro data for the United Kingdom finds 
that for job movers in the private sector the wages are procyclical but for the public sector they are 
acyclical.
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Figure 2.6: Response to a private sector technology shock under different policies
U nem ploym ent Rate Private  E m ploym ent P ublic  Em ploym ento
-0.1
-o J
-0.4
5 20
Quarters
25 30 35 4040 0 10 15
S h a re  o f unem ployed  se a rch in g  fo r P Private s e c to r  w age Public  s e c to r  w ageo
-0.2
-0.4
-OS
-0 H
40 0 5 10 15 25 30 35 40
V acanc ies  -  p rivate  se c to r V acancies -  pub lic  se c to r G overnm en t spend ing
2.5
i
■ 5
05
0
5 10 15 25 30 35 4040 0
Note: Solid line (optimal policy); dash line (countercyclical vacancies and acyclical wages) and dotted 
line (acyclical vacancies and wages). The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state 
value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, 
which is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.
for public sector jobs. This reduces the vacancy-filling probability in the private sector, 
which further dampens job creation and amplifies the business cycle. We can see that 
under the two exogenous rules, the response of unemployment is much stronger. There is 
an increase of 1 .6  percentage points of the share of unemployed searching of public sector 
jobs, much higher than under the optimal policy (0 .0 2  percentage points).
Table 2.3 compares the standard deviation of the key variables under the alternative 
policies, as well as when there is no public sector. If the government follows the optimal 
rule, the presence of public sector employment stabilises unemployment. However, if 
public sector wages are acyclical the volatility of unemployment increases twofold. The 
effects of the presence of public sector employment on the volatility of unemployment 
depends crucially on the government’s business cycle policy. The last column presents 
the welfare cost of business cycles under the different scenarios.9 When the public sector
9See the Appendix for details.
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Table 2.3: Business cycle properties under the different policies
Policy Standard deviations Correl Welfare
If u t Vw f (If, u t ) cost
No government 0.0007 — 0.0007 0.024 — 0.028%
Optimal policy 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.024 0.97 0.023%
1II5cfII0) 
p 
\
6
0.0159 0.0830 0.0014 0.023 0.18 0 .1 0 1 %
Rule (ipw =  0, if>v = 0) 0.0132 0.0673 0.0014 0.023 0.27 0.077%
is absent, the welfare cost of fluctuations is very small - around 0.028 percent of steady- 
state consumption. This is a well known result. When the public sector is present, under 
the optimal policy, the welfare cost of fluctuations is lower, but if the government wages 
do not respond to the cycle, it can be up to four times higher.
In their paper, Quadrini and Trigari (2007) have two conclusions contrary to mine. 
First, that the best policy to stabilize total employment is to have procyclical public 
sector employment. Second, that the presence of the public sector increases the volatility 
of unemployment. In their model, the government does not choose their wage opti­
mally. Instead, it sets a wage premium exogenously, which explains the disparity of the 
conclusions. As we have seen in the previous section, under a high public sector wage 
premium, after a hiring shock, the crowding out of the private sector employment can 
be more than complete, resulting in higher unemployment. This switch alters the policy 
recommendations for government employment.
2.7 E xtensions10
2.7.1 G overnm ent services as goods bought from th e private 
sector
To compare the results with the ones from a typical model of government consumption, 
I construct an extension where there is no public sector employment (If = 0), but where 
the government buys its goods from the private sector (ct +  gt = yt)- I am interested 
in the response to a government consumption shock of 6 .6  percent (Figure 2.7) and the 
optimal response of government consumption to a negative technology shock.
There are three main differences relative to the benchmark model. First, the effects of 
a fiscal shock on private sector employment and wages are the opposite from the model 
with public sector employment. The wages go down because the reduction of private 
consumption raises its marginal utility, lowering the value of unemployment. Because of 
the direct stimulus, private employment goes up and unemployment goes down.
10All figures can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.7: Response to a government consumption shock
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The second difference is the magnitude of the response of unemployment. A shock 
of 6 .6  percent in government spending only reduces unemployment by 0.008 percentage 
points. Both technology and government consumption shocks have a small quantitative 
effect on unemployment. However, as public sector employment or wage shocks strike 
directly in the labour market, they have a much stronger effect. Finally, the differences 
are also visible in the optimal business cycle policy. In recessions, the government should 
buy fewer goods from the private sector, in order to equate the marginal utility of the 
two goods.
2.7.2 Productive sector public em ploym ent
A recent paper by Linnemann (2009) finds, in the context of a VAR, that a government 
employment shock generates a positive response in the private sector employment. I 
want to see if this can be generated within the model, if we consider that public sector 
employment affects the productivity of the private sector. I consider that private sector 
technology follows:
ln(af) =  ln(ap) + a[ln(/f) -  ln(P)]. (2.23)
I look at the responses of unemployment and private sector employment to a separation 
and vacancies shocks for different values of a. For higher levels of a, the crowding out 
effect on private employment is lower and, therefore, it has a larger negative impact on 
unemployment. However, even with a value as high as 0.4, the crowding out is still 
substantial.
2.7.3 Different elasticities of substitution between goods
I have also examined the cases where the goods are substitutes or complements. Regard­
ing employment shocks, the qualitative results do not depend on 7 , and even quantita­
tively the differences are small. If the goods are complements, the increase in government 
services raises the marginal utility of the private good, so the negative effect on private
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sector employment is smaller. If they are substitutes, the household reduces more private 
consumption, leading to a bigger crowding out of private sector employment.
W ith respect to the optimal business cycle policy, the result of counter-cyclical vacan­
cies is only overturned if the goods are strong complements. If that is the case, during a 
recession, as the marginal utility of the government services falls with the consumption 
of the private good, the government should also decrease its vacancies. However, in all 
scenarios the public sector wage should follow the decline of the private sector wage.
2.7 .4  O ptim al policy  under alternative sources o f fluctuations
When discussing the optimal policy along the business cycle, I assumed it was generated 
by technology shocks from which the public sector was isolated. Now, I consider two 
alternative sources of fluctuations: an aggregate technology shock and a shock to the 
discount factor.
The result of procyclical wages holds for the two shocks, but the result of counter­
cyclical vacancies is reversed. Following an economy-wide technological shock, as the 
public sector is also less productive, the argument for sector reallocation does not hold 
and the government should also decrease its vacancies. If people become more impatient, 
the present discounted value of a vacancy goes down. As it affects both sectors symmet­
rically, both the private sector and the government should decrease their vacancies and 
wages.
2.8 How im portant is the directed search between  
the public and the private sector?
The theoretical model has one important policy prescription: government wages should 
keep track of the private sector wages over the business cycle. If not, the volatility of 
unemployment is higher because of the fluctuation of the share of unemployed searching 
for public sector jobs. It is clear that this result is entirely driven by the directed search 
assumption. The aim of this section is to show that the assumption is realistic. I begin 
by presenting some evidence from micro-econometric studies.
As mentioned previously, public sector wage premium varies substantially within 
groups. As reported in Gregory and Borland (1999), the premium is much higher for 
females, veterans and minorities, and it is higher for federal government employees com­
pared to state or local government employees. There are also differences across education 
levels. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that in the two previous decades, more educated 
individuals tend to be paid less in the public sector, while individuals with less education
45
PART I. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
tend to receive a higher premium. If people can direct their search, these differences 
should have repercussions.
Gregory and Borland (1999) report a number of studies that have found the existence 
of queues for federal public jobs. For example, Venti (1985) finds that for each federal 
government job opening, there are 2 . 8  men and 6 .1  times as many women that want the 
job. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that blue collar workers are willing to queue to obtain 
public sector jobs, whereas highly-skilled workers are difficult to recruit and retain in 
the public sector. A recent study for the United Kingdom by Postel-Vinay and Turon 
(2007) also finds evidence of job queuing for public sector jobs among low-employability 
individuals, who face larger potential premia from working there.
Most studies tha t estimate the public sector wage premium use switching regression 
models. The idea is tha t the unemployed can self-select to work in the sectors in which 
they have more advantages. Blank (1985) finds that, among other factors, sectoral choice 
is influenced by wage comparison. Heitmueller (2006) manages to quantify this effect and 
finds that an increase of 1 percent in the expected wage in the public sector increases the 
probability of being employed in that sector by 1.3 for men and 2.9 percent for women.
The micro evidence supports the directed search assumption, but it does not imply 
that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the mechanism plays a role over the business 
cycle. In this section, I estimate a log-linearized version of the model using Bayesian 
methods as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Sala, Soderstrom, and Trigari (2008). The 
main purpose is to evaluate the mechanism of directed search between the two sectors. 
Additionally, I can also assess the cyclicality of the public sector wages and vacancies, as 
well as get estimates for some of the key friction parameters.
2.8.1 E stim ation  prelim inaries
In order to test if the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs fluctuates 
over the business cycle, I modify the equation determining it (2.10). The log-linearised 
expression is:
st = «(1 -  s)E t(x9t+l -  xpt+1 -  mf +  mf), (2.24)
where x\ is the log-deviations from steady-state of W[ — U From the original expression, 
I have added the parameter k that measures the significance of the mechanism. If it is 
close to 0 , the data does not support the assumption. As in the theoretical section, I 
assume two rules for public sector wages and vacancies. However, I consider that each
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variable responds to a moving average of the private counterpart:
V 3 \r\(vp )
ln(uf) =  ln(®») +  V l ^ i=0 4 ( ~ ln(Sp)] +  In K ) ,
ln(iu?+1) =  ln(iD9) +  r p= oH ™ U ) _  ,n^ j j  +
Following one of the extensions, I allow the private sector technology to depend par­
tially on the level of public sector employment, though a coefficient a , to be estimated.
In(aJ) =  ln(ap) +  a  (In (If) -  ln(/"5)) +  ln(a£).
I use US quarterly data from 1948:1 to 2007:1 for 6  variables: unemployment rate, 
government employment (% of labour force), government per employee real wage, pri­
vate sector per hour real wage, aggregate job-separation rate and aggregate job-finding 
rate. The series of government per employee real wage is calculated by dividing the com­
pensation of government workers from the NIPA tables by the government employment. 
The monthly job-finding and job-separation rates are taken from Shimer (2007) and are 
transformed into quarterly, by allowing for multiple transitions between the two states 
within the quarter. All other variables are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I include 6  different shocks: government vacancies, government wages, separation rates 
in both sectors, bargaining power and private sector technology. The variables enter the 
estimation in demeaned log-differences.11
I calibrate the utility function parameter £ to be equal to 0.18, (3 to 0.99 and I 
normalise the technology in both sectors to 1. In each iteration, the steady-state public 
sector vacancies are set such that, in equilibrium, the employment in the sector is 0.15 
while the steady-state public sector wage is set as a premium over the private sector. 
Instead of establishing the prior over the matching efficiencies, I opt for doing it on the 
steady-state probability of filling a vacancy .
I assume that the matching elasticities with respect to unemployment, the steady- 
state bargaining power of the unemployed and the autoregressive coefficients of the shock 
process have a Beta distribution. I assume that the standard deviations of the shocks 
have an inverse gamma distribution. All other parameters are assumed to be normally 
distributed. Given the strong evidence presented in Section 2.3, the prior mean for the 
separation rates is 0.06 for the private and 0.03 for the public sector. Also, the prior mean
n With the exception of the wages, all other variables are stationary. As a robustness check, I have 
also estimated the model with the stationary variables entering in levels and the wages in demeaned 
log-differences. The posterior distributions are quite close between the two versions. The results, as well 
as all the equations of the model in its log-linearized form and the relation of the observable variables to 
the model’s variables can be found in the Appendix.
47
PART I. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
of q1 is 3.9 for the private (duration of a vacancy of 20 days) and 2.5 for the public sector 
(30 days). However, as the matching elasticity in the public sector came from a back- 
of-the-envelope calculation, I start with the prior that the mean and standard deviation 
are the same across sectors. The prior distribution of k and of the business cycle policy 
parameters is centered around 0 with a standard deviation of 0.3.
2.8.2 R esu lts
I estimate the model with Bayesian methods (see An and Schorfheide (2007) for a re­
view). The likelihood function of the model is combined with the prior distribution of 
the parameters to obtain the posterior distribution. Subsequently, 2,000,000 draws of 
the posterior are generated with the Metropolis Hastings algorithm, where the step size 
is chosen such that the acceptance rate is around 1/3. The draws are divided into two 
chains with different starting values. The first 2,500 draws of each chain are dropped. 
Given the recent studies alerting for identification problems in DSGE models (Canova 
and Sala (2009)), I have done estimations with simulated data. Although there are sev­
eral parameters that are not identified using the data, the main parameters of interest 
are, namely: k, ipw, , r]p, rj9 and all the parameters of the shock processes.
Table 2.4 reports the prior distribution and the mean, the 5th and the 95th percentile 
of the posterior distribution of the parameters. The mean of the posterior distribution 
of k is close 0.5 with a 90 percent interval between 0.4 and 0.6. This suggests that, 
although st does not fluctuate as much as the model predicts, the mechanism still has 
explanatory power. W ith respect to the policy, there is a strong countercyclical policy in 
vacancies with an estimated mean close to —0.9. Public sector wage policy seems slightly 
procyclical, with the posterior mean of i\)w of around 0.4.
The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is much lower 
in the public sector. The posterior mean for the private sector is around 0.65, but only 
0.16 in the public sector. The steady-state vacancy filling probability in both sectors do 
not seem to be identified, as well as the cost of posting vacancies in the public sector 
and the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods. The posterior 
mean of the cost of posting vacancies in the private sector is around 1.6. The posterior 
distributions of both separation rates are very similar, both centered at 0.015.
The posterior mean of the flow value of unemployment is around 0.35, while of the 
bargaining power is around 0.6. The posterior distribution of a  is centered around 0.15. 
This value suggests that public employment might increase the productivity of the private 
sector or, alternatively, it might be capturing demand effects that are absent from the 
model.12
12I have also estimated the model for three subsamples of roughly 20 years: 1948:1 to 1967:3, 1967:4 to
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Table 2.4: Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters
P aram eters Prior P oster ior  d istribution
d istr ib u tion Mean 5th-95th
Percentil
S tru ctu ra l param eters
Elasticity of substitution 7 Normal (0, 0.1) 0.014 (-0.129, 0.146)
Utility of unemployment X Normal (0.5, 0.1) 0.352 (0.245, 0.470)
Separation rate (private sector) Ap Normal (0.06, 0.01) 0.016 (0.010, 0.023)
Separation rate (public sector) Normal (0.03, 0.01) 0.015 (0.011, 0.019)
Cost of posting vacancy (private sector) Normal (2, 0.3) 1.628 (1.136, 2.121)
Cost of posting vacancy (public sector) c9 Normal (1.1, 0.2) 1.200 (0.886, 1.512)
Vacancy filling probability (private sector) 9" Normal (3.9, 0.2) 3.989 (3.700, 4.300)
Vacancy filling probability (public sector) qg Normal (2.5, 0.2) 2.486 (2.152, 2.796)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemp. (private) r f Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.647 (0.560, 0.753)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemp. (public) r f Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.159 (0.060, 0.258)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.10) 0.638 (0.537, 0.735)
Public sector wage premium 7T Normal (1.02, 0.01) 1.031 (1.017, 1.043)
Productivity of public employment a Normal (0, 0.1) 0.167 (0.082, 0.249)
Cyclicality of public sector wages i\)w Normal (0, 0.3) 0.428 (0.165, 0.685)
Cyclicality of public sector vacancies tPv Normal (0, 0.3) -0.937 (-1.225, -0.656)
Importance of directed search K Normal (0, 0.3) 0.479 (0.381, 0.579)
A u toregressive  param eters
Productivity Pa Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.987 (0.980, 0.994)
Public sector wage PW Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.973 (0.956, 0.990)
Public sector vacancies PV Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.281 (0.182, 0.383)
Private sector separation rate PIP Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.952 (0.917, 0.988)
Public sector separation rate pig Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.500 (0.265, 0.768)
Bargaining power Pb Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.936 (0.892, 0.977)
Standard  d ev ia tion s
Productivity a a IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.008 (0.007, 0.008)
Public sector wage a w IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.010, 0.012)
Public sector vacancies a v IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.439 (0.305, 0.554)
Private sector separation rate a ip IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.071 (0.064, 0.077)
Public sector separation rate a  ig IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.002, 0.021)
Bargaining power a b IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.033 (0.017, 0.056)
2.8.3 M odel com parison
To show how the model with directed search performs, I compare it with two alternative 
models: one where there are no fluctuations in the share of unemployed searching in 
the public sector (/c =  0 ) and the other with random search, where the new matches 
depend only on the relative number of vacancies. 13 I compare them from two angles. 
First, to see how well they explain the variables used in the estimation, I compare the 
logarithms of the marginal data density, computed using the Mean-Harmonic Estimator. 
An alternative way to compare the models is to look at the predictions for an unobserved
1987:2 and 1987:3 to 2007:1. The results can be found in the Appendix. The parameter k was important 
in the first two subperiods (posterior mean close to 0.5), but its importance has diminished during the 
period of the great moderation. The parameter a  was quite high during the first period (posterior mean 
close to 0.25), suggesting that there were strong complementarities in the production function which 
have disappeared in the last two decades. All other parameters are quite stable.
13Details in the Appendix.
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Table 2.5: Model Comparison
Marginal Prediction of vacancies Prediction of tightness
Data S td (v e) 
St d(vd)
C orrela tion std{%y C orrela tion
Density (ve, v d) Std(%)d a i r , ( vz ) d)
Directed search 3185.0 0.90 0.52 0.65 0.88
Directed search (k =  0) 3154.0 0.90 0.49 0.67 0.88
Random search 3151.0 0.79 0.68 0.59 0.76
Note: v  represents priva te sector vacancies. The superscript e refers to the estim ated series 
and d refers to the data (Help-wanted index).
variable. I use the Help-Wanted index as a proxy for private sector vacancies and look 
at its correlation with the predicted series, as well as compare the volatility of the two 
series. I also compare the prediction for labour market tightness. The results are shown 
in Table 2.5.
The marginal data density is higher for the directed search model. The numbers 
imply that we would need a prior probability over the directed search model parameters
5.8 * 1014(= exp(3185 — 3151)) times larger than our prior over the random search model 
in order to reject the fact tha t the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs 
fluctuates in response to shocks. The Random search model does slightly better than the 
Directed search model in terms of the correlation of predicted vacancies with the actual 
values, but it does worse in predicting the volatility of vacancies, as well as the moments 
of labour market tightness.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter examined the links between the public and the private sector through the 
labour market. I have built a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search 
and matching frictions to analyse the effects of fiscal shocks, as well as to understand the 
optimal employment and wage policy.
The main normative conclusion is tha t the government’s wage policy plays a key 
role in attaining the efficient allocation. In steady-state, the optimal public sector wage 
premium should reflect differences in the labour market friction parameters. Under the 
baseline calibration, the optimal wage is 3 percent below the private sector. In reality, 
all studies point to the existence of a wage premium in the public sector. Although there 
are other reasons for governments to set higher wages, namely to induce effort or to avoid 
corruption, they should weight its costs in terms of inefficiency in the labour market.
Over the business cycle, public sector wages should follow the wages in the private 
sector. Otherwise, in recessions too many people queue for public sector jobs and in 
expansions few people apply for them. Although I have abstracted from financing issues,
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a procyclical public sector wage policy has the advantage of requiring a lower tax burden 
in recessions. However, it also has problems. First, lowering public sector wages in 
recessions might be politically difficult to implement. Yet, to achieve efficiency in the 
labour market the only relevant wages are those of the new hires which are potentially 
easier to reduce in recessions. The second problem related to implementation is that 
wages in the public sector are usually decided annually. One possible solution is to index 
the wage growth in the public sector to private sector wage growth. Finally, I have 
ignored the insurance role of the government. If agents are risk averse, they would prefer 
to have a constant income profile throughout the business cycle, which is an argument 
for acyclical wages. While this is a valid line of reasoning, one has to realise that the 
intertemporal insurance is achieved at the cost of stronger fluctuations in unemployment.
Additionally, the baseline model suggests that it is optimal to have a leaning-against- 
the-wind, vacancies policy. While the result of procyclical wages is very robust, the result 
of counter-cyclical vacancies should be interpreted with caution because it does not hold 
in a number of settings: if the goods are complements, if the shocks affect both sectors 
symmetrically or if the steady-state public sector wage is higher than optimum.
The main positive conclusion is that the response of the labour market variables to 
fiscal shocks depends on the type of shock considered. A reduction of separations lowers 
unemployment, an increase in wages raises it, while hiring more people can increase or 
decrease unemployment. All shocks raise the wage and crowd out employment in the 
private sector. Conversely, when the government buys goods from the private sector, a 
fiscal shock lowers the wage and increases employment in the private sector. The mixed 
effects of the different components of government consumption on the labour market 
might be one reason why many empirical studies on the effects of government spending 
find ambiguous results.
Many of the model’s results rely on the assumption that the unemployed can direct 
their search between the private and the public sector. I believe tha t this mechanism 
is playing a significant role during the current recession. A casual look through the 
newspapers gives the impression that the unemployed are turning to the public sector for 
jobs, but also that the wages there have not suffered as much as in the private sector. 
Although governments were praised for their reactions against the economic crisis, they 
can still do better.
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2.10 A ppendix
2.10.1 D ata
Table A2 .1 : Data - CIPD
All Manufacturing Private sec­ Public Voluntary and
sectors and production tor services services not-for-profit
C ost o f  recru iting (£ )
Senior managers 15123 13396 18964 10452 8534
Managers and professionals 9738 8050 12393 6067 6471
Administrative, secretarial 4519 3680 5628 1935 4976
and technical
Services (costumer, per­ 8996 4565 13980 2327 1399
sonal and sales)
Manual, craft workers 2381 2498 2978 1898 1379
T im e to  fill a  vacancy (w eeks)
Senior managers 17.1 16.8 16.5 18 16.6
Managers and professionals 12.5 12.1 11.8 14.3 11.8
Administrative, secretarial 6.5 6.0 7.1 9.1 7.1
and technical
Services (costumer, per­
sonal and sales)
7.0 6.7 5.6 9.9 7.4
Manual, craft workers 5.9 5.2 4.5 8.3 6.3
Table A2.2: Data - definition and sources
Variable
7f Government employ- 
ment
•9 Government per em­
ployee real wage
D efin ition  and source
All Employees: Government (BLS)
Government consumption expenditures: 
Compensation of general government employ­
ees /  government employees, deflated by CPI 
(BEA-NIPA Tables and own calculation) 
Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
(BLS)
Civilian Unemployment Rate (BLS)
Index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspa­
pers (The Conference Board)
Job-separation rate (Shimer, own calculation 
for quarterly aggregation)
Job-finding rate (Shimer, own calculation for 
quarterly aggregation)
A vailab ility
w
w
Ut
v t
Business sector 
hourly real wage 
Unemployment rate 
Vacancies
At Separation rate 
ft Job-finding rate
1939ql-2008q3
1947ql-2008q2
1947ql- 2008q2
1948ql-2008q3  
1951ql- 2006q2
1948ql-2007ql
1948ql- 2007ql
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Figure A2.1: Looking at the data
G overnm ent Employment (% of labour force) Unemployment rate
B usiness sector hourly nominal w age G overnment per em ployee real w age
Government per em ployee nominal wage
Figure A2.2: Growth rate of Google keyword searches in the United Kingdom 
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 Government jobs  Jobs
Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the 
same four weeks in the previous year.
V acancies (Help w anted index)
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2.10.2 Steady-state optim al wages, search and unem ploym ent
Figures A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5 show the optimal steady-state wages in both sectors, the 
share of unemployed searching in the public sector and the unemployment rate as a 
function of the labour market friction parameters in the public sector, as well as the 
technology and utility function parameters.
Figure A2.3: Optimal steady-state public and private sector wages
O ptim al public  and  private  w ag e s O ptim al public and  private  w ages O ptim al public  a n d  private  w ages
2
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0.965 
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0945 
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O ptim al public  a n d  p rivate  w ages
0 8 0.85 0.9 0 95 115 1.2 1.25
O ptim al public  a n d  private  w ages
Note:
wages.
The solid line is the optim al public sector wage and the dash line is the optimal private sector
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Figure A2.4: Optimal steady-state share of unemployed searching in the public sector
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Figure A2.5: Optimal steady-state unemployment rate
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2.10.3 E xtensions
G O V . SERVICES AS GOODS BOUGHT FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Figure A2.6: Optimal policy with government consumption
U nem ploym ent Rate Private E m ploym ent P rivate  s e c to r  wage
0.03
0 OS
001
0 -0 040 20 25 30 3SS 10 15 S 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
V acancies -  p rivate se c to r Private consum ption
-0.
-0.
0 3010 15 20 25 35 40
Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment 
rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.
P r o d u c t i v e  s e c t o r  p u b l i c  e m p l o y m e n t
Figure A2.7: Response to a public employment shock
S epara tion  rate sh ock  (B aseline  SS)0,
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o
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N ote: Solid  line (a  =  0 .0 ); dash line (a  =  0 .2 ) and dotted  line (a  =  0 .4 ). The response o f the
p riva te  em ploym ent is in  percentage o f its  steady-sta te  value and unem ploym ent rate in  percentage points
difference from  steady-sta te .
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D i f f e r e n t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  b e t w e e n  g o o d s
As it is hard to select one value for 7 , I distinguish three cases: if the goods are sub­
stitutes ( 7  — 0.5), complements ( 7  =  —0.5) and one where the elasticity of substitution 
of 1 ( 7  =  0 .0 ). Figures A2.8, A2.9 and A2.10 show the impulse responses to the different 
fiscal shocks, for different levels of 7 .
Figure A2.8: Response to a public sector wage shock (Baseline steady-state)
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N ote: Solid line ('y =  0 .0);  dash line ( j  =  0 .5)  and dotted  line ('y =  —0 .5). The response o f the variables
is in  percentage o f th eir s teady-sta te  value, except fo r  the unem ploym ent rate and the share o f unem ployed
searching fo r  public sec to r jobs, which is in percentage po in ts difference from  the steady-sta te .
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Figure A2.9: Response to a public sector vacancies shock (Baseline steady-state)
U nem ploym ent R ate Private  E m ploym ent
0.4
C 35
03
038
0.2
0 15
0.1
:> of>
o
-0 05
-0.1
o 5 10 25 30 35 40
Quarters
S h a re  o f unem ployed  s e a rc h in g  fo r f
12
'0
8
6
2
00 25 30 35 405 10 15
V acanc ies  -  p rivate  s e c to r
0 5 10 15 25 30 35 40
J o b  finding ra te  -  p rivate  s e c to r
Quarters
Private s e c to r  w age
Pub lic  E m ploym ent
o 5 10 15 25 30 35 40
Public s e c to r  w age
V acancies -  public  s e c to r
Jo b  finding rate  -  pub lic  s e c to r
70
60
60
40
30
20
to
o 5 10 15 20
Quarters
25 30 35 40
Quarters
Probability  o f filling a  v a ca n cy  -  p rivate  se c to r
*
G overnm en t sp e n d in g
Quarters
Note: Solid line fy  =  0.0); dash line ('y =  0.5) and dotted line ('y = -0 .5 ) .  The response of the variables 
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed 
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.
59
PART I. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
Figure A2.10: Response to a public sector separation shock (Baseline steady-state)
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N ote: Solid line ('y =  0 .0); dash line ( j  =  0 .5)  and dotted line ('y =  —0 .5) .  The response of the variables
is in percentage of th eir steady-sta te  value, except fo r  the unem ploym ent rate and the share o f unem ployed
searching fo r  public sec tor jobs, which is in percentage poin ts difference from  the steady-sta te.
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Finally, Figure A 2.ll shows the optimal business cycle policy for different elasticities. 
As we see the result of countercyclical vacancies does not hold if the private and public 
consumption good are complements.
Figure A 2.ll: Optimal business cycle policy under different elasticities
U nem ploym ent R ate Private  E m ploym ent
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Note: Solid line ( j  =  0.0); dash line ( j  =  0.5) and dotted line ( j  =  —0.5). The response of the variables 
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed 
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.
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O p t i m a l  p o l i c y  u n d e r  a l t e r n a t iv e  s o u r c e s  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s
Figure A2.12: Optimal policy under an economy-wide technology shock
U nem ploym ent R ate  Private  se c to r  w age Public  s e c to r  w age
Or
Quarters 
V acanc ies  -  p rivate  s e c to r V acancies -  public se c to r
-1 20 5 10 15 20 25 30
Quarters
T echnology0,
-0J
Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment 
rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.
Figure A2.13: Optimal policy under a discount factor shock
U nem ploym ent R ate  Private  s e c to r  w age  Pub lic  s e c to r  w age
V acanc ies  -  p rivate  s e c to r
c
-0.1
■o 2
-0 3
-0.4
-0.50 5 10 15 25 30 35 40
V acancies -  public se c to r D iscoun t fac tor
0 5 10 IS 20 25 30 35 40 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment 
rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.
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2.10.4  D erivations
S o c ia l  p l a n n e r ’s p r o b l e m
The social planner maximises the consumer’s utility (2.4) subject to the technology 
constraints (2.16) and (2.11) and the labour market frictions (2.1)-(2.3). Setting up the 
Lagrangian:
oo
5 3  Pt+k{u{apt+kl^+k -  ?X+fc, agt+kl9t+k -  ?X+fc) +  "(1 -  lt+k -  lt+k)
k=0
- n l r t K r t +1 -  0  -  -  /A ( i  -  »«*)(! -  -  U ) * K * ) 1-*]
- n l k l i l k +1 -  (i -  v K k  -  -  ipt+k -  i9t+k) r s (.v9t+k)1- ’>!}}-
The first order conditions are given by:
vct : uc(ct,gt)gp = f i j ( l  -  rf)qp 
v? : ug(ct ,gt)<;9 = Qt2(l -  r)9)q9t 
QtV9m 9t Sl\rfmpt
s t St 1 ~  st
.m?.! „mg.
?+1 = ^  = /5{at+iuc(c(+i>fft+i) -  1) + -  Ap) -  -  ^ V 9-***■}^t+1
?+i : =  P{a9t+iUg(ct+u9t+i) ~  ^u(wt+i) +  fi?+i(l “  A9) -  fi}+i7?P—i±i ~  ^t+i1!9—~ }•^t+i ^ + 1
Plugging the first two equations in the third one gives the implicit expression for optimal 
level of search in each sector:
u g ( c t , g t )<i9 r f v 9  =  u c ( c t ,  g t ) < ? r f i %
(1 - 7 f ) s t  (1 -  r}p ) { l  -  s t )'
If we rewrite the third condition as +  Q \ r f m p  =  —  L =  ,  we can use it
to simplify the last two conditions and get:
_  aMct+i,gt+l) r„ _vw_, X ttt+ l)  N , x.s <? rf<?vpt+1 n
P Uc(Cu9t) {( ^ ) ( ,+  1 ttc(CH.l,ft+l)) +  ( V +1 (1 — St+l)“ f+l
^  =  ug( y <9t+1) X „ +1) ) + (1_ xl)^ _ _ r ^ ±L]
Qt U g { c t , g t )  +  U g { c t + i , g t + i )  q yt + l  s t + i u t + i
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t i o n  1
Plugging the steady-state expressions for the value of job, unemployment and em­
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ployment in the Nash sharing rule gives us: 
(1 - 6)  —
wp -  ^  ap - w p
Uc = b-
The decision rule for private sector vacancies is given by the free-entry condition of firms:
( 1 - 0 ( 1 - A  p)) = [ap - w p].
(3?
Combining the two equations using (aP — wp) we get the following expression: 
^  _  *  =  (1 _  m
uc (1 -  s)u (1 -b)qP(3'
Adding it to the free-entry condition:
-  J ]  =  {1 -  ^  -  Ap -  - £ - ) ) - * -  +  £ ( i  -  P(1 -  Ad).
We can simplify it into
[aP _ i S i ]  =  ( l _ /J( l _ A P ) ) 7- 4 _ +
uc (1 — b)qPl3 (1 — s)u(l  — b)<p’
which can be re-written as:
cp jj hcpvp
This is equivalent to the social planner’s first order condition for private vacancies if 
b = rf.
W e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  h ig h  p u b l ic  s e c t o r  w a g e s
Let {copt^gopt^Uopt} be the steady-state private and government consumption, and 
unemployment under the optimal public sector wage. The {c, g, u} is the allocation 
under an exogenous public sector wage. We want to find what is the welfare gain as a 
percentage of steady-state private consumption of having the optimal steady-state public 
sector wage (Section 2.4). This is given by x that solves the following equation:
'U'iS'opti 9opt) ~b v(uopt) ~  ^((f T ^)c, g) -I- v(u).
Using the utility function:
[exp[ln(c2p, +  C s i t )  +  l x { u opt -  «)] -  Cs1] ’x  — _ J - )7 rc
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If 7  =  0, the utility function is not defined, so I use the equivalent w(c*,g*) = In(c*) +  
£ ln(#*). The welfare cost in terms of steady state consumption is then given by:
exp [In(cop*) +  C 0 n 9opt - \ n g )  + x{uopt ~u)}x  = ---------------------------- -------------------------------- 1 , 7  =  U.
c
W e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  b u s in e s s  c y c l e s
In Section 2.6 I show the welfare costs of business cycles under different policies for 
{v f ,w f} .  Let us start by defining the variables in log-deviations from the steady-state:
c* =  log (f) c* =  cexp(c*)
9t = lo g (f) 9t = gexp(gt) 
ut =  lo g ( f ) ut =  w exp (it*).
If we do a second-order approximation to the variables around the steady state {c, g,u}:
Ct = c(l +  c* +  ^c2) +  o(3),
9t =  <?(! +  9t  +  \ g l ) +  °(3), 
ut =  u (l +  ut +  \ u 2) +  o(3).
The second-order approximation of the utility function gives:
U(ct,gt ,ut) = U(c,g,u)  +  Uc{c,g,u)[ct -  c] +  Ug{c, g, u)\gt - g }  + Uu(c,g,u)[ut -  u] +  
1 1 1
-jU cc(c, g, u)[ct -  c]2 +  -U g g (c , g, u)[gt -  g f  +  - Uuu(c, <7 , u)[ut -  u]2 +  
Ucg(c, g , u)[ct -  c][gt - g \  + Um (c, g , u)[ct -  c][ut -  u] +
Ugu(c,g,u)[gt -g][ut -  u] +  o(3).
But for it to be correct, we have to plug in the second-order approximation of the variables. 
Given the additive separability of the utility functions, we can drop the cross-terms 
between the consumption goods and unemployment.
U(cu gt,u t) = U(c,g,u)  +  Uc(c,p, w)[c(c* +  ^c2)] +  Ug(c,g, u)[g(gt +  ^ g 2)] +  
Uu{c,g,u)[u(ut +  ^ u 2)} +  ^Ucc{c,g,u)[c{ct +  ^c2) ]2 +  
^Ug9(c,g,u)[g(gt +  ^ * 2)]2 +  ^Uuu(c,g, u)[u(ut +  ^ u 2)}2 
+Ucg{c,g,u)[c(ct +  ^c2)][g(gt +  +  o(3).
Collecting terms and substituting the derivatives,
U(ct,g u u t) =  U(c ,g ,u )+  uccct + ugggt + v uuut +
0 Q
- (c U c c  +  Uc)c2t + ~(gugg + ug)g2 -  ~(uvuu +  isu)u2 +  ucg(c, g)cgctgt +  o(3).
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Taking the unconditional expectation, we can write the welfare cost in terms of the 
moments of the variables:
I solve the model up to a second-order using perturbation methods and compute the 
moments of the variables to find the value of E. To express the welfare costs as a 
percentage of steady-state consumption, we solve the following equation:
u(( 1 - x ) c , g ) - u ( c , g )  =  S.
For the CES function, the derivatives are given by:
7?-1
E[u(cu gt) +  v{ut) -  u(c,g) -  v(u)\ «  uccE[ct] +  uggE[gt] +  vuuE[ut] +  ~{cucc +  uc)E[c}]
9 ti
+  2 ^ u"  + us )E \9t\ + 2 ^ Uuu + + u cg{c ,g )cgE[ctgt] = H.
( 7  -  1)& 2 7 c2'1' 2
(cr + Cs1)2’
C i g 2l~2 
(ct' +  Cs7)2’
- 7c p - 1# - 1
V u ( u )  =  X , 
^’u u (   f i ’
And the expression for the welfare cost is:
_ , {exp[7= +  l n ^  +  Cff1')] - C s 7}‘ . , n
X  = 1 -------------------------------------------------------------   , 7  y  U
If 7  =  0 the solution is given by:
_ , exp{E +  Inc}
X  =  1 ----------------------------- -- --------------------
c
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E x t e n s i o n : G o v e r n m e n t  C o n s u m p t io n
The Lagrangian of the social planner’s problem is:
oo
Y  0 t+k{ u (aPt+klt+k ~  Spt f +k ~  St+fc, 9t+k) +  ^ (1  -  lpt+k) -  
fc=0
nl+k[ l lM  -  (1 -  V)Ft+k -  m( 1 -  Pt+k, < +t)]}.
The first order conditions are given by:
t .  =  -  rf)af>M  +  (1 -  rf)  . +  (1 -  A”) - f  -  ^ L i ] } ,
Qt ^cishidt) 'U‘c{ct+\i 9t+\) 9t+i “^ t+i
Uc{Ct,gt) — W'giCti Qt) •
2.10.5 B ayesian  estim ation
M o d e l  - A l l  e q u a t io n s
The labour market is described by the following equations:
1 =  Zf +  If +  ut, (A2.1)
lpt+1 = ( l - \ pt )lpt + m l  (A2.2)
lUi = (1 ~  x t )lgt +  (A2.3)
mpt = ^ ( ( l - s t)utr P( v ^ \  (A2A)
m9t = ^ { s tuty 9{v9ty -" \  (A2.5)
=  (A2.6)U
mu
mf
r f  =  — • (A2.8)stut
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The marginal utility of consumption and the stochastic discount factor are:
7—1
cl
4  +<97
V u M  = X, (A2.10)
'U,c { C t i  Q t )  — „7 1 /- 7 ’ (A2.9)
Pt,t+1 =  /3“ c(c‘,+1’gtt l ) ' (A2-n )
9 t)
I define a variable x\ as the difference between the value of working and being unemployed.
I use it to re-write the equation pinning down st and the Nash bargaining:
af =  w p  -  Uf = w? -  vf Ut\  + Et0t,t+i{ 1 - K -  f t K +i, (A2.12)
uc{ct,gt)
x f  =  W? -  Ul =  w\ -  +  Etpt,t+1( 1 -  A? -  p?)z?+1, (A2.13)
W c(Q, 9t)
Jt = aFt - w rt + £ , / W (  1 -  A?)Jt+1], (A2.14)
(1 -  «i) Si
(A2.15)
(1 -  6t)(xf) =  W t- (A2.16)
The production functions, the vacancy posting condition and the policy rules are given 
by:
= (A2.17)
gt = a fl f-<;9vf, (A2.18)
|  =  EtPt,t+i[dt+i -  < 1  +  (1 -  A O ^ H , (A2.19)
V 3 In .1
ln(t)f) =  ln(®s) +  ipv[^ i=0 K i~') -  ln(tjP)] +  I n K ) ,  (A2.20)
ln(wf) =  ln(u>s) + +  (A2.21)
I include 6 different shocks: a shock to government vacancies, to government wages, to 
private and public separation rates, private sector bargaining power and to technology.
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These shocks are described by the following equations:
ln(af) =  ln(ap) -f a(ln(Zf) — In (I9)) +  ln(cj°). (A2.22)
I n K )  =  pv M ^ - i )  +  (A2.23)
ln(a;r)=/>*”ln(a;r_1) +  er, (A2.24)
ln(a£) =  pa +  e“, (A2.25)
ln(Af) =  (1 -  p'») ln(Af) +  pl« l n ^ )  + e{», (A2.26)
ln(Af) =  (1 -  p1”) ln(Af) +  p"> ln(A',_1) +  ej”, (A2.27)
ln(6e) =  (1 -  pb) ln(6) +  pb ln(6,_!) +  ebt. (A2.28)
Finally, I define that overall job-separation and job-finding rates:
/« =  = £ ± 2 ? ,  (A2.29)
Ut
At = ^  (A2,30)
M o d e l  - S t e a d y  S t a t e
I set the steady-state government employment at I9. As there is no recursive way to
write the steady-state variables, they solve the following non-linear system of equations:
Jp = 1 -  I9 -  u,
fnp = Xplp, 
m 9 = X H9, 
fhp = fip( ( l - s ) u ) TlP(vp)1- 11\
ffl9 =  fl9 (su)v9 (v9)1^ 9,
V rhp 
Pt = (1 — s)u 
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g m  Pt = j z r z ,  
( .s ) u
fhp
f  = — ,vp
iTi9 — EL
X*  =
W h~9 — _________ “£.
I -  (3(1-  A9 -p a )
inP -  EL
x1' =~P — _________ H£_1 -  (3(1 -  \p -  pp) 
fhpxps =  m 9x 9( 1 — 5 ),
(1 -  b)(xp) = bJ , 
ap — wp
J  = 1 — (3(1 — Ap) ’
W 3  =  7TWP ,
c =  aplp -  <?vp,
g = a919 — q9v9, 
Fy~l
uc(c,g) = -
f  =
A =
c'r + Cg'r
Vu = X, 
fhp +  fh9
u
A pIp +  \ 9l9
lp + l9
E s t i m a t e d  l o g - l i n e a r i z e d  m o d e l
The variables with tilde are expressed in deviations from steady-state.
0 =  Pi? +  Pi? + uut, (LI)
it+i =  (1 -  , (L2)
i?+1 =  (1 -  A’ )/? -  M ?  +  A»m?, (L3)
m ?  =  -  r - ^ S i )  +  (1  -  (L 4 )1 — 5
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rhf = r]9{ut +  st) +  (1 -  r]g)v9t , (L5
qP = m pt -  f ,  (L6
f t  =  mt  +  T ~ —=,St -  ut, (L7
1 — s
f t  =rh9t - s t -  ut, (L8
=  0, (L10
Pt,t+1 =  ^t[^c(ct+ijPt+i) — <7t)]> (L ll
qi)P 1/ _  _
f  = — wpt -  - ^ ~ { v u  -  uc) ~  /?(ApAf + p ppf) +  /?(! -  Ap +  A,«+i), (L12
71)" V — ~ _ ~
f  = — w9t -  —?zr{i>u ~  uc) ~  /2(ASA? +  p®p?) +  /?(1 -  A5 -  +  A,t+i), (L13
X9 x puc
~ np w p — ~ _ ~ _ ~
Jt =  ja ? t -  - J +  /?£*((! -  A”)A +  (1 -  Ap)7t+1 -  ApAj). (L14
To test the relevance of the directed search assumption, I have added the parameter k to 
the log-linearized equation tha t determines st
st = «(1 -  s)Et (x9t+1 -  xpt+l - r h pt + m 9t ), (L15
Jt + 7 - L  k  = (L16l — o
aPlp ~ cpvp
Ct = ^ - ( a f  +  ? )  -  (L17c c
q 9 19 _ £-9 f]9
9t = a?t +  Zf) — uf, (L18
9 9
| ^ 7  =  -  ^ ? +i -  (1 -  Ap) J C i  -  Ap J a p + {ap - w p + { I -  \ p) ^ ) h ) ,  (L19
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v “ =  V  -------------------------------------
wf+i =  i>'
+
u$ +  W f_i +  v?t_ 2 +  ii?_j
apt =  a lf  +
,~,v _  nv~,v  Iu t ~  P 1 +  et ,
,“,10 _  rV,~,W . 10u t — P u t-1 +  et ,
,~,a __ . au t — P u t_ i +  et ,
Af =
A? =  P^A^, + 6?,
bi — pbbt- i  + 1t J
, p ra'' fl m>
-   +  m yt --------------f t  = rhpt - t -m p - ) -  m g mp  - | -  7719 Ut,
a / \ P  Tp\ M p / \ o  m  As / 5 „ UAt = (A? + ff) - - . - +  (Af +  Zf)T, -  , 7.-  +  «t-
Ap/p + A p / p  +  A p / 9  1  -  u
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  o b s e r v a b l e  v a r ia b l e s
i f b
Differences
~  tf-i
U°b
w f h
pOb
h
ut -  ut-1
~  q ~  aw: — W_  t - 1
luf06 U? -  U?_!
A?6 At -  At_t
fO b  f  fJt Jt ~  J t -1
Levels
zfot r*(i+r?)
u (l +  tit)uOb
w
w
gOb
t
pOb
A f
} ? h
w9t -  ujf.t 
_  "'t’- i
A(l + At) 
/ ( I  +  /t)
(L20)
(L21)
(L22)
(L23)
(L24)
(L25)
(L26)
(L27)
(L28)
(L29)
(L30)
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M o d e l  w i t h  r a n d o m  s e a r c h
Equation A1-A3, A6 and A9-A11 are the same. As there is no directed search, we 
drop equation A15 and the matches in each sector are given by the relative vacancies:
m Pt +  rn9t = ^ { u t ) ^  {vpt +  u?)1-T?P, (R4)
v9t mpt =  vpt m 9u  (R5)
A  =  (R7)ut
Pt =  (R 8 )ut
xpt = w ^ ~  +  ~  A? -  p?)x?+1 -  p?xf+1), (R12)
A  =  A  -  +  ^ tA,*+i((1 -  -  P?)^?+i - P?z?+i)- (R13)uc{ct,gt)
For the log-linearized model the expressions are:
. (RL4)
mf -  iSf =  -  r f { - r ^ — v l  +  ^ - r - v f ) ,  (RL5)mP + m 9 vnP +  m9
nT)P tj _  ~  ~
i f  =  — «Sf -  ^ - ( 5 .  -  uc) -  /J(A'Af +  p”# )  +  0 (1  -  \ p -  +  A ,(+i) . (RL12)
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E s t im a t io n  r e s u l t s  ( l e v e l s )
Table A2.3: Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters
Param eters Prior
d istrib u tion
P osterior  d istrib u tion
Mean 5th-95th 
Percentil
Structural param eters
Elasticity of substitution 7 Normal (0, 0.1) 0.123 (-0.034, 0.282)
Utility of unemployment X Normal (0.5, 0.1) 0.333 (0.197, 0.472)
Separation rate (private sector) Ap Normal (0.06, 0.01) 0.035 (0.028, 0.042)
Separation rate (public sector) X9 Normal (0.03, 0.01) 0.030 (0.018, 0.041)
Cost of posting vacancy (private sector) sp Normal (2, 0.3) 0.561 (0.335, 0.777)
Cost of posting vacancy (public sector) s9 Normal (1.1, 0.2) 1.191 (0.908, 1.488)
Vacancy filling probability (private sector) r Normal (3.9, 0.2) 3.982 (3.617, 4.339)
Vacancy filling probability (public sector) q9 Normal (2.5, 0.2) 2.484 (2.130, 2.834)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemp. (private) r f Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.801 (0.731, 0.870)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemp. (public) T}9 Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.238 (0.123, 0.353)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.10) 0.820 (0.773, 0.871)
Public sector wage premium 7T Normal (1.02, 0.01) 1.023 (1.011, 1.035)
Productivity of public employment a Normal (0, 0.1) 0.137 (0.037, 0.235)
Cyclicality of public sector wages iPw Normal (0, 0.3) 0.365 (0.088, 0.632)
Cyclicality of public sector vacancies Normal (0, 0.3) -0.395 (-0.601, -0.172)
Importance of directed search K Normal (0, 0.3) 0.450 (0.327, 0.579)
A utoregressive param eters
Productivity Pa Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.987 (0.980, 0.995)
Public sector wage PW Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.978 (0.964, 0.992)
Public sector vacancies PV Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.919 (0.859, 0.979)
Private sector separation rate plp Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.978 (0.966, 0.990)
Public sector separation rate pig Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.211 (0.103, 0.313)
Bargaining power Pb Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.906 (0.863, 0.953)
Standard d ev ia tion s
Productivity a a IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.008 (0.007, 0.009)
Public sector wage a w IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.010, 0.012)
Public sector vacancies a v IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.086 (0.040, 0.132)
Private sector separation rate a lp IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.132 (0.102, 0.162)
Public sector separation rate a l9 IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.155 (0.091, 0.220)
Bargaining power a b IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.020 (0.012, 0.028)
Table A2.4: Model Comparison (Levels)
Marginal Prediction of vacancies Prediction of tightness
Data Std(ve) C orrela tion s td (± r C orrela tion
Density Std(vd) (ve, v d) S t d ( Z ) d O e.(*)d)
Directed search 4381.7 2.39 0.40 0.94 0.58
Directed search (k =  0) 4357.2 0.97 0.59 1.15 0.73
Random search 4345.0 0.71 0.50 0.76 0.71
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S u b s a m p l e  e s t i m a t i o n  r e s u l t s
Figure A2.14: Subsample stability of parameters
0 8
0.6
0.4
0 2
0
-0.2
-04
3
V
Subsample
12
1
C 8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
2
Subsample
3
V
2 3
006
0 065
0 08
0 045
0.04
Q 038
0 03
0 088
o 02
0 015
3
06
0 7
0.6
0 8
0.4
03
0.2
0.1
2
Subsample
3
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Chapter 3 
Interactions betw een public and 
private wages1
3.1 Introduction
The relevance of public wages for total government spending has increased gradually over 
the past decades in several European countries. Apart from the importance that such a 
budgetary item has for the development of public finances and for attaining budgetary 
objectives2, public sector employment and wages play a key role in the labour market. 
In this context, the main objective of this paper is to study one aspect of the relation 
between fiscal policy and the labour market, namely the interaction between private and 
public sector wages.
First, we analyse the interactions between the wages in the two sectors empirically. 
We examine the determinants of private sector wage growth, paying attention to the role 
of public sector wage and employment growth, as well as other market related variables. 
Additionally, we look at the determinants of public sector wage growth. Although there 
is evidence of some pro-cyclicality of public wages (Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008)), 
their developments may be less aligned with those of the private sector. For instance, 
public wages can also depend on the fiscal position. In fact, Poterba and Rueben (1995) 
and Gyourko and Tracy (1989) find that fiscal conditions affect wages of public employees 
at a local level. Moreover, they might be used as an instrument for income policies, thus 
they can depend on political factors such as the political alignment of the ruling party or 
election cycles. For instance, Matschke (2003) finds evidence of systematic public wage 
increases prior to a federal election in Germany.
xThis chapter was written in co-authorship with Antonio Afonso from the European Central Bank.
2According to the European Commission, the average share of public wages (compensation of em­
ployees) in general government total spending was around 23 per cent in 2007 for the European Union, 
that is, around 11 percent of GDP. Interestingly, the public wages-to-total government spending ratio 
was 28 per cent in 2006 in the US.
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We develop our analysis for OECD countries for the period between 1973 and 2000. 
We carefully discuss the econometric issues involved, particularly the problem of endo­
geneity, and how we subsequently address them. In a nutshell, we find that a number of 
variables affect private sector wage growth, for instance: changes in the unemployment 
rate (negative relationship), total factor productivity growth and changes in the urban­
isation rate. Moreover, public sector wages and employment growth also affect private 
sector wage growth. A 1% increase in public sector wages raises the wages in the private 
sector by 0.3 percent. Public sector wage growth seems to respond mainly to private 
sector wage growth, but also to the budget balance, the tax wedge and the position of 
the countries in the political spectrum.
Second, we set up a dynamic two-sector labour market equilibrium model in order to 
understand the interaction mechanisms. The model, that features search and matching 
frictions in the labour market and exogenous growth, captures the essence of the inter­
action between the wages in the two sectors. The government determines wage increases 
depending on the expected growth rate of private sector wages and an error correction 
that depends on the public-private wage differential. The long-run growth rate is deter­
mined in the private sector and then spreads out to the public sector, but similar to other 
models that address this issue, we also find that public sector wages and employment af­
fect private sector wages.3
Public sector wages and employment impinge on private sector wages via three chan­
nels. First, they affect the outside option of the unemployed, either by increasing the 
probability of being hired (public sector employment) or by increasing the value of being 
employed in the public sector (public sector wages). Therefore, they put pressure on wage 
bargaining. Second, they both crowd out private sector employment which, due to the 
presence of diminishing marginal productivity of labour, raises the average productivity. 
Finally, both public wages and employment have to be financed by an increase in taxes, 
which will also affect the wages paid by the firm. In addition, the model also features the 
effects from private sector wages to public sector wages in response to technology shocks. 
Re-doing the empirical exercise with simulated data, yields very similar coefficients to 
the ones estimated for the OECD countries.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the empirical setting and 
in Section 3.3 we report and discuss the results. In Section 3.4 we present the theoretical 
model. Section 3.5 summarises the main findings of the chapter.
3See, for instance, Holmlund and Linden (1993), Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002), and Ardagna 
(2007).
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3.2 Empirical framework
In this section, we estimate the determinants of both private sector and public sector 
wages. Our underlying idea is to estimate two different wage functions that link private 
and public wages, while carefully addressing the problem of endogeneity between the two.
Most papers provide an aggregate perspective of the relation between the two wages 
focussing on wage levels per employee (see, for instance, Nunziata (2005), Jacobson and 
Ohlsson (1994) and Friberg (2007)). However, we prefer to model the growth rates of 
real compensation per employee to assess the behaviour of the two variables in the short 
run. Since we have annual data, the use of growth rates eliminates the low frequency 
movements, but preserves the movements at business cycle frequency, which we are more 
interested in uncovering (Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995)).
In the long-run it is natural that the two variables are cointegrated with a slope 
coefficient of one, if not one would observe a constant divergence of the wages in the two 
sectors. This does not exclude differences in the levels of the wages, but simply that 
these differences do not show a trend. In fact, we observe a public sector wage premium 
or a gap, either due to different skills composition of employment or because of barriers 
between the two sectors.
3.2.1 Em pirical specification for private sector w ages
Our baseline wage function for the developments in private sector salaries is given by
<jt = a, + < 5^-1  +  P X T  +  7T”2% + +  Wt- (3.1)
In (3.1) the index i (i = 1, . . . ,N)  denotes the country, the index t (t = 1, ...,T) indicates 
the period, a* stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country «, and it 
is assumed that the disturbances jj,it are independent across countries. uft is the growth 
rate of the real compensation per employee in the private sector.
Xft is a vector of macroeconomic variables that might be endogenous to private sector 
wage growth. This vector includes the growth rate of real compensation per employee 
in the public sector, uft’, the growth rate of the consumer price index, growth rate of 
total factor productivity, change in the unemployment rate, change in urbanization rate, 
growth rate of the per worker average hours worked, growth rate of the countries’ terms 
of trade, change in the tax wedge and the growth rate of public employment. The latter 
can also positively impinge on the growth rate of private sector wages if higher labour 
demand in the public sector pushes private sector wages upwards.
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On the other hand, Z\t is a vector of institutional exogenous variables. It includes 
the change in union density, an index of bargaining coordination, the change in benefit 
duration and the change in the benefit replacement ratio. Previous work by Nunziata 
(2005) concluded that these institutional variables are important determinants of the 
level of wages. While union density should contribute to increase wages, the benefit 
replacement rate and duration affect the outside option of workers and may also influence 
their wages. Additionally, if the bargaining process is centrally coordinated it is likely 
to restrain private sector wage growth. Finally, we include an index of central bank 
independence to capture potential credibility effects on inflation expectations as well as a 
variable that measures the change in education attainment of the working age population 
to control for composition effects.
Finally, Eit- \  in (3.1) is defined as the percentage difference between public and private 
sector wages - the public wage premium or gap:
ui^
Eit-r = l n ( - j £ ! )  * 100. (3.2)
K - i
where w9 and wp are respectively the nominal public and private per employee wage in 
levels. This term can be interpreted as an error correction mechanism. There are two ways 
through which public sector wages can affect private sector wages. There is the direct 
effect, captured in 6P, in equation (3.1), and there is the indirect effect through the error 
correction mechanism of magnitude kp. If the ratio of public-to-private wages increases, 
private sector wages may rise in order to correct the wage differential downwards. This 
can be seen both as a demonstration effect stemming from the public sector or a catching 
up effect in salaries implemented in the private sector. Therefore, kp is expected to be 
positive.
In addition, one can assess the cyclicality of private wages. If the coefficient on the 
change in the unemployment rate is negative this implies a pro-cyclical behaviour of pri­
vate wages. While the idea of wage counter-cyclicality was put forward by Keynes (1939), 
empirical results actually produce evidence of both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical pri­
vate sector behaviour. Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) offer several arguments for the 
possibility of both outcomes.
3.2.2 Em pirical specification  for public sector wages
We also estimate an equation for public sector real wage growth. The baseline wage 
function for the developments of public sector salaries can be assessed with the following
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specification:
u>ft = + 5 ° ^  + 9°X?t + x°Z?t + k’ E u-! + rfF* +  <?!% + fiit. (3.3)
We consider tha t government wages can respond to the same variables as private 
wages, except for the average hour worked per worker, central bank independence and the 
growth rate of public employment growth. Indeed, the hours worked in the public sector 
are more standardized than in the private sector, and the central bank independence is 
more relevant for the private sector. Xft also includes the growth rate of private sector 
wages. Additionally, Fit includes fiscal variables, such as the general government budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP and the general government debt-to-GDP ratio. Pu 
contains the political variables, which consist of the percentage of votes for left wing 
parties and a dummy variable for parliamentary election years. While the variables in Fit 
are endogenous, we consider the variables in Pit as exogenous. $  stands for the individual 
effects to be estimated for each country i.
Similar to the specification for the private sector wages, k9 now measures to what 
extent public wages correct the imbalances of the long-term relation between the two. In 
this case, increases in the public-to-private wages ratio can produce a future reduction in 
public sector wages, implying an expected negative value for k9.
While one would expect that recent fiscal developments may impinge on the public 
sector wages per employee, this hypothesis seems less relevant for the development of 
private sector wages. On the other hand, if one expects the unemployment rate to impinge 
negatively on the development of private sector wages, this effect may be mitigated in the 
case of public sector wages, given the higher rigidity of the labour force in the government 
sector and a possible higher degree of unionisation.
3.2.3 E conom etric issues
There are two main econometric issues when estimating the wage functions (3.1) and 
(3.3). The first issue is the presence of endogenous variables, particularly the simultaneous 
determination of public and private sector wage growth. To deal with this, we estimate 
each equation separately and instrument all the endogenous variables by the remaining 
pre-determined variables and two lags of all variables. We compute the Sargan over­
identifying test to access the validity of the instruments. As we are using the lagged 
variables as instruments, what we are essentially doing is predicting the value of the 
regressors based on past information. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficients should 
be, for instance, the effect of expected public sector wage growth on the growth rate of 
private sector wages.
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Although our distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables is arbitrary, 
we run a Hausman test to examine the exogeneity of each block of variables.
The second econometric issue is that the regressors and the error term are correlated, 
because we allow for a country specific error and include a lagged dependent variable. Al­
though we also tried the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator, our preferred methodology 
is a simple panel 2SLS estimation. First, the Arellano and Bond methodology implies 
estimating the equation in first differences (of growth rates) which adds a lot of noise 
to the estimates. Furthermore, as Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) point out, the 
bias created by the presence of a lagged dependent variable in panel data tends to zero 
if we have a long time series component. As we have close to 30 time observations for 
most countries in the sample, we proceed with the estimation with a panel 2SLS. We also 
include country fixed effects.
3.3 Estim ation results and discussion
3.3.1 D ata
We study this issue in a panel framework for eighteen OECD countries, covering essen­
tially the period between 1973 and 2000.4
For the employment and wage data our main data source is the OECD Economic 
Outlook database, the European Commission database AMECO and the Labour Market 
Institutions Database used in Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) and expanded by 
Nickell (2006). Private sector wages are defined as total compensation of employees 
minus compensation of government employees. Private sector wages per employee are 
defined as private compensation of employees divided by private sector employees (total 
employment minus government employees minus self-employed persons).5 We compute 
the real wages per employee using the consumption price deflator.
Using aggregate data has its limitations. On the one hand, it ignores the composition 
of public and private employment, in particular with respect to the skills level of employ­
ment. On the other hand, it is difficult to get a completely clean identification strategy. 
Despite these problems we still think using aggregate data is an advantage. First, no 
other type of data would allow for such a long time span for so many countries. Sec­
ond, the identification using lags as instruments has been used quite successful in several 
studies, for instance by Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) and Nunziata (2005).
4Given data availability, the countries used in the empirical analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. See the Appendix for details and sources.
5This approach is also used by Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008)
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The share of government employment in total employment increased for most countries 
in the 1980s, while there was an even more generalised decline after the beginning of the 
1990s. Regarding real wages per employee an upward trend occurred for most countries, 
both for private and public wages. In addition, although the ratio of public-to-private 
wages per employee is relatively constant, it has followed an upward path for the majority 
of European countries since the beginning of the 1990s.6
3.3.2 P rivate w age determ inants
The first two columns of Table 3.1 report the results for the growth rate of the real private 
sector wages per employee. One can observe that the growth rate in public sector wages 
affects their private counterpart both directly and through the error correction model. 
Both coefficients are positive and statistically significant. A 1 percent increase in real 
public sector wage growth increases private sector real wage growth by 0.3 percent. The 
growth rate of public employment also has a positive and significant effect on the growth 
rate of nominal private sector wages. A 1 per cent increase in public sector employment 
increases private sector wage growth by close to 0.2 percent.
The change in the unemployment rate exerts a negative effect on private sector wages 
growth. In other words, private sector wages have a pro-cyclical behaviour: a 1 percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate reduces the growth rate of private sector wages 
by around 0.5 percentage points. On the other hand, such a growth rate increases with 
total factor productivity growth.
The inflation rate does not affect the growth rate of real private sector wages per 
employee, which supports the idea that agents have rational expectations. Some wage 
stickiness is captured by the statistically significant lagged dependent variable, while 
there are no statistically significant effects reported for the terms of trade or for the tax 
wedge.
Regarding the set of pre-determined explanatory variables (in vector Z), it is interest­
ing to note that the growth rate of real private sector wages is negatively affected by the 
index of central bank independence. Changes in union density, bargaining coordination, 
the benefit replacement rate and education do not statistically affect the growth rate 
of real private sector wages. Moreover, the change in benefit duration has a negative 
significant coefficient.
In the estimations, the Hausman test clearly supports that the institutional variables 
block is exogenous and that the variables in the macroeconomic block are endogenous. 
The Sargan test points to the validity of the instruments.
6See Afonso and Gomes (2008) for a more detailed assessment of the data trends.
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Table 3.1: Determinants of the real growth rate of wages per employee (1973-2000)
P rivate sector P u b lic  sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged dependent variable 0.120** (2.46) 0.140*** (3.23) 0.243*** (5.07) 0.246*** (5.60)
Error correction component 0.034** (2.47) 0.038*** (2.91) -0.097*** (-5.35) -0.094*** (-6.49)
Growth rate of public sector wages 0.304*** (4.72) 0.325*** (5.41)
Growth rate of private sector wages 0.730*** (4.43) 0.562*** (5.14)
A Unemployment rate -0.501*** (-2.97) -0.451*** (-3.57) 0.218 (0.79)
Inflation rate -0.005 (-0.10) -0.015 (-0.21)
Growth rate of TFP 0.349*** (2.78) 0.361*** (2.94) -0.175 (-0.85)
A Urbanization rate 0.873 (1.58) 0.888* (1.71) -1.000 (-1.14)
Growth rate of terms of trade 0.031 (0.64) -0.005 (-0.08)
Growth rate of hours per worker -0.604 (-0.96)
Growth rate of public employment 0.229** (2.09) 0.231*** (3.07)
Tax wedge 0.187 (1.42) -0.562** (-2.29) -0.455** (-2.43)
Budget balance 0.102 (1.61) 0.113** (2.28)
Government debt 0.003 (0.24)
A Union density 0.001 (1.03) -0.001 (-0.45)
ABargaining coordination 1.975 (1.60) -1.210 (-0.60)
A Benefit duration -4.567* (-1.84) -3.894* (-1.65) 1.032 (0.26)
A Benefit replacement rate -0.018 (-0.55) 0.019 (0.39)
A Education 0.392 (0.35) -1.130 (-0.66)
Central bank independence -2.416*** (-3.33) -2.530*** (-3.96)
Election year -0.171 (-0.59)
% Left wing votes 0.069* (1.81) 0.057* (1.68)
Observations 437 (18) 440 (18) 437 (18) 437 (18)
R 2 0.380 0.381 0.228 0.263
Sargan test# 40.1 (0.15) 44.6 (0.28) 42.2 (0.09) 49.2 (0.24)
Overidentifying restrictions 32 40 31 43
Hausman test (Exogenous)& 5.56 (0.99) 3.10 (0.96) 4.08 (1.00) 0.68 (1.00)
Hausman test (Endogenous)® 20.29 (0.26) 28.5 (0.00) 2555.4 (0.00) 23.7 (0.00)
Notes: the coefficients are estim ated using 2SLS. Endogenous variables: the change in unemployment 
rate, the change in the urbanisation rate, the growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, 
growth rate of real per worker private sector wages, growth rate of hours per worker, growth rate of 
public employment, growth rate of term s of trade, budget balance, governm ent debt and tax wedge. They 
are instrumented by the remaining pre-determ ined variables and two lags of all explanatory variables. 
The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. #  
The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instrum ents are uncorrelated with the 
error term  and that the excluded instrum ents are correctly excluded from  the estim ated equation. Under 
the null, the test s ta tistic  is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The 
p-value is in brackets. & The null hypothesis is that the block of institutional variables is exogenous. 
Under the null, the estim ator used is efficient but it is inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis. 
The consistent estim ator would be to consider all variables as endogenous and instrum ent them with 
lags. The p-value is in brackets. $ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic variables is 
exogenous. Under the null, the m ost efficient estim ator is fixed effects estim ation taking all variables as 
exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the estim ates are consistent. The p-value is in brackets.
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3.3.3 P ub lic wage determ inants
We now turn to the analysis of the determinants of the growth rate of real public sector 
wages per employee, which are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.1. The 
estimations pass the Sargan test. When we include all regressors, the p-value of the test 
is low, albeit above 0.05. In the reduced specification the p-value is around 0.24.
The growth rate of real public sector wages per employee reacts positively to real 
private sector wages, with a coefficient between 0.6 and 0.7. On the other hand, it 
responds negatively to an increase in the ratio between public and private sector wages 
in line with our previous conjecture. Therefore, this correction mechanism adjusts public 
wages downward when the differential vis-a-vis private wages rises. Note tha t the absolute 
value of the coefficient is roughly three times higher than the one from the similar error 
correction component of the coefficient estimated in the private sector model. This means 
that three quarters of the adjustment is done via public sector wages.
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant with a magnitude of around 
0.24, denoting a higher degree of wage stickiness than in the private sector. The growth 
of public sector wages is not affected by any of the market variables. Regarding the 
explanatory fiscal variables, improvements in the budget balance increase the growth rate 
of nominal public sector wages. An increase in the budget balance ratio of 1 percentage 
point translates into an increase of the growth rate of public sector wages of around 0 .1  
percentage points. Increases in the tax wedge are associated with lower public sector 
wage growth. In terms of the pre-determined exogenous variables, there is a statistically 
significant positive effect of the percentage votes for left wing parties.
3.3.4 R obustness, system  estim ation
Given that the two wage variables are jointly determined, a more efficient approach is 
to perform a 3SLS estimation of the system of two equations. The drawback is that, if 
there is a problem with one of the equations all the parameter estimates are inconsistent. 
We start the estimation with all variables and then exclude the variables that are not 
statistically significant. According to the results shown in Table 3.2, we do not reject the 
validity of all the instruments at a 5 percent significance level.
We note that the results are close to the estimations of the single equations. The 
lagged dependent variable is significant in both equations with a higher value in the 
public sector. In addition, the error correction mechanism is also significant, but its mag­
nitude in the private sector equation is somewhat higher than in the baseline estimation. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the direct effects of wage growth in the other sector are
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Table 3.2: System estimation (1973-2000)
Private sector P u b lic  sector
(1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable 0.082** (2.15) 0.166*** (4.27)
Error correction component 0.056*** (4.66) -0.109*** (-7.55)
Growth rate of public sector wages 0.473*** (8.59)
Growth rate of private sector wages 0.881*** (8.11)
A Unemployment rate -0.311*** (-2.80)
Growth rate of total factor productivity 0.276*** (2.61)
A Urbanization rate 1.148** (2.34) -1.572** (-2.26)
Growth rate of public employment 0.172*** (2.59)
Tax wedge 0.208* (1.79) -0.404** (-2.30)
Budget balance 0.103** (2.34)
A Benefit duration -3.422 (-1.63)
Central bank independence -2.071*** (-3.57)
Observations 437 (18) 437 (18)
R 2 0.341 0.310
Hansen-Sargan test# 103.1 (0.057)
Notes: the coefficients are estim ated using SSLS. Endogenous variables: the change in unemployment 
rate, the change in the urbanisation rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, growth 
rate of real per worker public and private sector wages, growth rate o f term s of trade, growth rate of hours 
per worker, change in tax wedge, the growth rate of public employment, budget balance and government 
debt. These endogenous variables are instrum ented by the remaining pre-determ ined variables and two 
lags of all explanatory variables. #  The null hypothesis of the Hansen-Sargan overidentification test is 
that the instrum ents are uncorrelated with the error term  and that the excluded instrum ents are correctly 
excluded from the estim ated equation. Under the null, the test sta tistic is distributed as chi-squared in 
the number of overidentifying restrictions (82). The p-values are in brackets.
also somewhat higher than in the baseline estimations: 0.47 from public to private and 
0 . 8 8  in the opposite direction.
The change in the unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, change 
in the urbanisation rate, growth rate of public sector wages, employment, and Central 
Bank independence are all significant determinants of private sector wages, with the 
coefficients having the same magnitude as previous estimates. The estimate of the effect 
of the budget balance on public sector wage growth is still 0 .1 , but the percentage of 
left wing votes is not significant. The tax wedge is now statistically significant for both 
private and public sector.
3.3.5 R obustness, including further dynam ics
In our baseline estimations, the only dynamic element is the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. Even if that coefficient is small one could argue that there might be 
direct effects of past explanatory variables on the regressors. Therefore, we included one 
lag of all explanatory variables in the regressions.
86
CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WAGE INTERACTIONS
Table 3.3: Estimation with lags (1973-2000)
P rivate  sector P u b lic  sector
(1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable 0.125** (0.033) 0.259*** (0.000)
Error correction component 0.038** (0.044) -0.098*** (0.000)
Growth rate of public sector wages 0.262*** (0.000)
Growth rate of private sector wages 0.682** (0.011)
A Unemployment rate -0.121 (0.569) -0.158 (0.811)
Inflation rate -0.040 (0.595) 0.076 (0.517)
Growth rate of total factor productivity 0.338 (0.220) -0.011 (0.982)
A Urbanization rate -1.000 (0.622) -1.370 (0.415)
Growth rate of terms of trade 0.068 (0.473) 0.009 (0.948)
Growth rate of hours per worker -1.026 (0.285)
Growth rate of public employment 0.230 (0.168)
Tax wedge 0.155 (0.433) -0.715 (0.140)
Budget balance 0.105 (0.585)
Government debt -0.022 (0.349)
A Union density 0.001 (0.188) -0.003 (0.186)
ABargaining coordination 2.160 (0.128) -3.199 (0.340)
A Benefit duration -4.664 (0.118) 3.583 (0.529)
A Benefit replacement rate -0.019 (0.633) 0.059 (0.396)
A Education 0.491 (0.702) -0.272 (0.906)
Central bank independence -2.340** (0.025)
Election year -0.235 (0.712)
% Left wing votes 0.071 (0.199)
Observations 437 (18) 437 (18)
R 2 0.398 0.126
Zero effect of lagged variables^0 24.18 (0.062) 9.76 (0.879)
Sargan test# 15.05 (0.719) 26.64 (0.032)
Overidentifying restrictions 19 15
Notes: the coefficients are estim ated using 2SLS. Estim ation included a lag of both endogenous and 
exogenous variables. The coefficient refers to the sum of the coefficients o f the contemporaneous and 
lagged variable. In parenthesis is reported the p-value of the test that the sum  of the coefficients is zero. 
For the lagged dependent variable and the error correction mechanism we present the p-value of the 
usual significance test. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. Endogenous 
variables: the change in unem ploym ent rate, the change in the urbanisation rate, growth rate of total 
factor productivity, inflation rate, growth rate of real per worker public and private sector wages, growth 
rate of term s of trade, growth rate o f hours per worker, change in tax wedge, the growth rate of public 
employment, budget balance and government debt. These endogenous variables are instrum ented by the 
remaining pre-determ ined variables and two lags of all explanatory variables. #  The null hypothesis of 
the Sargan overidentification test is that the instrum ents are uncorrelated with the error term  and that 
the excluded instrum ents are correctly excluded from  the estim ated equation. Under the null, the test 
sta tistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. % The null hypothesis 
is that the coefficients of all lagged explanatory variables are jo in tly  equal to  zero. The p-values are in 
brackets.
In general, the inclusion of lags does not carry much explanatory power in this case. 
Indeed, the R-square changes very little from the baseline estimation, and the test that all 
coefficients of the lagged explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is not rejected at 
the 5 percent significance level for both equations. Consequently, not much is gained from
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the inclusion of the above mentioned lags, as they just increase the standard deviations 
and reduce the significance of some variables.
As we are interested in the overall effect of a variable on the wage growth, in Table
3.3 we only report the sum of the two coefficients (contemporaneous and lagged) and the 
p-value of the test that the sum of the two coefficients is different from zero. The main 
results from the baseline specification remain; notably, there is a spillover between private 
and public wages, through the direct effect and via the error correction mechanism, with 
similar magnitude to the baseline results .7
3.4 A nalytical framework
3.4.1 M odel
The empirical section offered several important conclusions, useful for the setting up of 
the model. First, the relation between public and private wages is bi-directional, with 
market forces and productivity having an effect on private sector wage growth, which 
is then followed by the public sector. Second, developments in the public sector wages 
caused by, for instance, political issues or by the need for fiscal tightening also affect the 
private sector wages. Moreover, and in addition to the contemporaneous relation, there 
is also an error correction mechanism that corrects the gap between the wages in the two 
sectors. Most of such correction occurs in the public sector.
In this section we set up a dynamic labour market equilibrium model that captures 
the qualitative essence of the interaction between private and public sector wage growth. 
The purpose is twofold. The first objective is to uncover the transmission mechanisms of 
fiscal policy through the labour market. The second is to find out if the model with only 
frictions in the labour market is able to replicate the findings of the empirical section.
The model is an extension of the model in Chapter 2. The economy has a public and a 
private sector and search and matching frictions, along the lines of Pissarides (2000). The 
unemployed can only search for a job in one sector. There is some micro-econometric 
evidence on the assumption of directed search between the private and public sector. 
Blank (1985) finds that sectoral choice is influenced by wage comparison. Heitmueller 
(2006) is able to quantify this effect and finds that an increase in 1 percent in the wages in 
the public sector relative to the private sector increases the probability of choosing public 
sector employment by 1.3 and 2.9 percent respectively for men and for women. The 
model has several differences from the one in Chapter 2 , that make it more realistic: it
7 We have also performed alternative robustness checks: estimations with only the subset of European 
Union and euro area countries, estimations with only macroeconomic variables and a longer sample, 
GMM Arellano and Bond estimation and also for the nominal wages. See Afonso and Gomes (2008)
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features exogenous growth in the private sector technology; the public sector wage bill is 
financed through a distortionary labour income taxation; the production function in the 
private sector has a more general form with diminishing marginal returns and we analyse 
different fiscal rules for the setting of public sector vacancies and wages, as opposed to 
discussing the optimal policy.
General setting
Public sector variables are denoted with superscript g while private sector variables are 
denoted by superscript p. Time is denoted by t. The labour force consists of many 
individuals j  G [0, 1]. A proportion ut are unemployed, while the remainder are working 
either in the public (/f) or in the private (/f) sector
1 =  It +  If +  ut• (3-4)
The presence of search and matching frictions in the labour market prevents some un­
employed individuals from finding work. The evolution of public and private sector 
employment depends on the number of new matches and raf and on separations in 
each sector. We consider that, in each period, a constant fraction of jobs is destroyed, 
and this fraction (A) might be different between the two sectors
lUi = (1 ~  x i)ll +  m t> i = P’9- (3.5)
We assume that the unemployed choose in which sector they want to conduct their search, 
so u\ represents the number of unemployed searching in sector i. The number of matches 
formed in each period is determined by two Cobb-Douglas matching functions:
m\ = m lu\ r)%v\ w , i= p ,g .  (3.6)
U9We define the share of unemployed searching for a public sector job as sf =  From 
the matching functions we can define the probabilities of vacancies being filled q\, the 
job-finding rates conditional on searching in a particular sector, p\, and the unconditional 
job-finding rates, f\:
i m\ { ml £i ml .
Qt =  — > Pt =  — > f t  =  — , i = p , g -v't u\ Ut
Households
In the presence of unemployment risk we could observe consumption differences across 
different individuals. As in Merz (1995), we assume all the income of the household 
members is pooled so tha t private consumption is equalised within the household.
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The household is infinitely-lived and has preferences over the private consumption 
good, c*, and a public consumption good gt
oo
5 Z ^ ( lnct +  Chi^i), (3.7)
t=o
where j3 G (0, 1) is the discount factor. The budget constraint in period t is given by
Ct + B t = (1 +  r t- \ ) B t- i  +  (1 — Tt)wtlt +  (1 — +  ztut +  IR. (3-8)
rt- 1 is the real interest rate from period t-1 to t, and Bt- 1 are the holdings of one period 
bonds. (1 — Tt)w\l\ is the wage income from the members working in sector i, net of 
taxes, being r  the distortinary tax rate. The unemployed members receive unemployment 
benefits zt . Finally, IIt encompasses all lump sum transfers from the firm.
The household chooses consumption and bond holdings to maximize the expected life­
time utility subject to the sequence of budget constraints, taking the public consumption 
good as given. The solution is the consumption Euler equation:
1 = 13(1 +  r 1) £ ([— ]• (3.9)
Ct+1
Workers
The value to the household of each member depends on their current state. The value of 
being employed is given by:
W i =  (1 -  T (K  +  EdW ( 1  -  A4)W/+1 +  XUt+1}, i = p , g  (3.10)
where pt,t+ 1 =  ^ ^ [ ^ 7 ] stochastic discount factor. The value of being employed
depends on the current wage as well as on the continuation value of the job, which depends 
on the separation probability in each sector. Under the assumption of directed search the 
agents are either searching in the private or in the public sector. The value functions are 
given by
U't =  2 t +  £!A ,t+1[pjW?+1 +  (1 -  p’)C/(+1], i = p , g .  (3.11)
The value of unemployment depends on the level of unemployment benefits and on the 
probabilities of finding a job in the two sectors. Optimality implies the existence of 
movements between the two sectors to guarantee that there is no additional gain of 
searching in one sector vis-a-vis the other
u t  =  U? = Ut. (3.12)
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This equality determines the share of unemployed searching in each sector, and the re­
spective expression is implicitly given by
r< E t{W?+l -  UM ] m \E t [W *, -  UM ]
( T 1 * )  "  *  ' 1 J
The optimal search of public sector jobs increases with the number of vacancies in the 
public sector and the value of a such a job, which depends positively on the public sector 
wages and negatively on the separation probability.
F irm s
The private sector representative firm hires labour to produce the private consumption 
good. The production function depends on labour, but part of the resources produced 
have to be used to pay for the cost of posting vacancies
C =  (3.14)
The technology, a;J, has a unit root and grows at an average rate on 7 . Its law of motion 
is given by
lnaf =  ln a ^ j  +  7  +  e“. (3.15)
The firm’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of profits given by
OO
Et 0t,t+k[apt+k{l?+ka) -  «?+*«?+*) -  «’?+*?+*]• (3.1.6)
fc=0
and faces the law of motion for private sector employment given by
?+i =  ( l - V ) ?  +  < « .  (3.17)
The firm takes the probability of filling a vacancy, gf, as given. At any given point 
the level of employment is predetermined and the firm can only control the number of 
vacancies it posts. The solution to the problem is given by equation (3.18)
%  =  E A , t+l^ [ ( l  -  a)i& * -  +  (1 -  A”) / - ] .  (3.18)
Qt at at+1 <7*+i
The optimality condition of the firm states that the expected cost of hiring a worker 
must equal its expected return. The benefits of hiring an extra worker is the discounted
value of the expected difference between its marginal productivity and its wage and the
continuation value, knowing tha t with probability \ p the match can be destroyed.
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Private sector wage bargaining
We consider that the private sector wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between 
workers and firms,
wpt = argmax(Wfp -  Ut)b(Jt)l~b, (3.19)
PwZ
where b is the bargaining power of the unemployed and Jt is the value of the marginal 
job for the firm, given by the following expression
Jt =  ( 1 -  a)lpt - a - w p +  £ * / W (  1 -  Ap) Jt+i]. (3.20)
The Nash bargaining solution is given by:
(W[ -  Ut) =  6(1 ~ TtW  -  Ut +  J*)- (3-21)1 -  brt
In the presence of distortionary taxes the share of the surplus going to the worker is lower 
than its bargaining power. The reason is that for every unit that the firm gives up in 
favour of the worker, the pair lose a fraction r  to the government. So they economise on 
their tax payments by agreeing a lower wage.
Government
The government produces its consumption good using a linear technology on labour. As 
in the private sector, the costs of posting vacancies are deduced from production
9l =  If -  <?v?. (3.22)
It sets a labour income tax to finance the wage bill and the unemployment benefits
n(wt l t )  = (1 ~  Tt)(wfl9t ) +  ztuu (3.23)
and the unemployment benefits are given by
zt = za\. (3.24)
Finally, the government follows a policy for public sector vacancies and public sector 
wages {uf, wf+1}^l0. We assume the government sets the wage one period in advance, at
the time it posts the vacancies. As st is determined based on the expected vale of both
public and private sector wage in 1, the current period public sector wage only affects
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the current level of taxes. We assume the following rule for public sector wages:
W t + 1 p  rW t + l i  | rW t —l  -I yi-,1 . w f o
+ -  1 -  $ ) +  ' (3-25)
In every period, the government sets its wage for the next period based on the expected 
growth of private sector wages and on an error correction mechanism mimicking the 
public wage premium in (3.3), that adjusts the differences from the actual to the target 
public sector wage premium (4/). Public sector vacancies are set at their steady state 
level, designed to target a steady state level of public sector employment
v? = v9 +  ef. (3.26)
Both public sector vacancies and wages are subject to shocks. We can interpret a shock to 
wages (e™) as a short-run phenomenon coming from the need for fiscal tightness, because 
of pressure from the trade union or arising from a change in government.8
3.4.2 C alibration
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency to be close to the UK economy. Figure 
3.1 shows the level of government employment and the job-separation and job-finding 
rates in the two sectors. The data are taken from the UK Labour Force Survey.9
We calibrate the steady-state public sector vacancies such tha t the steady-state em­
ployment in that sector is 20% of the total labour force. The separation rate in the public 
sector is set to 1%, half the one in the private sector (2%). The public sector wage is set 
such that in steady-state, the public sector wage premium is equal to 4%. This value is 
in line with several empirical estimates (see Gregory and Borland (1999) for an overview 
of the literature).
We also calibrate the two matching functions differently. We set r f  equal to 0.5 as 
it is common in the literature. In contrast, r f  is set equal to 0.2, which implies that 
vacancies are relatively more important than the pool of unemployed in the public sector 
matching. This was the value found in an estimation for the United States in Chapter 
2. The parameters ffi1 are set in such a way that the duration of a vacancy is 12 weeks 
for the private sector and 16 weeks for the public sector. These values are taken from 
two studies for the United Kingdom by the National Audit Office (2009) and the CIPD 
(2009). The latter study also estimates that the average cost of recruiting a worker is 
between £4600 and £5800. This corresponds to between 10 and 12 weeks of the median 
income in United Kingdom (£479 according to the ONS). In the public sector, the costs
8The model written in efficiency units can be found in Appendix.
9See Chapter 6 for a detailed study on UK labour market flows.
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Figure 3.1: Evidence for the United Kingdom
Government employment Job-separation rate Job-finding rate
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Note: The data is taken from  the Labour Force Survey. Government em ployment includes employment 
in local and central government, health authorities, universities and armed forces.
of recruiting are between 20% to 80% lower than for the total economy, depending on 
occupation category. We therefore set q,p to be such that the recruitment cost per employee 
in the private sector is equivalent to wages paid over three-month period and p  such that 
the cost of recruitment per hire in the public sector is 20 percent lower than the private 
sector.
The unemployment benefit is set around 0.40, which implies a net replacement rate 
around 0.7 while a  is set to 0.3. The discount factor is set to 0.985 and the quarterly 
growth rate of technology to 0.005, implying a steady-state interest rate of 4 per cent 
a year. As there is not much empirical evidence on the coefficient of the private sector 
wage bargaining we set it such that the equilibrium unemployment rate is around 7%, 
close to the average unemployment rate of the last 20 years in the United Kingdom. The 
baseline value of k is set at —0.025, which implies an annual correction of around -0.10,
Table 3.4: Baseline Calibration
Structural Param eters
r)P 0.50 gp 0.75 fhP 0.59 Ap 0.02 7 0.005
rj9 0.20 p  0.50 fh9 0.49 X9 0.01 /3 0.985
a  0.30 b 0.43 ip 0.04 z 0.40 k —0.05
Stead y-state  values
fP 0.20 qP 1.01 u 0.07 s  0.42 f  0.26
f 9 0.03 q9 0.81 I9 0.20 %  1-04 2 0 72
Shocks
pw 0.65 pv 0.80 pa 0.70
a w 0.0054 av 0.0009 O a 0.0061
M om ents at annual frequency
M odel OECD U K
Standard deviation
Private wage growth 0.030 0.030 0.033
Public wage growth 0.030 0.031 0.029
Public employment growth 0.023 0.023 0.021
A utocorrelation
Private wage growth 0.291 0.451 0.110
Public wage growth 0.375 0.340 0.225
Public employment growth 0.563 0.586 0.511
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the value found in the empirical section. Much of the analysis compares the responses 
of the model with alternative values for the error correction mechanism. Overall, the 
calibration implies a steady-state overall job-finding rate of 0.23: 0.20 in the private and 
0.03 in the public sector.
Finally the standard deviation and the autocorrelation of the shocks are calibrated 
such tha t the standard deviations and the autocorrelation of the annual growth rates of 
public and private wages and public employment are close to the ones from the United 
Kingdom and from the average of the OECD countries used in the estimation. Table
3.4 summarises the baseline calibration, the implied steady-state values of the relevant 
variables and the moments of the growth rates of public sector employment and wages 
and private sector wages.
3.4.3 S im ulation
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the impulse responses of the private and public wage growth, 
the public-to-private wage ratio, the tax rate and of the unemployment rate to the three 
shocks: public sector wages (e™), public sector vacancies (ej'), and technology (e“).
A positive shock to public sector wage growth has a direct spillover effect to the 
private sector wage growth, mainly through three channels. First, it increases the value 
of being unemployed because if those individuals are hired by the public sector they get 
paid more. This effect is amplified because of the endogenous increase of the share of 
unemployed searching for public sector jobs. Second, as the shock crowds out private 
sector employment, it raises the marginal productivity and consequently private sector 
wages. Finally, the increase in the tax rate necessary to finance the wage bill, has two 
opposite effects. On the one hand, it reduces the match surplus and raises the private 
sector wage. On the other hand, it reduces the share of the surplus going to the worker, 
which puts a downward pressure on wages. The contemporaneous and annual elasticity 
of private wages with respect to public sector wages is around 0.10.
The subsequent dynamics are driven by the error correction mechanism. As the pre­
mium of working in the public sector increases relative to the target, there is a correction 
of public sector wages that, after 6 quarters have a growth rate below the long-run value. 
This adjustment is quicker the higher the magnitude of the error correction coefficient 
(k). In addition, an increase in the unemployment rate occurs after the shock.
A positive shock to public sector vacancies initially raises private sector wage growth 
(see Figure 3.3). The annual elasticity is around 0.3. Both the tax and the bargaining 
channel drive the wages up but, additionally, public employment crowds out the employ­
ment in the private sector raising the average productivity of workers which serves as a
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Figure 3.2: Response to a public sector wage shock
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Figure 3.3: Response to a public sector employment shock
Private  s e c to r  w age  grow th
U nem ploym ent rate
0.078
0 078
0074
0.072
0.070 8 12 16 20
Public se c to r  w age  growth
0.028
0 026
0 024
0 022
002
0 8 12 16 20
Quarters
0.27
C 268
C /66
0 264
0 262'0 4 6 12 16 20
Quarters
P u b lic-p riv ate  w age ratio
1.04
1 0395
i 039
1 0385
1 038,0 8 12 16 20
Quarters
Public  em ploym en t
0.204
0 203
0 202
0 201
02 ,0 8 12 16 20
Quarters
Note: the solid, dashed and dotted lines corresponds to the case where n is -0.025, -0.05 and -0.10  
respectively. The growth rates of wages are expressed in annual terms.
96
CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WAGE INTERACTIONS
Note: the solid, dashed and dotted lines corresponds to the case where k is k is -0.025, -0.05 and -0.10 
respectively. The growth rates of wages and technology are expressed in annual terms.
Figure 3.4: Response to a technology shock
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reference for the bargaining process. The increase in the private sector wages reduces the 
premium paid in the public sector relative to the target, therefore, after the initial period 
the public sector wages grow above the average to catch up with the private sector.
Regarding a technology shock, depicted in Figure 3.4, the private sector wage growth 
increases substantially and contemporaneously, and stays above average for several peri­
ods. As the public-private wage premium is reduced, the wages in the public sector grow 
at a faster pace in the subsequent periods.
3.4.4 R econciling the m odel with the data
The model we set up does not have a straightforward connection with the estimated 
equation, nor are the elasticities necessarily comparable. The empirical exercise uses 
annual data and the IV estimation retrieves the effect on the wage growth in one sector 
of the expected wage growth in the other. In the model, set at a quarterly frequency, we 
show how the variables respond to unexpected shocks in technology, public sector wages 
and employment.
In order to reconcile the two, we simulate the model to generate quarterly observations, 
aggregate data into annual frequency and then perform IV regressions of the type used 
in section 3.2. We estimate 5000 regressions with 100 observations each, as well as 1000 
regressions with 500 observations. Table 3.5 shows the results.
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Table 3.5: IV estimation with simulated data
P rivate sector P u b lic  sector
Nobs=100 Nobs=500 Nobs=100 Nobs=500
Nreg=5000 Nreg=1000 Nreg=5000 Nreg=1000
Lagged dependent variable 
Error correction component 
Growth rate of public sector wages 
Growth rate of private sector wages 
Growth rate of TFP 
Growth rate of public employment
-0.139 (0.083) 
0.018 (0.021) 
0.192 (0.125)
0.807 (0.164) 
-0.027 (0.083)
-0.058 (0.059) 
0.016 (0.010) 
0.210 (0.073)
0.626 (0.111) 
-0.051 (0.042)
0.243 (0.090) 
-0.103 (0.043)
0.697 (0.267)
0.230 (0.045) 
-0.075 (0.016)
0.857 (0.159)
K 2 0.867 0.801 0.294 0.199
Notes: the coefficients are estim ated using 2SLS. Endogenous variables: total factor productivity, growth 
rate of real per worker private and public sector sector wages, growth rate of public employment. They are 
instrum ented by two lags of all explanatory variables. The standard deviation of the estim ated coefficients 
are in parentheses.
In the equation determining the public sector wage growth the three coefficients are 
very close to the ones estimated for the OECD countries (see Table 3.1). The error 
correction mechanism is between -0.08 and -0.10 and the response to expected wages is 
also around 0.7. Another similar feature is that the R-square of the estimation for the 
public sector wage growth tends to be quite low.
In the equation determining the private sector wage growth, the coefficient of public 
sector wages (0.2) and the error correction mechanism (0.02), all have magnitudes sim­
ilar to the ones we estimated for the OECD countries. The coefficient of total factor 
productivity growth is slightly bigger, which is expected since it is the only source of 
fluctuations directly affecting private sector wages in the model. This also translates 
into a high R-square. The autocorrelation coefficient is slightly negative, which means 
that for OECD countries there must be some other sources of autocorrelation, perhaps 
wage stickiness. Still, the difference is relatively small. On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficient of the growth rate of public employment tends to be close to zero.
3.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the interactions between public and private 
sector wages per employee in OECD countries, and to uncover the determinants of public 
and private sector wage growth. We find that the public sector wage growth is mainly 
driven by private sector wages and the government budget balance.
Regarding the private sector wage growth, we find that it is influenced by the unem­
ployment rate, total factor productivity and urbanization rate. More important, public 
sector wages and employment also affect private sector wage growth. The empirical esti­
mates show that a 1 percent increase in public sector wages raises the wages in the private
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sector by 0.3 percent, while the regressions with simulated data point to an elasticity of 
around 0.2 percent.
The dynamic labour market equilibrium model tha t we set up captures the main 
essence of the interaction between public and private wages, and is quantitatively con­
sistent with the main estimation findings. This is true even if it abstracts from other 
channels that may be relevant. For instance, higher public sector wages might translate 
into higher demand, increasing the pressure on the private sector labour market. Alter­
natively, public sector wage growth may also carry a signal to the private sector about 
the government’s expectations for inflation. In addition, in the presence of on-the-job 
search, the transmission mechanism of public sector wages can be amplified.
In light of our results, and as discussed in Pedersen et al. (1990), governments could 
use their role as an employer to reduce public sector wages. This policy, in addition to re­
ducing the tax burden necessary to finance government spending, would have a downward 
impact on private sector wages, unemployment and, possibly, on inflation. Nevertheless, 
one has to bear in mind the issue of the composition of public sector employment. It 
is a known fact tha t high-skilled workers have a negative premium from working in the 
public sector (Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007)), which makes it harder for the government 
to recruit them (Nickell and Quintini (2002)). Therefore, wage moderation for this group 
could worsen the problem and make retention of high-skilled workers even harder in the 
public sector.
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3.6 A ppendix
3.6.1 M odel in efficiency units
As the technology has a unit root with drift, the model does not have a steady state. There 
is a balance growth path in which employment, unemployment, vacancies and labour 
market flows are constant; and in which wages, consumption, the value of employment 
and unemployment and the value of a job for the firm are growing at rate 7  values. We 
define the variables in efficiency units with tilde (as a ratio of technology),
-Tjp_ = u * - ^ L  r - i l  * - zwt — , wt+i — , Ct — , w t — , u t — , Jt — 1 — z i — £ •at ^  at at at at at at at
We can re-write the non-stationary equations in efficiency units. The Euler equation 
becomes:
l = / 3 ( l + r t)Et [ ^ - ^ - ] .  (A3.1)
Q + i  at
The value functions become:
W;f =  (1 -  r t)u f  —  +  -  W )W t3+1 + A‘Ut+1], i = p,g,  (A3.2)
at~ 1 at
W? =  (1 -  Tt)w? +  E t t [(1 -  A”)W?+1 +  Apt/(+1], i = p , g ,  (A3.3)
at
Ui = z + E tPt,t+i — \p\W*+1 + ( l - p \ ) U ^ 1],i = p,g,  (A3.4)
a t
Jt =  (1  -  a ) i r a -U% + B A .+1  —  [(1 -  Ap)J i+1]. (A3.5)
<h
The first order condition from the firm and the Nash bargaining becomes
5  =  £ tA,(+1^ ± i[ ( l  -  a )JE r  -  u>>+1 +  (1 -  A ')-£ -] , (A3.6)
Qt at qt+1
{W f -  Ut) = 6(1 ~ .n \ w ? - U t  +  Jt). (A3.7)
1  —  0Tt
Finally, the equations for the public sector become:
Tt W Pt)  = (1 ~ n ) - tl~ - + zv*, (A3.8)
9t
^ t+l^t jp [at+l ^ t+ l]  | \^ t— 1 ,7,1 , vug f  \  o c\\
- w ]+K [w r r  ]+et  ■ ( }
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where
P
9t = - jr -  = exP(7 +  $)•  (A3.10)
at- 1
3.6.2 D ata
Table A3.1: Summary statistics and sources
M ean Standard
d ev ia tion
M in M ax Source
Growth rate of real private sector wages 1.42 2.17 -7.46 9.40 OECD
Growth rate of real public sector wages 1.11 3.13 -8.24 11.06 OECD
Error correction mechanism 7.78 21.26 -50.35 91.89 OECD
A Unemployment rate 0.09 1.07 -2.76 5.10 CEP-OECD
Total factor productivity growth rate 1.87 1.53 -2.52 6.34 OECD
A Urbanisation rate 0.21 0.25 -0.06 1.60 CEP
Inflation rate 5.85 4.59 0.02 23.23 OECD
Terms of Trade growth rate -0.12 4.65 -20.30 28.89 BHHS
Hours per worker growth rate -0.08 0.32 -3.82 3.15 CEP-OECD
Growth rate of public employment 1.38 2.28 -5.76 14.98 OECD
Budget Balance -2.98 4.35 -15.71 15.37 AMECO - IMF
Government Debt 54.16 28.02 2.31 140.85 AMECO - IMF
A Tax wedge 0.24 1.72 -10.28 5.87 BHHS
A Union density -0.21 1.19 -5.90 4.80 CEP
A Bargaining Coordination -0.01 0.08 -0.25 0.20 CEP
A Benefit duration 0.01 0.04 -0.21 0.32 CEP
A Replacement rate 0.26 3.02 -7.40 24.10 CEP
A Education attainment 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.48 CEP
Central bank independence 0.53 0.21 0.17 0.93 BHHS
Election 0.30 0.46 0 1 Comparative 
parties dataset
% Left wing votes 36.33 14.36 0 56 Comparative 
parties dataset
Note: I  use two datasets that expand the Labour M arket Institutions Database created by Nickell, Nun- 
ziata, and Ochel (2005):the BHHS expanded by Baker, Glyn, Howell, and Schm itt (2003) and the CEP  
- OECD Institutions D ata Set by Nickell (2006). The comparatives party dataset was created by Duane 
Swank and it is available on h ttp ://w w w .m u.edu /polisci/Sw ank.h tm .
Employment and wage variables
The data on public employment and wages is taken from the OECD (Economic Outlook 
database). For most countries there is information on Government employment (EG). To calcu­
late the per employee wage we divide Government final wage consumption expenditure (CGW) 
by Government employment. To get the wage in real terms we deflate it using the Private final 
consumption expenditure deflator (PCP).
We also have the value for the Compensation of employees (WSSS) and Total employment 
(ET), which refers to the total economy. We define Private sector compensation as the total 
Compensation of employees minus the Government final wage consumption (WSSS-CGW). We 
define the private employment (EP) as Total employment minus Government employment minus 
Self Employed (ES): EP=ET-EG-ES. The private sector nominal wage per employee is Private 
sector compensation divided by private sector employees.
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For the case of Australia, there is no information on government employment but there 
is on Private sector employment and Compensation of private sector employees. In this case, 
Government employment is defined as Total employment minus Private sector employment and 
Compensation of public sector employees defined as the value of Compensation of employees 
minus Compensation of private sector employees.
Other variables
Benefit replacement rate - Benefit entitlement before tax as a percentage of previous earnings 
before tax. Source: CEP.
Benefit duration index. Source: CEP.
Coordination index - Captures the degree of consensus between actors in collective bargain­
ing (1 low, 3 high). Source: CEP.
Trade union density - Ratio of total reported union members (minus retired and unemployed) 
to all salaried employees. Source: CEP.
Educational attainment - Average years of schooling from total population aged 15 and over 
(taken from Barro and Lee dataset and intrapolated). Source: CEP.
Tax wedge - Payroll tax plus income tax plus the consumption tax rate. Source: BHHS.
Productivity growth - Growth rate of productivity per worker. Source: OECD.
Terms of trade - Growth rate of terms of trade. Source: BHHS.
Urbanisation rate - Percentage of the population living in urban areas (taken from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators). Source: CEP.
Inflation - Source: OECD.
Unemployment rate - Source: CEP.
Budget Balance - Government balance as percentage of GDP. Source: AMECO European 
Commission database, complemented with IMF data for early years.
Government debt - Government debt as percentage of GDP. Source: AMECO European 
Commission database, complemented with IMF data for early years.
Election year - Dummy if there was a parliamentary of presidential election. Source: Com­
parative parties dataset.
Left wing - Percentage of left with votes of last parliamentary elections. Source: Compara­
tive parties dataset.
Central Bank Independence Index. Source: BHHS
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Chapter 4
O ptim al labour and profit taxation  
and the supply of public capital1
4.1 Introduction
Over the past four decades most developed countries have experienced similar trends in 
several government instruments, both on the expenditure and on the taxation side. In 
a nutshell, compared to the 1960s many governments are now allocating relatively more 
resources to government consumption than to public investment and shifted part of the 
taxation burden from corporate profits to labour income.
As shown in Figure 4.1, in the G7 countries government consumption has increased 
on average from 14 to 20 percent of GDP, while public investment has declined from 4.5 
to below 3 percent of GDP. Such a decrease in public investment has implied a decline in 
the stock of public capital from 60 to 50 percent of GDP. At the same time the statutory 
corporate tax rate has declined on average by 20 percentage points, while the marginal 
labour income tax has increased by 15 percentage points.2
Among the possible explanations we investigate whether such trends can be generated 
as the outcome of an optimal policy plan chosen by a benevolent government. The 
literature on optimal dynamic taxation, following Judd (1985) or Chamley (1986), has 
typically analyzed the choice of taxing labour or capital income where the provision of 
public expenditure is treated as exogenous. This is no coincidence. Under standard 
assumptions the choice of how much public good to provide does not influence the choice 
of how to spread the tax burden between different sources of income. However, since the 
taxation and the expenditure sides are analyzed independently, those models are limited
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Davide Debortoli from the University of California, 
San Diego.
2In appendix we show the variables disaggregated by country as well as for an average of 18 OECD 
countries. Most of them share the same trends.
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in their ability to explain the co-movements between the composition of expenditure 
and the sources of taxation. Additionally, with a few exceptions, they focus on capital 
taxation while in reality perhaps their major component is the taxation of corporate 
profits.3
We build on the dynamic optimal taxation literature in considering a model where 
the government can choose how to allocate the public expenditure between two types of 
goods, namely public consumption and investment in productive public capital. Public 
expenditure is financed by levying taxes on labour income and corporate profits. The 
corporate profit tax plays a different role than a simple tax on capital income. Since public 
capital increases corporate profits, taxing corporate profits becomes a way to extract the 
private rents generated by public capital.
The presence of productive public capital and taxes on corporate profits generates 
a link between the choice of how to allocate expenditure and how to finance it. The 
provision of public capital affects the rents of firms, and alters the trade-off between 
taxing profits or wages. Similarly, the level and the composition of the tax rates affect 
the trade-off between government consumption and investment. In other words, the 
composition of expenditures and the structure of taxation are two interrelated choices.
As a result, in our model it is optimal for the government to have a positive profit 
tax also in steady-state. As a tax on capital income, the corporate profit tax distorts 
the accumulation of private capital. However, it also allows to extract the firms’ rents 
that exist due to public capital. In the same spirit as in Correia (1996), in our model 
a factor of production, public capital, cannot be taxed directly. Then, taxing corporate 
profits becomes an indirect way of taxing public capital. As a result, the optimality of 
zero capital taxation established by Judd (1985) or Chamley (1986) is overturned. Under 
the baseline calibration, the steady-state corporate tax rate is 32 percent and implies an 
effective marginal tax rate on private capital of around 20 percent.
In light of the model we find three possible explanations for the trends in the fiscal 
instruments. One hypothesis is that public capital has become a less important input in 
the production function. This is a plausible scenario given the change in the economic 
structure towards a “weightless economy” , more centered in services and knowledge- 
based (Quah (1998)). As the importance of public infrastructure declines, the government 
reduces public investment and raises government consumption. Additionally, as the firms 
enjoy fewer rents, the government also reduces the profit tax and compensates it with an 
increase in the taxation of labour income.
3See studies by Joines (1981) or Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
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Figure 4.1: Taxes and allocation of public spending in the G7 countries
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Note: The sources fo r  the sta tu tory and effective marginal tax rate are Michigan W orld tax database and 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008). The marginal labour income is from  Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994). The public investm ent and the government consumption series are from  OECD. The estim ates of 
public capital are from  K am ps (2006). The countries included are: Canada, France, Germany, Raly, Japan, 
United Kingdom  and United States.
The second explanation is that we are simply observing the transition to the steady 
state, starting from a low level of public capital. At the beginning, the Ramsey planner 
sets a labour income tax at low values to induce labour supply, and a high corporate 
tax for several periods. This tax structure together with a reduction in government 
consumption allows for high rates of public investment and rapid accumulation of public 
capital. Along the transition, public investment and the corporate tax go down, while 
government consumption and labour income tax experience the opposite trend.
Under the optimal plan, the four instruments are determined endogenously and they 
respond to changes in the parameters. However, the interdependence of the instruments 
has an important implication. Any exogenous factor affecting one of them will also affect 
the optimal choice of all three other instruments. We find tha t exogenous movements in 
any one instrument alters both the optimal level and the composition of spending and 
taxes. Although exogenous changes in only one instrument, cannot explain in isolation 
the three other trends, if one considers that globalization has simultaneously put a down­
ward pressure of profit taxation (through international tax competition) and increasing 
pressure in government consumption (through the demand for public transfers), it would 
also lead to an increase in labour income tax and a decline in public investment.
This paper relates to other papers in the fiscal policy literature. Baxter and King 
(1993) analyzed the business cycle implications of exogenous changes in taxes and in
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the supply of an unproductive public good and of productive public capital. We build 
on their framework in two dimensions. First, we consider that the government has two 
instruments available to raise revenue: labour income and profit taxation. Second, we 
consider the government chooses optimally the tax rates, as well as the allocation of 
spending.
Other authors have also explored the relation between profit and capital taxation. 
Abel (2007) finds that if firms can have immediate expensing, the effective tax rate on 
capital is always zero, independently of the corporate tax rate. The corporate tax does 
not, therefore, affect the investment decision of the firms, so the government can raise a 
substantial amount of revenue in a non-distortionary way by setting the maximum possi­
ble profit tax. Conesa and Dominguez (2009) also distinguish between corporate taxation 
and dividend taxation in a setting where the firms’ rents are generated by the presence 
of intangible capital. In their setting, corporate tax should be zero in every period. On 
the other hand, as the government has a non-distortionary dividend tax available, it 
should set it at the highest possible level, in order to capture the economic rents. In our 
framework this is not possible because the government has only one instrument available, 
and the extent to which profit tax is tied to the effective marginal tax rate on capital 
is exogenous. One interesting aspect of our framework is that the size of the rents is 
influenced by the government’s choices.
The chapter continues as follows. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we describe the model 
and characterize the solution of the optimal policy problem. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 we 
calibrate the model and we analyze the different possible sources of the observed trends 
in fiscal policy instruments. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 M odel
The model is a standard deterministic neoclassical growth model, augmented with pro­
ductive public capital. The economy is populated by a representative infinitely lived 
household, whose standard preferences are given by
oo
^ 2 ^ u ( c t,g t ,nu pt), (4.1)
t=o
where ct and nt denote private consumption and hours worked. The utility function is 
also assumed to be increasing and concave in the amount of public consumption (gt) and 
public capital (pt) provided by the government.
The household rents capital (kt) and supplies labour to a representative firm, facing 
distortionary taxes on labour income (r”) and corporate profits (r*). Its period-by-period
112
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL TAXATION AND THE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC CAPITAL
budget constraint is then
ct + kt+i = w tn t{l - r " )  +  (l +  r t)fct +  T t V* =  0 ,1 ,2 ,..., (4.2)
where wt denotes the hourly wage, r t denotes the return on capital net of taxes and 
depreciation, and T t represents all the lump-sum transfers to the households in terms of 
profits or government subsidies.
Output is produced by a representative firm using labour, private and public capital. 
Following Arrow and Kurz (1970) we consider a constant return to scale production 
function y t =  f ( k t ,P t ,n t ). Taking as given prices (rt , w t) and policies (r", pt ), firms 
choose the production factors to maximize their after-tax profits, given by
(1 -  7f) [f{kt,pu nt) -  wtnt -  8kkt -  ( r tkt] -  (1 -  Q rtkt . (4.3)
In writing equation (4.3) we assume that only a fraction £ of the financial cost of capital 
can be deduced from the tax base.4 We motivate this assumption on two grounds. First, 
the parameter £ introduces a wedge between the statutory tax and the effective marginal 
tax rate on capital, a feature consistent with what observed in the data. In the limiting 
case of (  = 0, the effective marginal tax rate and the statutory tax rate coincide. Second, 
the parameter (  may reflect the firm’s financing structure, divided between bonds and 
equity, which is assumed to be exogenous in our model. Typically, bond interest payments 
can be deduced from the tax base, while dividends to shareholders cannot.
In order for the firm’s problem to be well-defined, we impose a limit on corporate 
tax rate r n < 1. Otherwise firm’s profits would always be negative, as can be seen in 
equation (4.3). Once this limit is imposed, given the positive externality produced by 
public capital, firm’s profits are strictly positive in equilibrium, despite the assumption 
of a perfectly competitive market.5
The government provides the public good gt and the public capital p t , raising taxes 
on labour income and corporate profits, subject to the balanced budget condition6
9t +  Pt+i ~  (1 ~  $P)Pt = r? (wtn t) +  r f  (yt — wtn t -  5kkt -  ( rtkt) . (4.4)
4If all the financial costs of capital could be deduced from the tax base (i.e. when (  =  1), the profit 
taxation would be non-distortionary and corporate taxes would always be used to its maximum extent.
5Profits remain positive as long as the production function is not homogenous of degree one in private 
capital and labour. Even in that case, positive profits could arise in the presence of other frictions like 
monopolistic competitions and limited entry, not explicitly modeled here for simplicity.
6Since the government can accumulate public capital, the balanced budget condition only limits the 
possibility of the government to borrow from the private sector. This assumption is made for simplicity 
and is largely irrelevant for our considerations.
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Finally, the aggregate feasibility constraint is given by
ct +  9 t+ P t+ 1 -  (1 -  $p)Pt +  h + i  ~  (1 -  fik)kt = f ( h , P t , n t ). (4.5)
We can now define the competitive equilibrium as follows.
D efin ition  2 Given an initial stock of private capital (ko) and public capital (po), a 
competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation {ct, kt+i, n t } ^ 0, a policy {pt+i,gt, , t ”} ^ 0 
and a price system {r*, 0 such that (i) the allocation maximizes (4-1) subject to the
sequence of constraints (4-2), a no-Ponzi scheme constraint, for given prices, policies 
and initial capital ko; (ii) In any period t, firms maximize (4-3), given prices and public 
capital pt; (Hi) the government satisfies its period by period budget constraint (4-4)-
It then follows that, in addition to the feasibility constraint (4.5), the competitive equi­
librium is characterized by the following relations:
(4.6)
=  M l - i f ) ,  (4.7)
^C,t
■ 1-C
gt +  Pt+1 -  (1 -  fip)Pt = rf- (wtn t) +  t* 1-C T'i- ( fk,t — 3 )kt +  fpjPt
(4.8)
where we used the firm’s optimality conditions to substitute for the equilibrium values 
of wt and rt. Moreover, to obtain (4.8) we made use of the homogeneity of degree one of 
the production function.7
Some considerations are in order. First, as indicated by the Euler Equation (4.6), 
the ratio constitutes a wedge between the rate of intertemporal substitution and
the marginal returns on capital. That ratio can, therefore, be considered as the effective 
marginal tax rate on private capital. Second, the government budget constraint (4.8) 
indicates that the tax base for corporate taxes is composed by two elements: the returns 
on private capital (fk,t — Sk)kt and the returns on public capital (f P)tPt)• The presence 
of the latter term shows why taxing capital income is different than taxing corporate 
profits. Taxing corporate profits allows the government to appropriate part of the rents 
associated with the provision of public capital. This indicates that the supply of public 
capital and the corporate profit tax rate are two interrelated choices. In what follows, we 
characterize the choices of the composition of taxes and expenditures when policies are 
chosen optimally by a benevolent policymaker.
7As usual, the household’s budget constraint is also satisfied, as implied by Walras’ Law.
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4.3 Optim al fiscal policy problem
The goal of a Ramsey planner is to choose the best competitive equilibrium implied by a 
sequence of policies {pt+i, <7t,T4n, r tfc}” 0. The planner’s problem is therefore
oo
,  max „ y 2 ^ u (ct,9 t ,n t ,Pt)
{ct ,nt ,fct+i ,pt + 1 ,gt ,rt ,rtn}t=0 “
S.t. (4.5) -  (4.8)
Tn < 1 Vt =  0, 1, ...
Po,&o given
To better understand the interactions between the tax rates and the composition of 
public expenditure, we can look at the first-order optimality condition with respect to 
the corporate tax rate, given by
Mm fp,tPt  +
1-C
(i -  c r?y
{h,t -  <5*) h — Xt- i u cj  ( f kft — 8k) 1- C
(1  -  c T,n
2 ’ (4.9)
where At_i and /xltt represent the shadow values of relaxing constraints (4.6) and (4.8), 
respectively.8 The left-hand side of (4.9) represents the marginal benefits of increasing 
profit taxes due to the higher tax revenues. An increase in r n increases the revenues 
from public capital income (first term in the square brackets) and increases the effective
marginal tax rate (as given by the ratio i z L ■j) applied to private capital income (last(i-C r? y
term in the brackets). An increase in r 71- also generates some welfare costs due to the 
interest rate distortions, as indicated in the right-hand side of (4.9). At an optimum, the 
planner equalizes these marginal costs and benefits. We can rewrite equation (4.9) as
(T? = 1 ( fk, t  ~  Sk) k t ( X t- i u Ctt -  -  C) (4.10)
There are three elements that affect the choice of the tax rate. The first one is the 
extent to which the profit tax is tied to the effective marginal tax rate. If C =  1, the 
firm can deduce all costs of capital from the tax base, corporate taxation becomes non- 
distortionary and the optimal tax rate is 100 percent. If £ ^  1, the tax rate is distortionary 
and the government chooses it by balancing two opposite effects. On the one hand, the 
more distortionary the tax rate is, captured by the multiplier of the Euler equation, the 
lower the tax rate. On the other hand, it is increasing on the size of the rents f p,tPt and 
on the shadow value of government revenue n i>t- From these considerations it follows that
8For illustrative purposes only, we are assuming that the constraint Tn <  1 is not binding. Notice 
that the latter constraint will always be binding in t  =  0. In that period, being A_i = 0 ,  equation 4.9 
implies that by raising corporate profit taxes the government can achieve the Pareto-optimal solution 
where the constraint 4.8 is never binding.
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the optimal level of corporate taxes depends on the amount of public capital supplied. 
For a given level of public expenditure, the higher the share of public investment, the 
higher the benefits from increasing r t7r.
Also, the composition of public spending depends on the tax rates. This is clear when 
combining the first order conditions of government consumption and public capital, given 
by
Ug,t ~  @ Up,t+ 1 +  P ^ 2 , t + 1 [(1  — &P) +  f p , t + 1] +
1 — T n
— Tt)fpn,t+1 +  (3^tUc,t+It----~ r^-fpk}t+1 +
1 — sTt+l1
/ K t + 1 [(l - ' 5 p) +  K p,t+1] ,  (4.11)
where Hp^+i = t£+1 (fpp^+iPt+i +  f P,t+1) +  i - c t ^  "h+ifpk,t+i +  ^+i/np,t+ i^+i is the 
derivative of future government revenues with respect to public capital, while ii2,t and 
fis)t are the shadow values of relaxing constraints (4.5) and (4.7), respectively.9
When choosing the allocation of spending between public investment and government 
consumption, the Ramsey planner equates the marginal benefit of the two types of public 
goods. If the government had lump sum taxes available, the marginal benefit of public 
investment would be the present value of the marginal utility of public capital and the 
effect on future aggregate resources (first line). However, the presence of distortionary 
taxation gives more incentive for the government to invest. First, by increasing the 
productivity of private factors, it counteracts the effects of distortionary taxes (second 
line). Second, public capital also increases future tax revenues (third line). In other 
words, public capital raises the marginal productivity of factors and increases the firm’s 
rents that are taxed. Thus, higher tax rates, particularly the corporate tax rate, increase 
the return to public investment in terms of future tax revenues and raise the incentive 
for the government to invest instead of consume.
4.4 Calibration
Before proceeding to our numerical analysis, we have to make some specific assumptions 
regarding the functional forms of the utility and the production function and calibrate 
the relevant parameters. We consider a separable log utility function and a Cobb-Douglas 
production function:
u {ct ,gu nu Pt) = ln(c*) +  V>n M l  -  M  M & ) +  V  Mp*)
9The other first-order conditions are reported in the appendix.
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f ( k u Pt ,n t) = k«pet n] a 9
The discount factor is such that the steady-state annual real interest rate is 4 percent. 
The elasticity of output with respect to private capital is 0.3. The parameter 6 is more 
controversial. Estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital in the 
literature are quite dispersive (see Bom and Ligthart (2008) for a meta-analysis). We set 
it a t 0.05, the benchmark value used by Baxter and King (1993) at the lower end of the 
empirical literature.
The three parameters of the utility function ?/;n, 'ijj9, ipp are such that, in steady state, 
the household works one third of the available time, the ratio of government consumption 
to output is around 0.2 and the stock of public capital amounts to 56 percent of output. 
The parameter (  is set such that the effective marginal tax rate on capital is close to 
10 percentage points below the statutory tax rate. The depreciation rate of private and 
public capital are set at 8 and 6 percent. These numbers imply that private investment 
(ik) corresponds to 18 percent of GDP and public investment (ip) to 3.4 percent of GDP.
Table 4.1 shows the baseline calibration and the implied steady-state values of the 
main variables. Under this calibration, in steady state, the corporate tax rate is 32 
percent and the labour income tax is 30 percent.
Table 4.1: Baseline calibration
6 0.05
1.6
P aram eters  
a  0.3 C 0.35 
W  0.35 V'P 0.01
Sk 0.08 
0  0.96
SP 0.06
S tea d y -sta te  value o f  variables
T n 0.32 0.23 Tn 0.30 * 0.21
I
m
V 0.034
E 0.56 f  2.24 n  0.33 l-  0.18 c 0.58y V y y
4.5 Explaining the co-m ovem ent of fiscal variables
The purpose of this section is to understand the interaction mechanisms that characterize 
the model and to discuss some hypotheses that are consistent with the evolution of fiscal 
instruments described above. First, we examine how the steady state varies with the 
different parameters. Then we look at the transition dynamics. Finally, we analyse how 
the optimal choice of the instruments is made, when one of them is set exogenously.
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4.5.1 Decreasing need of public infrastructure
Figures 4.2 show how the several fiscal variables change in steady state with the elasticity 
of output with respect to public capital (9). As the importance of public capital in the 
production function decreases, the Ramsey government reduces the corporate tax rate to 
extract a smaller fraction of the rents. Labour income tax increases but the magnitude is 
small. In the expenditure side, as 9 decreases, there is a transfer of resources from public 
investment to government consumption; on the one hand, because public capital becomes 
a less important input of production; on the other hand, because it has a dimmer impact 
on the stream of future tax revenues. At the limit, when the weight of public capital in 
the production function is zero, the model is equivalent to the standard model of optimal 
dynamic taxation. There are no rents in production, so the optimal steady-state profit 
tax rate is zero.
In order to better understand the role of the deduction allowance, we show how it 
affects the steady state (Figure 4.3). If the firms can deduce all financial costs from 
their reported profit, the corporate tax rate is not distortionary. The optimal policy 
in that case is to have a 100 percent corporate tax rate, which allows the government 
to capture all the rents from public capital. The most interesting element is that the 
effective marginal tax rate on capital is not very responsive to £. Even with a £ close 
to 0.9, the effective marginal tax rate on capital is around 20 percent. As the effective 
tax rate on capital becomes detached from the profit tax rate, the government prefers to 
capture a larger fraction of the rents, instead of reducing the intertemporal distortion.
Statutoiy Effective
Figure 4.2: Steady-state effects of the elasticity of output w.r.t. public capital
C orpo rate  tax  rate
G overnm en t c o n su m p tio n P ublic  inv e stm e n t I G ov. C onsum ption
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Figure 4.3: Steady-state effects of the deduction allowance
C orpo rate  tax  ra te C o rp o ra te  ta x  I L abor tax
t
Public  inv e stm e n t I G ov. C onsum ption
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In the Appendix we illustrate how the steady-state of the model changes with the 
other parameters of the model, namely the relative weights of government consumption, 
leisure and public capital in the utility function and the elasticity of output with respect to 
private capital ('05,V,n» ^ pj **)• All of these parameters alter the composition of taxation 
and spending, but none of them is consistent with the observed comovements.
4.5.2 Transition to steady state
When examining the transition dynamics of the model, our aim is to understand the role 
of the accumulation of both private and public capital along the path to steady-state. 
We consider two starting points: one with low public capital, where public and private 
capital are 60 and 20 percent below steady state (solid line), and one with low private 
capital with the inverse proportions (dashed line). The results are shown in Figure 4.4.
The transition dynamics do not change much from the traditional model. When the 
government re-optimizes, as the previous plan is made obsolete, it sets the profit tax rate 
at the maximum possible. At the same time, it reduces labour income tax to induce 
labour supply. When we start with a low private capital stock, the decline of labour 
income tax is so strong that it turns into a subsidy. This is achieved with the increase 
of profit tax, a sharp reduction of public consumption and a disaccumulation of public 
capital.
When we start with a lower public capital stock, corporate tax stays at the maximum 
value for several periods and the labour income does not decrease as much. Together with
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic transition to steady state
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the reduction of government consumption, it allows for a rapid accumulation of public 
capital. Along the transition path that takes roughly 20 years, public investment goes 
down, government consumption increases, corporate tax decreases and labour income tax 
goes up.
4.5.3 Effects of globalisation
As we have seen, under the optimal plan, the four instruments are determined jointly 
and changes in the parameters of the model alter the optimal allocation of spending and 
of the tax burden. An important corollary of this interdependence is that exogenous 
changes in one of the instruments can affect the optimal choices of all other instruments. 
In this sub-section we try to illustrate why this is relevant. We focus our discussion on 
how the model responds to exogenous changes in corporate tax rate (Figure 4.5) and in 
government consumption (Figure 4.6). The responses to the other two instruments are 
in appendix.
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As corporate tax goes down, the government tries to get additional revenue by raising 
the labour income tax. However, as total revenue falls, all types of expenditures go down, 
particularly the government consumption. As government consumption increases, both 
taxes go up in order to raise revenue, particularly the labour income tax. On the other 
hand, although there are more incentives for the government to invest because of higher 
taxes, government consumption drains so much revenue that it is optimal to reduce public 
investment.
When one instrument changes for exogenous reasons, there is a revenue and a sub­
stitution effect. The substitution effect comes directly from the first-order conditions of 
the Ramsey problem. However when the government exogenously increases one type of 
expenditure, it will require higher revenue which will push both tax rates up. Similarly, 
when it decreases one tax rate, it will generate lower revenue, so it forces both types of 
spending to go down. From these exercises it seems that the revenue effect always over­
comes the substitution effect, so we can never get the appropriate co-movement between 
the instruments.
Exogenous changes in one instrument are not sufficient to explain the trends in the 
four instruments. However, they can be attributed to the combination of a decline in 
profit tax and an increase in government consumption, which in turn can be seen as the 
effects of globalisation. Epifani and Gancia (2009) argue that the increase in the size 
of government is a consequence of the increase in openness, partially because it raised 
the demand for insurance and public transfers. The decline in the corporate tax rate is
Figure 4.5: Steady-state effects of exogenous changes in profit tax
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1 Statutory Effective
Figure 4.6: Steady-state effects of exogenous changes in government consumption
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usually attributed to international tax competition and a higher degree of capital and 
profit mobility (see Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008)). Our model shows why 
in turns those movements may result in a decline in public investment and an increase in 
labour income taxes. Quantitatively, if we combine a decline in the corporate tax rate of 
20 percentage points and an increase in government consumption by 6 percent of GDP, 
labour income tax would increase by 12 percentage points and public investment would 
decline by one quarter.
While the first two explanations for the evolution of the fiscal variables consist of an 
optimal response through time or to changes in technology, this last hypothesis is very 
different in nature. It implies that exogenous events are constraining the choice of one 
or more instruments. Even if the government is responding optimally to an exogenous 
event, there are some welfare costs associated. To illustrate this we do a simple exercise. 
If the government is limited by a corporate tax rate of 12 percent, the welfare costs is 1.4 
percent of consumption compensating variation relative to the Ramsey solution. On the 
other hand, if government consumption is constrained to be 6 percent of GDP above the 
optimal steady-state level, the associated cost is 1.2 percent of steady-state consumption.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that the decisions on both the level and composition 
of expenditure and revenue of the government are intrinsically related and should not 
be analysed in isolation. The optimal choice of government consumption weights the
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marginal benefit to the household’s utility against the costs of the distortions needed to 
raise revenue and the aggregate resources used. As for public capital, apart from entering 
the utility of the households, it raises output, generating more resources. Additionally, 
an increase in public capital raises the firm’s profits and the household’s wages, thus 
enlarging the tax base. The tax rates, particularly the profit tax, can, therefore, be 
interpreted as one of the returns of public capital, in terms of government revenue. This 
element is absent in the case of lump-sum taxation, but becomes relevant when taxes are 
distortionary. The level and the composition of the tax rates affect the trade-off between 
government’s consumption and investment. On the one hand, the government’s decision 
on how to allocate spending affects the size of the rents of the firm, which alters the 
trade-off between taxing profits or wages.
Although we cannot give a definitive answer on the origin of the trends we observe in 
the data, the model allows us to identify three scenarios that are consistent with them. 
First, if the production function is becoming less dependent on public capital, we would 
observe a decline in government investment and corporate tax rate, but an increase in 
government consumption and labour income tax. These trends are also consistent with 
the transition path to steady state, when we start from a low public sector capital. Finally, 
if we characterize globalization as both reducing the corporate tax rate and increasing 
government consumption, it can also explain the trends in both public investment and 
labour income tax rate.
Trying to identify the true source of the evolution of the fiscal instruments is an 
important task with defining welfare implications. If the data is driven by changes in 
technology or it is the optimal path towards the steady state, there is no particular 
reason for concern. However, if these trends are driven by exogenous factors such as 
globalisation, they generate welfare losses that governments should try  to avoid.
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4.7 A ppendix
4.7.1 M odel
The consumer’s first-order conditions:
— PuC)t+1 (1 d" Tt+i) , (A4.1)
(A4.2)
The firm’s first-order conditions:
(A4.3)
(! -  r f )  (f n,t ~  wt) = 0. (A4.4)
Combining these equations and imposing r* < 1, we get (4.6) and (4.7). If we want to 
determine the first-best allocation, achievable if the government has a lump sum tax we 
just have to solve the following problem
P0,k0 given
The first-order conditions of the Pareto problem are:
Q • 'U/c,t 9*2,t 0)
9 t  • u g,t 1^2,t =  0)
TH • V'rift “1“ 9J2,tfn,t — 0?
&H-1 : ~^2,t + /^ M2,t+l[(l ” ^) + fk,t+1] — 0, 
Pt+1 : ~^2,t + flup,t+1 + /?At2,t+l[(l — $P) + fp,t+1] = 0.
oo
max
{ct,kt+i,9t,nt,Pt+i}
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The Lagrangian formulation of the Ramsey problem is
max
{ct,kt+i,gt,nt,Pt+i-Tt >Tt h=o t=0
gt + Pt+1 -  (1 -  5>)Pt -  t?  (/„,(n () -  r f  (  J — L ( / M -  +  / p>(P ^
—P 1^ , t  \pt + Pt + Pit+i — (1 — P^)-Pf d- &h-i — (1 — — f { k t , P t , nt)j
^n,t
'U'Cyt P'U'C,t+1 ( I T
i+1
Tn- < 1 for all £ =  0,1,... 
P0, fc0 given
The first-order conditions of this problem are:
•t  •
c* :
Pt : 
n t :
fci+l
t+1
Mi,* +  (Fi^rys (/fc.i — ^fe) kt ~~ ^t-iUc,t (fk,t — 5k) — 0
M3 , t f n , t  =  0
Uc,t ~ M2,t ~  M3,i ' n^ '*  ~ ^tUcc,t + Af-iUcc  ^^1 + pi^r(/fc,i — = 0
Ug,t ~ (*2,t ~ Ml,i = 0
n,t d~ M2,tfn,t d“ Ml ,t T~t (fn,t d~ fnn,t^t) d-  ^1— d- fpnjPt'j 
d" /nn,i(l ~  Tt )  d~ Af_iUC)f fkn,t = 0
+
M3 ,t
—M2,t d~ PfJ/2,t+l [(1 ~ d- A,i+l] d- PH'2,t+\ x
Tt+l (/fcn.t+l^ t+l) d" ( i _ {fk,t+1  ^ ) d" fkk,t+lkt+l d- fpk,t+lPt+l)
P 1^ 3,t+1 [/fcn,i+l(l — r/+l)] d“ Af P uCjt+l i-^r^ fkk,t+1 = 0
—1*2,t d~ /3uP)t+i d- /?//2,i+l[(l — <^P) d- /p,i+l] — Ml,t d~ /^Ml.t+l X
(1 — P^) d“ f^+i (/pn,f+l i^+l) d" Tt+l  ^l-^r^ fkp,t+1 &t+l d~ fp,t+1 d" /pp.i+lPt+l^  
PfJ>3,t+l [/pn,i+l(l — rH-l)] d- At Puc,t+l 1^ i - ~ f k p , t+1 = 0
+
d-
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4.7.2 Figures
S t e a d y - s t a t e  e f f e c t s  o f  p a r a m e t e r s
Figure Al: Steady-state effects of the elasticity of output w.r.t. private capital
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Figure A3: Steady-state effects of utility of public capital
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Figure A4: Steady-state effects of utility of government consumption
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E x o g e n o u s  c h a n g e s  in  in s t r u m e n t s
Figure A5: Steady-state effects of exogenous changes in public capital
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Figure A6 : Steady-state effects of exogenous changes in labour tax
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4.7.3 Taxes and public spending in the G7 countries
Figure A7: Taxes and allocation of public spending in the G7 countries
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Chapter 5
Corporate tax com petition and the  
supply o f public capital1
5.1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, there has been a downward trend in two distinct government policy 
tools. On the one hand, statutory corporate tax rates have gone down in the majority 
of OECD countries from around 45% to 30%. On the other hand, public investment has 
declined from an average of 4.5% of GDP to below 3% of GDP. As a consequence, public 
capital stock has fallen by 10% of GDP (see Figure 5.1 below). In contrast, government 
consumption has increased during this period.
The decline in statutory corporate tax rate is a well documented phenomenon. It is 
usually attributed to international tax competition and a higher degree of capital and 
profit mobility.2 In contrast, the literature examining the downward trend in public 
investment is scarcer and far less compelling.3 In a way, the decline of public investment 
and public capital stock is a puzzle. Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007), 
among others, show for instance that the location of multinational firms does not entirely 
depend on national tax policies but also on ‘public infrastructure’, partly because of 
its positive effect of the productivity of private capital. Under these circumstances, the 
relationship displayed in Figure 5.1 could appear counter-intuitive: in a more competitive
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Frangois Pouget from Dauphine University.
2See, for instance, Krogstrup (2004).
3Some frequent explanations for the decline of public investment include: the increase of privatization, 
the increase of private-public partnerships, the smaller role of the government or, in the case of Europe, 
the need for fiscal stringency. Some of these explanations are not very convincing as argued by Mehrotra 
and Valila (2006). First, under national accounts, the investment undertaken by public enterprizes 
counts as private investment. Only investment recorded and financed from the budget counts as public 
investment . Second, private and public partnership is a very recent phenomenon that could not account 
for the pattern observed since the 1970s. Furthermore, government consumption has increased during 
the same period for most OECD countries. See Balassone and Franco (2000).
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Figure 5.1: Corporate taxation and allocation of public spending in OECD countries
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environment we would indeed expect countries to increase their stock of public capital 
(at the expense of public consumption) in order to attract more private investment.
We argue that these two phenomenons are related. Firstly, we claim that there is 
an intrinsical relation between corporate tax and public investment, beyond the simple 
identity of the government budget constraint. On the one hand, if the tax rate is high, 
governments spend more on public investment, relative to government consumption. The 
intuition for this is the following. The existence of public capital creates rents for the 
firms. Part of these rents are appropriated by the government through the corporate 
taxation. In a way corporate taxation can be seen as a return on public investment. If 
the tax rate is at high levels, a government that cares about revenue (or cares about 
the distortions of raising revenue) tends to favour public investment, at the expenses of 
government consumption. On the other hand, the level of tax rate also depends positively 
on the level of public capital. The higher the level of public capital, the higher the rents 
for the firm. The firm is, therefore, able to support a higher tax burden on its profit. 
Both policy variables respond positively to each other and the two are jointly determined.
Given the endogenous relation between corporate tax rate and public investment, we 
argue that the increase in the international tax competition, that has been exogenously 
driving the corporate tax rate down over the past years, caused, as a side effect, the 
reduction of public investment.
To make our case, we first build a model where the decision-maker decides on a cor­
porate tax policy, but also chooses how to allocate its public resource. In this respect, the 
government has two alternatives: it can either invest (and therefore increase the stock of 
public capital) or allocate its tax receipts into “unproductive” government consumption. 
Additionally, we consider an element of tax competition to assess the short and long run 
macroeconomic implications of a greater degree of corporate tax competition. We, then, 
perform an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries for the period between 1966 and 
2002 .
We set up a simpler version of the model in Chapter 4 that illustrate the interdepen-
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dence between the corporate tax rate and productive spending and develop more deeply 
the element of international tax competition. In our two-country model, governments 
can enlarge their tax base by deciding on a more accommodating corporate tax rate or 
by increasing the stock of productive public capital (or public infrastructures). Because 
the exact source of tax competition does not affect the main mechanism of the model, we 
focus on profit shifting as opposed to capital mobility. Due to the growing internalization 
of the corporate sector, particularly in Europe, multinational companies have increased 
their ability to change the location of their declared profit in response to tax rates dif­
ferentials for tax avoidance purposes.4 Our simulations indicate that, following a decline 
of 15% in tax rate (driven by increasing competition), public investment in steady state 
diminishes between 0.2% and 0.4% of output. This leads to a drop in the steady-state 
public capital stock over output ranging from 4 to 11 percentage points. We also perform 
simulation on the transition between steady states and find tha t the short-run impact 
on public investment can be up to three times larger than the long-run effect. We also 
create different scenarios and challenge the robustness of the relationship. In all cases, 
international tax competition reduces the share of public spending allocated to public 
investment, therefore reducing the stock of public capital.
In the empirical part we estimate two endogenous policy functions of corporate tax 
rate and public investment that also respond to their foreign counterpart. Evidence con­
firms the endogeneity and the complementarity between the two tools: tax rate increases 
with the level of public investment and public investment increases with the tax rate. 
We find that a decline in tax rate of 15%, reduces public investment by 0.6% to 1.1% of 
GDP. Further evidence suggests that both tools are driven by competition, particularly 
te corporate tax rate.
The next section of this chapter introduces the theoretical model by presenting the 
main assumptions and mechanisms in a partial equilibrium setting. In Section 5.3 we cal­
ibrate the model and present the quantitative results. The empirical analysis is presented 
in the Section 5.4 while Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 M odel
The general equilibrium model consists of two countries denoted A and B. National 
governments decide on a tax rate levied on the benefits of the corporate sector and
4Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) performed an empirical analysis based on OECD countries and 
estimate in their baseline scenario that 65% of the additional revenue from a unilateral tax increase is 
lost due to a decrease in the reported profit to the national tax authorities. See also Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008) who have calculated that the average semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top 
statutory tax rate. In particular, Germany appears to have lost considerable tax revenues due to profit 
mobility -see Weichenrieder (2009). For other contributions on international tax competition and profit 
shifting, see Kind, Midelfart, and Schjelderup (2005), and Elitzur and Mintz (1996).
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allocate their tax receipts either to “productive” public investment or public consumption. 
The corporate sector is introduced through a single representative multinational firm 
producing a homogeneous good in both countries.
Capital is perfectly mobile between the two countries and the firm can borrow at a 
world interest rate. Since the two national tax bases are not consolidated, the corporate 
sector has the ability to shift profit in order to reduce its overall tax burden. However, 
these operations entail some costs. We assume perfect foresight and no uncertainty.
5.2.1 H ouseholds
In each country i (i G {A;i?}), a representative household derives its utility from both 
private consumption and public spending. The instantaneous utility function at time t 
is given by
Ult = In c\ +  £ In g\ +  7  In P %t . (5.1)
The utility derived from public spending depends first on government consumption, 
which covers all current expenditures with no direct productive purposes. Additionally, 
the household’s utility depends on the stock of public capital, denoted Pt*. This stock 
represents a wide range of public infrastructures, such as roads or bridges, that are 
valuated by the representative household but also used in the production process (see 
below). Therefore, in line with Keen and Marchand (1997), our model relies on a clear-cut 
distinction between productive and non-productive government spending. Parameters £ 
and 7  tell us that the representative household can valuate differently these two categories 
of public spending.
In each country, the representative household takes public variables as given and 
maximizes the present discounted value of the lifetime utility of private consumption: 
U(clt) = P being the discount factor. The household’s budget constraint is
therefore described by
et + I it = w \ + rkt B it + T j - t .  (5.2)
In each period, household’s resources are either consumed (c\) or saved by holding shares 
of the private sector (II). We assume that the representative household supplies one unit 
of labour inelastically and wage rate is set at w\. Total net resources depend also on 
the total amount of private capital owned by the household, denoted B\, which yields a 
gross return of r f  and whose law of motion (assume that the depreciation rate of private 
capital is S) is
B't+1 =  (1 -  S)B\ + 1*. (5.3)
The household receives also dividends earned by the private sector: T\  (which will be
defined later on). Besides, a lump sum tax on personal income, t , is levied in order to
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finance public policy. Note that this specific tax rate will be considered exogenous in 
this model. Maximizing U(c\) subject to (5.2) gives us the consumption pattern of the 
representative household, which is determined by the following Euler condition (we define 
r t =  rf  — 8 as the net interest rate):
ct+ i  —  c t ( l  +  Tt+i)(3. (5.4)
5.2.2 C orporate sector
A single multinational firm operating in the two countries represents the private sector. 
It produces a homogeneous private good according to the following production function:
y\ = F{k\, PI, nj) =  f c f f f  (5.5)
The labor input, nlt , is considered to be immobile between the two countries. By contrast, 
capital is perfectly mobile and k\ describes the total quantity of capital used in country i. 
Public capital stock is included in the production function and, therefore, increases the 
marginal productivity of capital. P} is considered as given by the firm. The production 
technology is identical in the two countries.
A source-based corporate tax is applied on the declared profit of the representative 
firm in the two countries. Therefore, the aggregated net profit of the corporate sector is 
as follows:
n ™  =  ( i  -  rA)rA +  ( i  -  r(B) r f  -  n (kA + k?) -  # s t)
I r A = F (kA, PtA) — n f w f  — SkA — st (5'6)
W1 ■ \  r ?  =  F ( k f , P f )  -  n f w f  -  S k f  + st
TJ represents the declared profits of the firm in country i , and therefore its corporate 
tax base. We assume that the firm can deduce capital depreciation from the taxable 
profits.5 We define st > 0 (respect. < 0) the total amount of profit shifted from country 
A to country B (respect, from B to A). These profit manipulations are costly to the 
firm since national tax authorities seek to prevent tax evasion (for instance, transfer 
pricing distortions have to be justified). The function 'tp(st) capturing this cost is convex:
^(0) =  0, 'ipsist) > 0 and ^ ( s f )  > 0-6 Following Kolmar and Wagener (2007), we use
the following functional form: ip(St) = b(st)2.
5 Modeling this way implies that the statutory tax rate is equivalent to the effective marginal tax 
rate. If we allow the firm to deduce the financial cost of capital, the effective marginal tax rate would 
then be zero. This alternative is less realistic and it does not change the mechanism of the model. The 
relation between public capital and tax rate depends mainly on the statutory tax rate.
6This cost should be interpreted as the probability of being audit by the authorities, not being able 
to justify the transfer prices, and consequently being fined. We, therefore, assume that the marginal cost 
of tax evasion increases with the total amount of profit shifted.
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By maximizing after-tax profits (5.6) with respect to k\, w\ and st , we obtain the 
equations describing the behaviour of the corporate sector. The allocation of capital in 
each country depends on the following first-order condition:
Fk (k ? , Pi, n ‘) =  7>1 + 6 with: v't = — . (5.7)
The total amount of capital used in country i is such that its marginal productivity equals 
the gross cost of capital (which includes the cost of depreciation). Net cost of capital in a 
given country, i>J, increases with interest rates and corporate tax rate. Besides, because 
of the perfect mobility of capital, a unique interest rate applies in the two countries. 
When the government increases the total stock of public capital, Pt*, this automatically 
increases klt* due to its positive effect on marginal productivity of capital.
As one unit of labour is inelastically supplied in the two countries, the firm’s decision 
on labor consists on the choice of the wage rate according to the following condition:
Fn( k l g i , ^ )  = < -  (5-8)
At last, the firm’s decision on paper profit responds to the tax rate differential. Because 
0 5(st) > 0, profit will be shifted from A to B  if ta — tb > 0. Profit-shifting flows are 
decreasing with the marginal cost associated to these operations:
M s*t) =  r f  -  r?  s\ = Tt . (5.9)
5.2.3 G overnm ent
The objective function of the government is given by (5.10).
OO
V(Pi,9l) = X > ‘ (£ ln fft + 7 In/?)  • (5.10)
t=0
The purpose of the government is to maximize the present discounted value of the house­
hold lifetime utility derived from public spending. In our model, the decision maker aims 
to increase public spending ultimately and, therefore, behaves like a leviathan. This as­
sumption should be seen as a shortcut. The alternative would be to have two types of 
distortive taxation and a decision-maker maximising the consumer’s utility as in Chapter 
4. However, as we want to focus on the element of competition, approaching this issue 
through the optimal dynamic taxation theory, would add unnecessary complications.
Public resources in country i depend on the personal and corporate income tax rev­
enue. Corporate tax revenue R\ depends on a statutory tax rate and the corporate tax
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base (i.e. the declared profit of the firm in country i)
9 l + P \ = i + ^ l ( P t , T l T 1t ),  
w ith : T\,  7f ) =  Tt'r j  =  T't { F ( k " , i *  n i )  -  6 k ?  -  w ?  ±  s f] .
The second constraint the government faces is the law of motion equation of public capital 
stock (5P is the rate of depreciation)
Pi = ( l - 6 , , ) P U + p i .  (5.12)
We consider that the governments anticipate the outcome of their choice on the decisions 
of the private sector. In this sense governments know that both their decision on tax 
rate and public capital affect the firm’s choice of capital (5.7), labour (5.8) and profit 
shifting (5.9) and, therefore, the corporate revenue. Public decision consists of the choice 
of a statutory tax rate, r\ and a decision on public resources allocation between public 
investment and government consumption. Each government decides simultaneously and 
non-cooperatively. The Lagrangian associated with the government allocation problem 
is
oo
l =  Y ,  ln [ * + Ti  t ») -  pl] +  7 in p; -  [p;+1 -  ( i  -  sP)p; -  pi\ }. (5.13)
t= 0
Not surprisingly, the government chooses rt* in order to maximize its corporate tax rev­
enue:
=  0 . (5.14)
dr\
Since a corporate tax rate policy is decided simultaneously and non-cooperatively by the 
two countries, tax equilibrium between A and B is, thus, the outcome of a Nash game. 
Using (5.14) we obtain the reaction functions of the two countries.
(  iL . =  I L . +  d f  t (rtA -PtA)
I  b 26 d i f
A  corporate tax policy stance has two major determinants. Firstly, each government 
attempts to maximize the revenue of its “productive” tax base, denoted T(.). This consists 
of the tax base that would be only determined through the allocation of capital
r « ; M )  - { ( » . < ■  < . ) # *  [r- *  iri ! ( ; ) !A } ■
(5.16)
As one can observe on Figure 5.2, the revenue derived from this fraction of the tax base 
follows the pattern of a traditional Laffer curve with respect to the corporate tax rate
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max
Figure 5.3: Tax rate equilibrium 
r«______________ x\xB-,b)
Figure 5.2: “Productive” tax base
A a(x ;b)
„.tB(xA\b)
and is maximized for t/*13*. When r tl > r lmax, any corporate tax hike would entail a net 
loss, because the marginal revenue would be offset by the shrinking of the tax base.
The second determinant of a corporate tax policy is easily observed in (5.15): tax 
rate in a given country responds to its partner’s tax rate. These strategic interactions 
describe a race to the bottom phenomenon which is entirely dependent on profit mobility. 
When b is low, the multinational firm can engage profit shifting operations forcing the 
two countries to compete more (see Figure 5.3). On the other hand, if profit shifting 
operations were no longer affordable (b —» +oo), strategic interactions would disappear 
and corporate tax rates would be set at r^ ax.
Having described in details the nature of tax competition in this model, we can now 
analyze the determination of the stock of public capital in our model, given by the 
following first-order condition:
i i = ^  + d_3±&^ M<j_ c J. ( 5 . 1 7 )
9t r t+1 o r t+\ 9t+1 9t+1
When maximizing (5.13) with respect to p\ we obtain: Xt = £/<?*, so that the Lagrange 
multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal cost of public investment in t (in terms 
of households foregone utility of consumption of the public good). The right hand side 
represents the discounted benefits of investing on public capital. It is composed of the 
direct benefit of public capital on the representative household utility (t/F^+i). The 
second component of the benefit refers to the anticipated effect of public capital stock 
on the tax revenue: investing more on public capital, will drive the multinational firm to 
install more capital, thus bringing extra revenues in the future. This revenue may then 
be used to supply a general public good to the population. The third component reflects 
the fact that public capital is a durable good so these two effects carry on to the following 
periods after depreciation is accounted for.
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Using (5.4) and re-writing (5.17) at the steady state, we obtain:
(5.18)
The marginal benefit of an increase of public capital stock depends on its positive effect on 
corporate tax revenue and the marginal utility that the representative household derives 
from this public policy (which is of course decreasing with P l). The gross marginal cost 
increases with the interest rate and the depreciation rate of public capital stock.
We can observe by the first-order conditions (5.14) and (5.17) that the two instruments 
used by the decision maker in order to collect corporate tax revenue are interdependent. 
We illustrate this partial equilibrium relationship for country A on the Figure 5.4 below. 
Except for extreme values of , the stock of public capital is increasing with the statutory 
tax rate. This pattern directly depends on how strong is the impact of public capital on 
total corporate tax revenue (dR l(P l , r l, Tj )/d P l), which obviously declines when tax rate 
takes lower values. Note that total capital stock remains positive even when tax rate is 
equal to zero (indeed, as we can clearly see on (5.18), public capital stock does provide a 
satisfaction to the representative household besides increasing future tax revenue, so, it 
does not disappear even in the absence of corporate taxation).
On the other hand, tax rate depends positively on the level of public capital. The 
higher the public capital, the higher the rents, so the higher the governments will set 
their tax rate. Nevertheless, tax rate appears to be less reactive to public capital stock. 
In our model the tax policy stance relies mostly on the level of tax competition and on 
the partner country’s tax rate.
The endogenous relation between public capital and corporate tax rate that we de­
scribed above is not model specific. Under the ’’leviathan” assumption, the government 
uses corporate tax rate to maximize tax receipts and public investment partially to maxi­
mize future tax revenue. If we had assumed a perfectly benevolent government using two
Figure 5.4: Government’s first order conditions
ti0
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types of distortionary taxes to raise revenue, as in the previous chapter, a very similar 
intuition would hold. Firstly, the government would use a combination of taxes to mini­
mize the distortions needed to raise a certain amount of revenue. Public capital would, 
nevertheless, still create rents and it would guarantee that part of the future revenue 
would be non-distortionary. Thus, if competition drives the corporate tax rate down, 
given a certain level of rents, the amount of non-distortionary revenue raised by the gov­
ernment would go down. This would reduce the attractiveness of government investment 
relative to government consumption, so a benevolent government would optimally shift 
its expenditure from one to the other.
5.2.4 M arket clearing
In order to close the model we need three additional conditions. First we have the market 
clearing condition for both capital and goods markets:
f  b f + b f = k f  + k?
{ V? +  y f  = c f  + c? +  g f  +  g? +  p f  +  p f  +  i f  +  / f  +  b(stf
Total capital used by the firm equals to the amount of capital held by the households. 
Total production in the two countries must equal to the total private and public con­
sumption, private and public investment and the cost of profit shifting. Finally, we need 
a final equation to pin down the consumption level of each country.
(* + rt = w \ + rtvt - i +  r j . 7 (5.20)
5.3 Q uantitative analysis
5.3.1 C alibration
In this section we analyze the quantitative implications of corporate tax competition for 
public capital and public investment. The model is calibrated for an annual frequency. 
Table 5.1 shows the values of the parameters and the implied steady state values for key 
variables.
The calibration of the first four parameters is quite standard. The discount factor is 
such that the annual real interest rate is 3.5%. In line with Kamps (2006), the annual rate 
of depreciation of public capital is 5%. Its private counterpart is set at 8 %. The elasticity 
of output with respect to private capital is 0.26. The parameter 6 is more controversial.
7We defined the dividend paid in country i as the total declared profit minus the interest rate payment 
on existing capital: TJ =  [(1 — r l) {y \  —w \ — 8k\ — s t ) — r tklt }.
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Table 5.1: Calibration and steady state values in the benchmark case
P aram eters
s Depreciation rate (private capital) 0.08 P Discount Factor 0.966
sp Depreciation rate (public capital) 0.05 t Lump sum tax 0.243
a Elasticity of output (private capital) 0.26 l£ Relative preference for public cap. 0.182
6 Elasticity of output (public capital) 0.08 b Cost of profit shifting 0.625
S tea d y -sta te  variables
c/y Consumption /  output 0.587 k /y Private capital stock /  output 2.00
1/y Investment /  output 0.16 P/y Public capital stock 0.55
9/ y Government consumption /  output 0.225 T Corporate tax rate 0.3
p/y Public investment /  output 0.0275 R/y Corporate tax revenue /  output 0.054
Estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital range from 0 to 0.80. 
We set the value to 0.08 following a meta-analysis study of Bom and Ligthart (2008).
The last three coefficients are calibrated in order to obtain realistic steady state values 
for some variables. The relative preference for the two types of public goods, 7 / f , is such 
tha t public capital stock as a share of output in equilibrium is 0.55. The lump sump 
tax t is such that the government consumption in the economy is close to 2 2  percent of 
output. As we do not have any estimates of the cost parameter of profit shifting, b is set 
such that the corporate tax rate equilibrium is 30 percent. These three values are in line 
the evidence on OECD countries shown in the introduction.
5.3.2 S tead y-sta te  effects o f com petition
Starting from this baseline calibration, we now illustrate the consequences of tax competi­
tion on public capital stock and other key variables in the economy. Figure 5.5 illustrates 
how the tax rate equilibrium depends on the cost of profit shifting. We observe that when 
profit shifting becomes more affordable, a race to the bottom occurs. Not surprisingly in 
the extreme case of perfect profit mobility, tax rate is driven to zero.
The Figure 5.6 below shows how the steady state stocks of public capital and public 
investment over output respond to changes in the tax rate (driven by the decline in b). 
Under the benchmark scenario, a change of the statutory tax rate from 45% to 30% 
percent leads to a decline of public capital stock of 1 1 % of output and a decline of public 
investment of 0.4% of output.
The overall effect of increasing competition can be decomposed in two: the revenue 
and substitution effects. On the one hand, a decline in the tax rate automatically reduces 
total tax receipts, thus reducing the level of public investment, as well as government 
consumption via the budget identity. On the other hand, reduction of the tax rate makes 
public investment less attractive in relation to government consumption, as discussed in
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Figure 5.5: Tax rate equilibrium and the cost of profit shifting
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Figure 5.6: Corporate tax rate and the allocation of public spending
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the previous section. The overall decline might be, however, over-estimated because of 
the influence of the revenue effect. In reality, this effect is indeed likely to play a minor 
role since the total tax revenue derived from corporate taxation has remained relatively 
stable despite the fall of the statutory tax rate. In order to isolate the substitution 
effect in our analysis, we artificially control for the revenue effect by changing t such that 
total revenue is kept constant (see the dash lines in Figure 5.6). The decline of public 
capital and public investment would be slightly less than a half, 4% and 0.2% of output 
respectively.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the revenue and substitution effects. As tax rate decreases, 
corporate tax revenue goes down (left-hand side). In the case of extreme competition, 
corporate taxation disappears. The substitution effect is visible in the ratio between 
public investment and the general public good. As tax rates are driven to lower levels, 
we indeed observe a shift in the composition of public spending in favour of government 
consumption.
Figure 5.8 depicts the steady state response of some macroeconomic variables to 
changes in competition. The stock of private capital as well as private consumption go 
up with the increase in the tax competition. One might also expect that the race to the 
bottom of corporate tax rate always has a positive effect on total output. However, when
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Figure 5.7: Revenue and substitution effects
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Figure 5.8: Effect of competition on key macroeconomic variables
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tax rates reach very low levels, tax competition turns out to be counter-productive to the 
total output. The hump-shape curve displayed on the left-hand side is explained by the 
fact that public capital stock increases the marginal productivity of private capital. This 
productivity deteriorates when tax competition reduces the stock of public capital. When 
tax competition is strong, this negative effect cannot be compensated by the increase in 
private capital. One can, therefore, observe that there exists a threshold tax rate under 
which corporate tax competition is harmful to production.8
5.3.3 D ynam ic effects of com petition
Our model allows us to study the transition dynamics. We analyse how the main variables 
of the model respond to an increase in corporate tax rate competition from b = 0.705 
(which implies a tax rate of 35%) to b = 0.625 (baseline scenario with 30% tax rate). 
One can see from the Figure 5.9 that tax rate declines immediately close to its new 
steady-state value once the shock occurs. Furthermore, public investment also drops 
sharply in response, then picks up and converges to the new steady state. Simulations 
show that the short-run effect is roughly three times higher than the long-run effect. In 
this particular case, a decline of the tax rate by 5% has an immediate impact on public
8Note that this threshold value is highly dependent on the value of the parameter 6. We do not 
explore this issue further as our model is not indicated for welfare analysis.
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Figure 5.9: Response to an unanticipated permanent shock in b
Public capital stock I output Public investment I output Government consumption / output
57%
56%
56%
! 13 14 18 18 17 11 19 20
33%
30%
1 2 3 S 6 • 9 10 11 12 13 14
5 6 8 9 12 13
Public Investment I government consumption
0.123
0.121
0.117
3 4 10 11
Private capital / output
7 0 17 10 19 20
6 7 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 18 10 17 10 19 20
Corporate tax revenue / output
5.9%
a 3
Private Investment / output
2 J 12 13 14 19 20
investment of 0.41% while the long run effect is only 0.14%. This outcome occurs because 
the government readjusts his optimal stock public capital in response to the decline of 
the tax rate. Not surprisingly, a greater degree of tax competition has a positive effect 
on the stock of private capital and on output.
5.3.4 R obustness analysis 
A lterna tive  calib ration
Having described the main effects of corporate tax competition on our benchmark model, 
we now consider different realistic scenarios. For all of them we analyze the evolution 
of the public capital stock, public investment and government consumption. We observe 
that the main conclusion of the first section is confirmed: corporate tax competition has 
a negative impact on the stock of public capital. The quantitative prediction is also 
quite robust. Public capital stock over GDP falls between 8% and 15% of output and 
public investment between 0.3% and 0.6% of output under the alternative scenarios. The 
substitution effect accounts for close to half of the total effect.
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Figure 5.10: Robustness analysis - substitution effect
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Table 5.2: Effects of competition under alternative parameterizations
P ublic capital stock P ublic Investm ent
Parameters r =  45% r =  30% TE SE r =  45% r =  30% TE SE
9 =  0.12 77.2% 62.6% 14.6% 5.2% 3.1% 2.5% 0 .6% 0.3%
9 =  0.04 56.5% 48.4% 8 .1% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9% 0.3% 0 .1%
ct =  0.30 65.0% 52.5% 12.4% 4.4% 2.6% 2 .1% 0.5% 0 .2%
a  =  0.20 67.2% 57.4% 9.8% 3.4% 2.7% 2.3% 0.4% 0 .2%
7 / f  =  0.22 76.1% 63.7% 12.4% 4.0% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0 .2%
7 /^ =  0.14 55.7% 46.0% 9.7% 3.8% 2 .2% 1.8% 0.4% 0 .2%
t -  0.30 75.1% 63.7% 11.4% 4.3% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0 .2%
t =  0.18 57.1% 46.2% 10.8% 3.4% 2.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0 .2%
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Since the value of the parameter 9 has involved a lot of controversies, we test alterna­
tive values for the contribution of public capital stock on private output (scenarios 1 and 
2). For this reason, and despite the fact that our calibration is in line with the recent 
estimations given in the literature, we simulate two extreme cases. When P % has a minor 
effect on the output, the stock of public capital is lower at the steady state and exhibits 
a lower variability in the tax rates. By contrast, when 9 is relatively high, we observe 
that tax competition entails a larger drop of public capital stock.
Allowing different values for a  (scenarios 3 and 4) affects the substitutability between 
the private and the public capital. Not surprisingly, when the production process relies 
more on private capital, we observe a greater decline of public capital stock. Scenarios 5 
and 6  describe the effect of a change of the relative preferences of the society for the two 
public policy dimensions. W ithout a doubt, the relative preferences for public capital 7 /^  
has a relatively high impact on the level of public capital stock but less on its pattern. 
Different preferences do not affect the main mechanism of our model. Analyzing the 
impact of the variation of the exogenous tax rate leads to the same conclusions. The 
total stock of public capital increases with t , whose real value is a major determinant of 
the scope of government. The relationship between the corporate tax rate and the stock 
of public capital is robust to changes in the value of the parameters.
Asymmetric countries
Our final exercise is to analyse the steady-state values when asymmetries between the 
two countries are introduced. We consider two cases: asymmetries in 9 and in a. The 
respective results are shown in appendix.
When the production of a country relies more on public capital (country A in this 
simulation), the government accumulates more public capital than country B. This gen­
erates higher rents for the firm in country A, so the government sets a higher tax rate. 
In this case, there is profit shifting from country A to county B. If the level of compe­
tition is low, then the country with high 9 has a higher output than its partner, but as 
competition increases and tax rate declines, the negative effect in public capital is very 
strong and total output also declines. This suggests that for countries that depend more 
on public capital, corporate tax competition might induce significant welfare costs.
We now turn to the analysis of the case with different a ’s. Country A, where a  is 
higher, has a higher capital stock and higher output than its partner. The government 
sets a higher tax rate for this country, so there is profit shifting to country B. It is also 
interesting to notice tha t the decline in public capital is much stronger for country A. In 
the absence of tax competition, it has a higher public capital stock as a share of output, 
but when competition is more intense it is lower than of the country B.
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5.4 Empirical evidence
5.4.1 E stim ation  strategy
To access the validity of the main mechanism of our model, we estimate policy functions 
for the statutory corporate tax rate (taxu ) and for public investment (invu) in the spirit 
of Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008):
taxit = ai invu +  a 2tax™ +  a 3Xw +  e* +  eit (5.21)
invit =  Pitaxu +  fcinv™  +  /?3 X it +  +  ixit
We use the statutory tax rate and not effective marginal tax rate. It is clear from the
model that public investment depends on the statutory tax rate (the true rate of return
of generating one extra unit of rents) and not on the effective marginal tax rate.9
Apart from the endogeneity between the two tools, we also consider the international 
competition element. The statutory tax rate also responds to the tax rate of the rest of the 
world (tax™).10 Public investment depends on the statutory tax rate, but we also allow it 
to respond to the level of public investment of foreign countries (inv™). Although we do 
not model this element explicitly with our model, we include it to make the setting more 
realistic. Moreover, it allows us to identify the effect of public investment on the tax rate. 
In the absence of this element, it is hard to find another possible instrument for public 
investment. X it is a vector of control variables. We estimate each equation separately 
using instrumental variables estimation. The system is exactly identified: each equation 
has one omitted variable that is used as an instrument for the endogenous variable in 
the other equation. For the instruments to be valid, it is crucial tha t the corporate tax 
rate does not respond to foreign public investment and public investment does not react 
to the foreign tax rate. Although we cannot a priori justify this assumption based on 
existing evidence, we can test the validity of the instruments after the estimation.
The estimation of these reaction functions suffers from more problems of endogeneity. 
The tax rate and public investment of the rest of the world might react to domestic 
developments in the respective variables. Furthermore, some of the controls might also 
be endogenous to the tax rate or to public investment. To minimize these problems, we 
compute a 3 year non overlapping averages. Each time observation corresponds to 3 years 
averages. We, then, estimate these equations with all controls that might be endogenous,
9It should be noted that the dependence of public investment on the statutory tax rate exists re­
gardless of the level of the effective marginal tax rate. Also, this relation persists in a closed economy or 
in the absence of international competition.
10It is not our purpose to find out if the response to the foreign tax rate is due to competition for 
profits or for private investment
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as well as the foreign variables entering in lags. Although we cut the sample size to one 
third, it still allows us to be much more confident that our estimator will be consistent.
The corporate tax and public investment of the rest of the world are weighted averages 
of the variables for all other countries in the sample.
tax™ = wjttax™
j=-i
rw  \  tw
mVit = 2_> W3tmVjt 
j=~i
In the reaction functions we include public investment instead of public capital. Firstly 
because the decision variable of governments is public investment. Secondly, this way 
we avoid problems of non-stationarity, because both tax rate and public investment are 
bound between 0 and 1 and, therefore, cannot have unit roots. Similarly to Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) we do not include lagged dependent variables.11
5.4.2 D ata
We estimate the policy functions using a panel of 21 OECD countries. The variable 
corporate tax rate was taken from Michigan World Tax Database, and public investment 
was taken from Kamps (2006) and expanded with OECD data until 2005.
For robustness purposes, we use three different weights to calculate the variables for 
the rest of the world: uniform weights (Wi), the openness of the economy (W2) and the 
population (W3). The correlations between the three measures within a country range 
from 0.80 to 0.95 for both variables.
We use the following control variables: government consumption, the fiscal surplus, 
the degree of openness, GDP growth, the level of private capital, population growth, a 
dummy for election year, the % of left wing votes and a dummy if the country joined the 
EMU2 after 1999. Summary statistics and the source of each variable can be found in 
Table A5.1 in appendix.
5.4.3 E stim ation
We estimate the policy functions using IV estimation. Given tha t we only have 21 
countries, we model the country’s specific error as fixed effect. In the estimations, we
11 In this way we can still have consistent estimates of the short-run coefficients without introducing 
technical complications of estimating equations with lagged dependent variables in panel data. For 
instance, we would have to estimate the equations in differences (Arellano and Bond), which would be 
problematic because there would be many zeros on the left hand side. If we ignored the bias generated 
by the lagged dependent variable and estimated the system in levels, we would have multicollinearity 
problems between the (taxu-1) and (tax™ x).
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also include country specific time trends. We consider government consumption, the fiscal 
surplus, the degree of openness, GDP growth, the level of private capital as potentially 
endogenous, so they enter the equation in lags (previous non-overlapping 3 year’s average).
We estimate an unrestricted and a restricted model. The unrestricted model includes
Table 5.3: Estimation results: corporate tax rate
W1 W2 W3
(1) (2) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6)
In v t
2.999 2.478 15.224 2.055 4.532*** 3.524***
(0.78) (1.35) (0.54) (1.02) (2.63) (2.71)
T ax™ 1 0.385*** 0.410*** 0.342 0.454*** 0.427*** 0.461***(3.14) (3.74) (1.05) (4.18) (3.45) (4.29)
G ovconst- 1
0.892* 0.858*** 2.165 0.699** 0.951*** 0.815***
(1.92) (3.20) (0.68) (2.34) (2.89) (3.07)
B u d g e tt - 1
0.038
(0.17)
0.637
(0.47)
0.136
(0.85)
G D P g t - 1 0.007 0.212 0.068(0.03) (0.34) (0.28)
O pen t - 1
0.137** 0.128** 0.180 0.116* 0.115 0.105
(2.05) (2.12) (0.94) (1.92) (1.59) (1.64)
K t-1
0.628 12.967 2.379
(0.13) (0.46) (0.64)
Popgt
-4.266**** -4.079*** -7.945 -3.718*** -4.514*** -4.002***
(-2.83) (-4.11) (-0.87) (-3.65) (-3.82) (-4.02)
E lec tion t -0.255(-0.17)
-0.709
(-0.22)
-0.464
(-0.29)
L e f t t 0.071 0.225 0.086(0.82) (0.59) (1.05)
E m ut
-0.735 1.391 -0.36
(-0.38) (0.25) (-0.19)
Country trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
R2 0.67 0.69 0.41 0.70 0.63 0.66
Underidentification test# 4.505[0.034]
17.689
[0.014]
0.360
[0.548]
14.290
[0.046]
25.577
[0.000]
38.122
[0.000]
Sargan test8
-
1.160
[0.979] -
2.015
[0.918] -
1.803
[0.937]
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation  
of the previous 3 years. The estim ation runs from  1966-1969 to 1999-2002. I t includes the following 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germ any, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom  
and United States. The equations are estim ated using Instrum ental Variables fixed effects estimation. 
In columns (1) the equation is exactly identify with Inv™  as instrum ent fo r  I n v t . In columns (2) the 
nonsignificant variables are excluded from  the equation but added as additional instrum ents. The t 
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. #  The 
underidentification test is an LM  test o f whether the instrum ents are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test s ta tistic  is to be compared 
to a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instrum ents. The p-value is in brackets. $ 
The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instrum ents are uncorrelated with the 
error term  and that the excluded instrum ents are correctly excluded from  the estim ated equation. Under 
the null, the test sta tistic  is distributed as chi-squared in the number o f overidentifying restrictions. The 
p-value is in brackets.
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Table 5.4: Estimation results: public investment
W1 W2 W3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T a x t
0.062** 0.039* 0.066 0.069* 0.077* 0.075**
(1.98) (1.73) (1.57) (1.9) (1.92) (2.00)
In v l^ 0.315* 0.356** 0.233 0.231 0.126 0.125
(1.71) (2.13) (1.38) (1.48) (0.44) (0.44)
G ovconst- 1
-0.164** -0.142*** -0.173**’'‘ -0.172*** -0.166*** -0.161***
(-4.11) (-4.11) (-3.91) (-4.06) (-3.81) (-3.82)
B udget t - 1
-0.043** -0.0462*** -0.043** -0.044** -0.042** -0.042**
(-2.47) (-2.84) (-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-2.28)
G D P g t.!
-0.009 -0.010 -0.016
(-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.51)
O pen t - 1 -0.014 -0.017 -0.018* -0.017 -0.018*
(-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.70) (-1.57) (-1.75)
K t-1
-0.711 -0.571 -0.757* -0.712* -0.944** -0.865**
(-1.63) (-1.53) (-1.67) (-1.72) (-2.14) (-2.11)
Popgt
0.552*** 0.467*** 0.581*** 0.578*** 0.590*** 0.567***
(3.16) (3.10) (2.90) (3.11) (2.96) (2.96)
E lection t
0.015
(0.08)
0.012
(0.06)
0.038
(0.18)
L e f tt
-0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015
(-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.53) (-1.47)
E m u t -0.068 -0.05 0.019(-0.27) (-0.18) (0.07)
Country trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
R2 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.67
Underidentification test# 19.840[0.000]
32.897
[0.000]
11.449
[0.001]
15.437
[0.004]
14.140
[0.000]
15.711
[0.003]
_ 2.865 _ 0.151 _ 0.304Sargan test5
- [0.581] - [0.985] - [0.959]
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation  
of the previous 3 years. The estim ation runs from  1966-1969 to 1999-2002. It includes the following 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom  
and United States. The equations are estim ated using Instrum ental Variables fixed effects estimation. 
In columns (1) the equation is exactly identify with T a x \w as instrum ent fo r  T a x t . In columns (2) 
the nonsignificant variables are excluded from  the equation but added as additional instrum ents. The t 
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent, i f  The 
underidentification test is an LM  test o f whether the instrum ents are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test sta tistic  is to be compared 
to a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instrum ents. The p-value is in brackets. $ 
The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instrum ents are uncorrelated with the 
error term  and that the excluded instrum ents are correctly excluded from  the estim ated equation. Under 
the null, the test sta tistic  is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The 
p-value is in brackets.
all controls. We, then, remove the non-significant variables and add them as additional 
controls. We test the under-identification of each equation and, in the case of the re­
stricted models, we perform the Sargan over-identification test.
Table 5.3 and 5.4 shows the results. All specifications have considerable good fit with
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an R2 above 0.65. Except for the unrestricted specification for the corporate tax rate 
using W2, all regressions pass the underindentification test, suggesting that in general, 
the rest of the world variables are valid instruments for the the corresponding domestic 
variables. Also, in all restricted specifications we conclude from the Sargan test that we 
do no reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
There are two important results. Firstly, there is evidence of the endogeneity between 
the the two variables, particularly from the corporate tax rate to the public investment. 
Corporate tax rate also responds positively to public investment but it is only statistically 
significant when we use W3 as weights. This result is consistent with our model, as the 
reaction function of tax rate was positive, but very flat in the stock of public capital. On 
the other hand, the result that public investment increases with the statutory tax rate is 
quite robust to different weighting procedures. The coefficient ranges from 0.04 to 0.07. 
For an exogenously driven reduction of 15% of the tax rate, public investment goes down 
between 0.6% to 1.1%.
The second result is that there is evidence for international competition particularly 
in the corporate tax rate. A country’s tax rate responds close to 0.4% to an increase of 1% 
in the tax rate of the rest of the world. This is in line with values reported by Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008). For public investment, the coefficient of response to the 
foreign public investment is lower - between 0.2 and 0.3, but is only significant if we use 
uniform weights.
W ith respect to the control variables, government consumption, openness and pop­
ulation growth are, in general, significant in both equations. Private capital and fiscal 
surplus are only significant for public investment.
5.5 Conclusion
The strong downward trend of the statutory corporate tax rates represents one of the most 
striking aspects of international competition between governments. The main objective 
of this paper is to point out that other consequences of corporate tax rate competition 
have been overlooked.
Keen and Marchand (1997) argued that tax competition might lead to “too many 
business centers and airports but not enough parks or l ib r a r i e s In fact, this statement 
might be inconsistent with the general decline of public capital stock that has taken place 
over the last two decades among many OECD countries.
By contrast, we find a negative relationship between tax competition and public cap­
ital stock. The key difference between these two results is the following. In their setting,
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the relation between tax rate and public capital comes from international competition. 
In the presence of competition, there will be a bias in favour of public investment. In 
our model, this relation exists even in the absence of competition. Public capital stock 
increases tax revenue. Because of this positive externality there is always a bias in favour 
of public capital. As competition drives tax rate down, this reduces the externality of 
public capital and governments have an incentive to reduce their supply. The robustness 
analysis we performed provides a strong evidence that the central mechanism of our paper 
remains valid. Besides, this link appears to be significant for most countries where the 
share of public capital stock has, indeed, decreased.
The general equilibrium analysis appears to be extremely helpful since it allows us 
to assess quantitatively the effects of competition. We show that tax competition leads 
to a reduction of both tax rate and public investment. If tax rate goes down by 15%, 
public investment in steady state goes down between 0.2% and 0.4% of GDP. The short 
run impact is three times stronger. Our empirical estimates point to slightly higher 
values: between 0.6% and 1.1% of GDP. Further empirical evidence indicates that there 
is international competition in both corporate tax rate and public investment.
Although tax competition is likely to have a negative effect on the overall supply 
of public goods, the traditional view considers that tax competition favours the private 
sector. This is indeed what we found in the baseline scenario and it is explained by the 
fact that a race to the bottom reduces the net cost of capital. Nevertheless, we found 
that it exists a threshold tax rate under which tax competition has a negative effect on 
total output. This threshold depends crucially on the elasticity of output with respect to 
public capital.
We believe that our analysis is particularly relevant for the European Union countries 
where enlargement is likely to put more pressure on tax rates and therefore could reinforce 
the downward trend of public capital stock in western European countries.
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5.6 A ppendix
A s y m m e t r ic  c o u n t r ie s
Figure A5.1: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to public capital)
Government consumption I output
Public investment I government consumption
Privets cspital stock I output Private investment I output
10%
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•%
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0.15 025
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Figure A5.2: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to private capital)
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D a t a
Table A5.1: Summary statistics and sources
Variable Description Mean Sd Max Min Source
Inv Public investment (% GDP) 3.499 1.504 10.09 0.770 Kamps (2006)
Tax Top bracket corporate tax 38.21 8.730 56.41 7.148 Michigan World Tax Database
Gov cons Gov. consumption (% GDP) 17.66 4.511 30.14 7.325 OECD-Main Economic Indicators
Budget Budget surplus (% GDP) -2.212 3.851 18.00 -15.71 IMF- IFS
G D Pg GDP growth 2.778 2.639 12.48 -7.283 IMF- IFS
Popg Population growth 0.660 0.569 3.799 -4.526 WB - WDI
Open Openness (% GDP) 54.77 29.29 184.2 7.416 WB - WDI
Capital Private capital (% GDP) 2.512 0.541 3.818 1.255 Kamps (2006)
L eft Left party votes (% total) 37.96 14.15 67.6 0 Comparative parties dataset
Election Dummy for election year 0.316 0.465 1 0 Comparative parties dataset
N ote: the comparative party dataset was created by Duane Swank and is available on
h ttp ://w w w . mu. edu/polisci/Swank, htm.
Figure A5.3: Corporate tax rate and allocation of spending in OECD countries
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Chapter 6
Labour market flows: Facts from the  
U nited  Kingdom
6.1 Introduction
The behaviour of flows between employment, unemployment and inactivity drive move­
ments in aggregate indicators, such as the employment and unemployment rate. They are 
critical to our understanding of labour market dynamics and business cycle fluctuations. 
Furthermore, worker gross flows and transition rates lie at the heart of state-of-the-art 
models of unemployment, anchored in the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and 
matching framework.
The objective of this chapter is to establish a number of key facts about the properties 
of the UK labour market flows, by examining data from the Labour Force Survey over 
the past fifteen years. In so doing, it extends the work by Bell and Smith (2002) and 
provides a systematic study of worker gross flows based on UK data, along the lines of 
the pioneer work of Blanchard and Diamond (1990) for the United States.1
One significant aspect of the data is the differences in conditional transition proba­
bilities. For example, the job-separation probability is 1% if the person was previously 
employed, 5% if inactive and 11% if unemployed. The job-finding rate is 20% if the person 
has been unemployed for two periods, but it is 48% if the person was previously employed. 
Because of this, if we compute the annual flows based on the quarterly transition prob­
abilities and compare them with the actual ones, calculated directly from Labour Force 
Survey, the implied annual transitions overshoots by 50% the actual transitions and alters
1 There are some studies on the UK labour market flows, notably classical studies by Nickell (1982) 
and Pissarides (1986) or more recently Burgess and Turon (2005), but they only consider inflows and 
outflows of unemployment using claimant count data. Bell and Smith (2002), on the other hand, use 
Labour Force Survey data but their sample only runs until 2000 and they restrict their analysis to the 
size and cyclical properties of gross flows, job-to-job flows and job separations by reason.
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the relative pattern of the flows. When doing the reverse exercise -  extrapolating the 
quarterly flows from the observed annual flows -  one underestimates the true transitions 
by roughly one half.
The second main contribution of this paper is tha t it adds to the debate recently 
revived by Shimer (2007) regarding the relative importance of job-finding and separation 
rates for fluctuations in unemployment. It provides evidence for the United Kingdom 
using different decomposition methods proposed in the literature. The additional interest, 
relative to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) is that my sample covers a complete business 
cycle: the expansion between 1993 to 2001, the slowdown and the beginning of the current 
recession. I find tha t the job-separation rate is as important as the job-finding rate, 
particularly in the early 1990s recession and in the current one. This gives strength to 
the point made by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) that changes in the job 
separation rate explain most of the variation in unemployment during sharp recessions.
Finally, I go on to analyse particular elements of the labour market that can be 
useful for economists in other areas of research. Given the size of the flows from and into 
inactivity I have explored in more detail their role over the business cycle. In particular, I 
have disaggregated the inactive into two subgroups: those that want a job (and therefore 
can be considered marginally close to the labour market) and those that do not want a job 
and evaluated the differences between them. In the last few years the United Kingdom 
experienced structural changes in the level of education of the labour force. Therefore, 
it seems important to examine the size and the behaviour of labour market flows by 
education. I have also provided evidence on job-to-job flows and on-the-job search, on 
the causes of employment separations and on the differences between the public and 
private sectors.
These stylised facts are of interest to policymakers and macroeconomists alike. For 
policymakers they can help improve the monitoring of business cycles, the detection of 
turning points and the assessment of labour market tightness. For macroeconomists, this 
paper can be seen as a reference for the calibration of a number of parameters, and also 
provide a guideline of the empirical features that theoretical models should ideally have.
6.2 Prelim inary concepts
6.2.1 Labour m arket dynam ics
In order to analyse labour market dynamics I make use of some fundamental equations 
that describe the evolution of the stock of employed E  and the stock of unemployed U. 
The pool of inactive is denoted as I. Adding the three pools gives us the working-age
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population W, while summing employment and unemployment corresponds to the labour
j  and the participation rate as p = ^ ,force L. The unemployment rate is defined as u = -4.
Total employment evolves according to the following equation:
E t + 1 =  E t +  N EE +  N l E -  N tEU -  N EI. ( 6 . 1 )
where N  is the gross flows between the pools indicated by the superscript. If we normalise 
this equation by the total working-age population, we get the following equation that 
focuses on the total gross flows as the determinant of changes in the employment rate.
Et+l -  Et = _  Nf^_ _  Nf^ _
Wt Nt Wt Wt Wt K ' 1
Alternatively, (2) may be written in terms of transition probabilities rates (A):
Et+l — E t _  KUE Ut , A IE (1  Pe) a EU a EI (a o\
Et  _ A ‘ l - u ( +  ‘ P t { l ~ u t) At  A ‘ ' ^
We can perform a similar decomposition of the changes in unemployment:
U m  = Vt -  N ^ E +  N EU -  N e i + N [u . (6.4)
Again, we can either focus on the gross flows or on the transition rates:
Um  ~  Ut =  N ^_
Wt Wt Wt Wt Wt ’ ( ' 1
Um  -  Ut =  +  Aw O j-p O  _  k ue _  k u , (6 6)
Ut Ut p tUt
Some authors like Blanchard and Diamond (1990) or Davis (2006) focus on gross flows, 
while others, such as Shimer (2007) or Fujita and Ramey (2009) give more emphasis to 
transition rates. The two perspectives are complementary in the analysis of the labour 
market and the interest in one or the other depends ultimately on the theoretical model 
one has in mind. Thus I explore both of them.
6.2.2 Labour Force Survey
The data are constructed from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly 
survey of households living at private addresses in Great Britain. Its random sample 
design, is based on the Postcode Address File, a list prepared by the Post Office with 
all addresses which receive fewer than 25 articles of mail a day. The LFS panel samples 
around 60,000 households for five successive quarters. The households are interviewed
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face-to-face when first included on the survey, and by telephone thereafter. The respon­
dents are asked about the household’s characteristic, education, labour market status, 
economic activity, as well as other elements. The sample is split into five waves. Every 
quarter one wave of approximately 12,000 leaves the survey and a new wave enters. In 
this way, we can observe the changes in the labour market status of 80% of the households 
that took part in the survey and, therefore, obtain the gross labour market flows.
Although the quarterly survey starts in 1992, the 5 waves only run since the first 
quarter of 1993, so my sample is restricted to the period between 1993:2 and 2008:4. 
There is a break in the survey in 1996 as before, it did not include Northern Ireland. 
As Northen Ireland represent less than 3% of the working-age population of the United 
Kingdom, the break does not affect the size of the gross flows as a percentage of the 
working-age population or in hazard rates. The constructed flows series are weighted 
using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) census population weights.
Estimating gross flows on the basis of survey data has two shortcomings: they suffer 
from non-response bias, and response-error bias. For the LFS, the non-contact rate is 
around 5% while the refusal rate ranges between 10% and 15%. The response error bias is 
a more serious problem because, in longitudinal data the errors are cumulative and lead 
to an overestimation of flows. There is no practical way to deal with response-error bias. 
We should bear in mind that the results might be biased upwards, particularly in the 
flows between unemployment and inactivity. Nevertheless there is no reason to believe 
that the response-error bias affects the cyclical properties of the gross flows.
6.3 Worker gross flows in the U nited  Kingdom
6.3.1 A verage gross flows
Figure 6.1 summarises the average quarterly worker flows over the 1996-2008 period. It 
reports the total number of people that changed status in thousands (t), as a percentage 
of the working-age population (p) and as a transition probability or hazard rate (h).
Over the sample period there was an average 60,000 net increase in employment every 
quarter. Substantial quarterly gross flows hide, however, behind this value. An average 
of 870,000 people move out of employment every quarter, approximately 60% of whom go 
into inactivity. An average of around 930,000 people move into employment, where the 
split is broadly similar between unemployment and inactivity. In addition to the 2.7% of 
the total working-age population that join the pool of employed, there is an additional 
2.1% that change employer every quarter.
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Figure 6.1: Average quarterly worker flows, Labour Force Survey, 1996-2008
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Note: the worker flow s are expressed as total number of people in thousands (t), as a percentage of the 
working-age population (p) and as a hazard rate (h). The two boxes show the m ovements in and out 
of the working-age population. The sta tistics are fo r  the period starting in 1996 to include Northern  
Ireland.
Demographic change represents a very small fraction of worker turnover, as shown in 
the two boxes within the chart. Only a minority of young people (less than 16 years of 
age) joining the working-age population enter the labour force directly. Similarly, more 
than half of the people that reach retirement age (65 plus for men, 60 plus for women) 
are already inactive. For this reason, I exclude from the analysis new entries and exits 
from the working-age population.
How do these numbers compare to those for the United States? Table 6.1 compares 
the quarterly figures for the United Kingdom with the monthly values for the United 
States taken from Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999). If we interpret the size of the 
gross flows between unemployment, employment and inactivity as a proxy for labour 
market flexibility, one could be tempted to say that the labour market in the United 
Kingdom is much less flexible than in the United States. While 6.8% of the population 
change status every quarter in the United Kingdom, in the United States 6.5% change 
status every month. In my opinion, a comparison between these values can be misleading 
for two reasons.
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Table 6.1: Gross flows for the United States and the United Kingdom 
Monthly Quarterly Annual
US UK* USm U K U K a U K  U K *
E -> U 0.8 0.4* 1.4* 1.0 0.5* 1.4 2.1*
E I 1.7 0.5* 5.1* 1.4 0.7* 2.9 5.3*
U -> E 1.0 0.5* 1.6* 1.3 0.8* 2.0 2.5*
U -> I 0.8
*COo 1.3* 0.8 0.4* 1.0 1.4*
I -* E 1.5 0.4* 4.5* 1.3 0.8* 3.1 5.4*
I  --> U 0.6 0.4* 1.0* 1.0 0.5* 1.2 1.7*
Total 6.5 2.5* 15.0* 6.8 3.7* 11.6 18.4’
Note: gross flows in percentage of the working-age population. The columns with a * are extrapolated 
from  a different frequency denoted by the superscript (monthly (m ), quarterly (q) or annual (a)), by 
allowing fo r  multiple transitions and assuming constant transition probabilities.
First, because there might exist multiple transitions within the quarter. Suppose 
someone is unemployed in the first month, then moves to employment in the second, and 
then back to unemployment. While a monthly survey would pick up all transitions, the 
quarterly survey would not detect any. It is possible to overcome the problem of multiple 
transitions by calculating for the United States the quarterly probabilities implied by 
the monthly rates or, conversely for the United Kingdom, computing the monthly tran­
sition probabilities that generate the observed quarterly probabilities. This is what the 
literature typically does. The results are also shown in the second and third column of 
Table 6.1.2 After correcting for multiple transitions, the total implied quarterly flows in 
the United States are around 15% of the working-age population, twice the value for the 
United Kingdom. A big part of the flows, however, are accounted by the flows between 
inactivity and employment.
But for this comparison to be correct, we are implicitly assuming that: first, there 
is no heterogeneity on the labour force in terms of transition probabilities and second, 
that there is no duration dependency. If these assumptions do not hold, the surveys at 
different frequencies are implicitly putting different weights on the unemployed. One way 
to test if these two assumptions hold is to look at the conditional transition probabilities. 
Both duration dependence and heterogeneity would reflect on different conditional prob­
abilities. I computed the average conditional probabilities in the LFS, based on three 
period flows (N hi:i):
K i j  _  Ml \ v  -  N t j \u t - 2  _  Ml -  N tj \Jt - 2  _  Ml
t \Et - 2  N tE_ \ N f_ \ ’ t ]Ut-2 N$- i  M l ’ t jI t -2  N ' l 1 n J I ’
We can see in Table 6.2 the substantial differences in conditional probabilities. The 
probability of separation from employment to unemployment is 1% if the person was 
previously employed, 11% if he was previously unemployed and 5% if he was inactive.
2See Appendix for details on the calculations.
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Table 6.2: Conditional transition probabilities , Labour Force Survey
Unconditional Conditional on
probabilities E t - 2 Ut- 2 It -2
E — U 1.3 1.0 11.1 4.8
E -> I 1.9 1.4 5.2 18.2
U —► E 28.0 48.6 20.5 25.0
U - > / 18.2 10.4 13.1 33.7
I -> E 6.4 23.2 12.8 4.0
I -► U 4.8 9.5 22.0 3.6
Note: averages between 1996 and 2008.
The job-finding rate is 49% if two quarters earlier the person was employed, 25% if the 
person was inactive and 21% if the person was unemployed. In addition, one inactive 
person is between 3 to 6 times more likely to return to the labour force, if it has only 
been inactive for one period.
The are two possible explanations for these differences. On the one hand, they can 
be due to history dependence. Ruhm (1991), for instance, finds that displaced workers 
face higher unemployment rates for at least four years. Also, Stevens (1997) shows that 
the effects of displacements in earnings are quite persistent, because of additional job 
losses in the years following the displacement. The results show that this feature is not 
only present in job separations, but it is common to all movements between the three 
states. On the other hand, it might simply indicate a selection effect. The unemployed 
who have not found a job in the last quarter are more likely to have lower ability and 
therefore lower transition probability. The differences in conditional probabilities just 
reflect a changing composition composition of unemployed and not history dependence.
Whatever the cause of the differences of the conditional probabilities is, their existence 
implies that the extrapolation of flows at a different frequency than the one which the 
survey was carried, is biased. Therefore, one should be cautious when comparing results 
from surveys carried out at different frequencies, which often happens between the United 
States, United Kingdom and other European economies.3
In order to show how possible misleading this can be, I compute the annual transition 
probability for the LFS directly, by looking at the flows between the first and the fifth 
survey, and the annual rate extrapolated from the quarterly rates, by assuming equal 
conditional probabilities. We can see from the last two columns of Table 6.1 that the result 
is quite different. The annual transitions, calculated through the quarterly rates tend to 
overestimate the true values, particularly on the employment-inactivity transitions. The
3Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), for example, compare the United Kingdom based on a quarterly 
survey and Spain based on a bi-annual survey.
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total gross flows, estim ated using the quarterly transition probabilities, are 18.4% of 
working-age population as opposed to the consistently calculated value of 11.6%. When 
doing the reverse exercise -  extrapolating the quarterly flows from the observed annual 
flows -  we underestimate the true transitions by roughly one half.
6.3.2 Evolution o f labour market stocks and flows
The first row in Figure 6 . 2  displays the evolution of the employment rate, unemployment 
rate and inactivity rate in the United Kingdom over the past 30 years. The vertical line 
signals the beginning of the flows sample. We can see th a t the sample covers one complete 
business cycle. The unemployment rate fell until 2001, it was relatively stable until 
2005 and has increased since, particularly in the last two quarters. The inactivity rate 
has a small downward trend, but compared to historical standards it can be considered 
relatively flat.
The second and third rows in Figure 6.2 show the flows between the three pools, as 
a percentage of the working-age population and as hazard rates. Most of the action over
Figure 6 .2 : Labour market stocks, gross flows and hazard rates
Employment rate (% working-age population) Unemployment rate (% labour force) Inactivity rate (% working-age population)
2008q4
Employment outflows (% working-age population) Unemployment outflows (% working-age population) Inactivity outflows (% working-age population)
1993q4 1999q4 2002q4 2005q4
1 Employment t<a Unemployment flows
— ----- Employment t< 9 Inactivity flows
1990q4 1999q4 2002q4 20O5q4 2008q4 1993q4
Employment outflows hazard rate Unemployment outflows hazard rate
  Employment to Unemployment hazard n
 Employment to Inactivity hazard rate
Inactivity outflows hazard rate
2008q41999q4 2002q4
Inactivity to Employment hazard rate 
• Inactivity to Unemployment hazard r,
Note: the flows series are a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonality and high frequency 
movements.
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the sample has been driven by the flows into and out of unemployment. For instance, at 
the beginning of the sample, 2.9% of the working-age population moved into employment 
every quarter, but by the end of the sample it was less than 2.5% of the working-age pop­
ulation were entering the pool of employed. The reduction of the inflows to employment 
comes exclusively from unemployment: every quarter, the gross flows from unemployment 
to employment fell by 0.4% of the working-age population which corresponds to, roughly, 
150,000 people. Separations from employment to unemployment have also fallen, from 
1.4% to 0.9% of the working-age population in 2007 but they have picked up sharply since 
the beginning of the recession. By contrast, flows between employment and inactivity 
have remained broadly stable across the sample period.
Although the picture of the gross flows and hazard rates is very similar for employment 
and inactivity, this is not the case for unemployment. While the actual number of people 
that moved out of unemployment fell, shrinking the pool of unemployed, the probability 
of moving out of unemployment increased sharply between 1996 and 2005.
6.3.3 C yclical properties o f labour m arket flows
The literature on worker flows defines the cyclicality of flows as their correlation with the 
level of economic activity. I estimate it by running a ordinary least square regression of 
the log of each variable on season dummy variables, a linear trend and the unemployment 
rate. This follows Baker (1992), who undertakes a similar procedure to analyse the cyclical 
movements of unemployment duration.4 The results are shown in Table 6.3.
Inflows and outflows of all pools are countercyclical. In economic downturns, as 
the labour market gets looser, there are more movements between the three states. In 
particular, most of the action occurs in the unemployment pool. More of the unemployed 
find a job or stop searching for one. Also, more of the inactive start looking for a job and 
more workers lose theirs. Flows between employment and inactivity do not seem to have 
a cyclical component.
The separation rate from employment to unemployment, and the transition probabil­
ity from inactivity to unemployment are strongly countercyclical, while the job finding 
rate is strongly procyclical. In other words, recessions are periods when it is harder for
4In the working paper version of this paper I use simple correlation coefficients and the results are
identical whether I use unemployment or employment rate as the cyclical indicator. Additionally, I 
used detrended GDP or capacity utilisation but, although the results pointed in the same direction, the 
correlations were weaker and in many cases insignificant. I have also tried different detrending methods: 
using an Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 105  is very close to linear detrending, 
so the results are similar. Conversely, when I used a Baxter-King bandpass filter and an HP filter with 
the usual quarterly data parameter (1600), the correlations were low and not significant. These filters 
remove too much of the variation of the series.
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Table 6.3: Cyclical variation of labour market flows and hazard rates
E -+ U  
E  I  
U ^  E  
U - * I  
I  —> E  
I - + U
Note: the cyclicality o f the series is the coefficient on unemploym ent rate in a regression of the series 
in logs on season quarter dum m ies, tim e trend and unemployment rate. T -sta tistics are in brackets.*  
denotes significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%.
G ross flows H aza rd  ra te s
-> E 0.016 (1.33) -0.007 (-0.67)
E -> 0.027** (2.42) 0.036* (3.39)
-> U 0.078* (9.91) 0.086* (11.14)
U -> 0.057* (7.13) -0.072* (-16.18)
I 0.026** (2.02) 0.024 (1.98)
/■ 0.029** (2.04) 0.036* (2.70)
G ross flows H aza rd  ra te s
0.074* (6.96) 0.082* (8.26)
-0.008 (-0.50) 0.001 (0.04)
0.041* (3.29) -0.089* (-10.01)
0.080* (6.67) -0.049* (-4.11)
-0.011 (-0.69) -0.005 (-0.34)
0.080* (5.69) 0.086* (6.63)
an unemployed individual to find a job, an employed person is more likely to lose their 
job and an inactive person is more likely to start looking for one.
In terms of magnitude, job-finding rate seems to fluctuate as much as the job-separation 
rate. Also quite responsive is the hazard rate between inactivity and unemployment. It 
seems that job-finding and separation rates are equally important determinants of unem­
ployment fluctuations. Nevertheless, given the ongoing debate on the relative importance 
of each transition rate, I make a more careful analysis in the next section.
6.4 W hat drives unem ploym ent in U nited  Kingdom?
W hat dictates the cyclical behaviour of unemployment: hires or separations? The sem­
inal work on labour market flows by Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992) set the ‘conventional wisdom’ that recessions are mainly driven by 
high job loss rates. In two recent papers, Shimer (2007) and Hall (2006) have challenged 
this view by presenting evidence that cyclical unemployment dynamics are largely driven 
by a time-varying job-finding rate and that the separation rate is very close to being 
acyclical. These two papers had a very strong impact on the field. On the one hand, 
many researchers have used this evidence to develop models tha t incorporate constant 
job destruction rates (for instance Blanchard and Gali (2010) or Gertler and Trigari 
(2009)). On the other hand, other researchers put forward more evidence that opposes 
their claims. Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) provide new empirical evidence 
in support of the view that a recession starts out with a wave of separations. Fujita and 
Ramey (2009) and Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) argue that both job-separation rate 
and job-finding rate play a significant role in unemployment fluctuations.
The UK evidence is also controversial. Pissarides (1986) finds that, for the period 
between 1967 and 1983, almost all changes in unemployment can be accounted for by 
changes in the job-finding rate. In contrast, Burgess and Turon (2005) claim that between
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1967 and 1998 the unemployment dynamics arise mostly from shocks to inflows. More 
recently, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) find that, using claimant count data, the job- 
separation rate accounts for one third of unemployment volatility. However, using LFS 
data they conclude that the job-separation rate is as important as the job-finding rate.
The ongoing debate about the roles of hires and separations give emphasis to the use 
of different methodological approaches and data sources across researchers. To evaluate 
the contribution of job-finding and job-separation rates in the United Kingdom I use two 
decompositions of unemployment that have been proposed in the recent literature: Shimer 
(2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2009). I also correct the data for time aggregation, by 
applying the discrete correction method proposed by Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009), 
that ignores movements out of a given state and back, which occur within one week.5
6.4.1 U nem ploym ent decom positions
The starting point for all unemployment decompositions is the equation of the steady- 
state unemployment uf3:6
AEU
1 (6.7)‘ A f u +  A ¥E'
Shimer (2007) isolates the effect of the job-finding rate by constructing a counterfactual 
unemployment rate if job-separation were always to be at its sample average (denoted 
u { ) .  Similarly, he constructs the series for the unemployment rate, if the job-finding rate 
were to be at its sample average (denoted u*).
/  _  K E U  s _  A EU
AEU +  ’ U% Afu +  AUE' ( }
Shimer’s decomposition has faced some criticism because the steady-state approximation 
is non-linear in the two hazard rates. In this sense, if we chose different values for s and 
/  instead of the sample average we would get different answers.
Fujita and Ramey (2009) propose a more natural decomposition. By linearizing 
steady-state unemployment around the previous period steady-state itflj, we get the 
following expression:
A E U  _  A E U  A  U E  _  \ U E
^ 7 - ^  =  ( 1  -  « C i )  ‘ kev  -  t 1  -  < - i )  * a v e " 1 ■ ( 6 - 9 )
u t - 1  A t - i  Jh - i
5 We can write each one of the nine quarterly transition probabilities as a non-linear function of all 
nine monthly or weekly transition probabilities. We can then retrieve them by solving a system of nine 
equations. See details in Appendix.
6  This expression is only correct when we ignore the flows in and out of inactivity. I do this to 
be easier to compare with the results from existing literature. Furthermore, both Shimer (2007) and 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) conclude that, including the flows in and out of inactivity do not change 
the relative importance of the job-finding and job-separation rates.
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which is simply breaking down the percentage change of the steady-state unemployment 
rate into percentage changes on both job-finding and job-separation rates.7 We can 
restate this expression as dust9 = du{ +  du9, where
7, s s  _  „. ss  \ U E  _  \ U E  \ E U  _  \ E U
d<  =  du(  =  - a - < i )  ‘  \ ue  < _ 1 . M  ‘  A  E U * ' 1- ( 6 - 1 0 )u t- 1 A i - 1 lyt- 1
The variance of the percentage change of the steady-state equilibrium unemployment is 
the sum of the covariance between du99 and du{ and the covariance between du9ta and 
du9t :
Var(dusts) = Cov(dusts, du{) +  Cov(dusts, du®). (6-H)
6.4.2 C laim ant count data
One way to assess the robustness of the results is to repeat the exercise using data 
generated at a monthly frequency. I use data on the claimant count unemployment 
outflows and inflows to calculate a proxy for job-finding and job-separation rates. This 
data, provided by ONS, covers the unemployed that are claiming unemployment benefits. 
It is a proxy for two reasons. First, people registered in the claimant count are only a 
subset of the unemployed. Second, despite constituting the large majority, claimant 
account flows include not only flows between unemployment and employment but also 
include flows between unemployment and inactivity. W ith this data we can go back 
to 1989, which allows us to also capture the early 1990s recession. Figure 6.3 shows 
a comparison between the unemployment rate, the monthly job-finding rate and the 
monthly job-separation rate based on the LFS and the ones calculated from the claimant 
count (three month average for the quarter).
The claimant count job-finding and job-separation rates are always higher than the 
monthly transition probability calculated from the LFS: the job-finding rate between 5 to 
10 percentage points and the job-separation rate between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points. 
As mentioned above, claimant count flows data also include flows into and from inactiv­
ity. These flows can bias the job-finding and separation-rates upwards. The unemployed 
registered in the claimant count are a subset of total unemployment and have a more 
effective search mechanism but they are also more likely to lose their jobs and therefore 
have higher transition rates. In addition, the discrepancy in the results might be at­
tributed to the time aggregation correction of the quarterly LFS data. As shown before, 
extrapolating monthly transition probabilities based on quarterly series might generate 
a downward biased series. Putting these issues aside, the correlations between the series 
are quite high: 0.99 between the unemployment rates, 0.90 between the job-separation 
rates and 0.91 between the job-finding rates.
7This is a discrete time version of the decomposition Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009).
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Figure 6.3: Comparison between LFS and claimant count data
Job  separation rate Job finding rate
1980q4 1984q4 1988q4 1992q4 1996q4 2000q4 2004q4 2008q4
Unemployment rate
Table 6.4 displays the relative importance of job-separation rate using the LFS and 
claimant count data, for the two methodologies and the different frequencies. If we 
look at weekly transition probabilities, using LFS data  the job-separation rate accounts 
for around 50% of unemployment volatility. Using claimant count data, for the same 
sample the values are lower -  between 38% to 48%. However, when we include the early 
1990s recession the the importance of job-separation increases, particularly using Shimer 
decomposition. This evidence gives strength to the point made by Davis, Faberman, and 
Haltiwanger (2006) th a t changes in the job-separation rate explain most of the variation 
in unemployment during sharp recessions, whereas fluctuations of the job-finding rate are 
the focal element during mild recessions.
These values are in line with the ones reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). 
Using LFS data  they find th a t job-separation rate has the same contribution to unem­
ployment volatility as the job-finding rate -  around one third each -  while the rest is 
accounted for the flows between unemployment and inactivity. They also find that, when 
using claimant count the job-separation rate seems less im portant.8
Table 6.4: Relative importance of job-separation rate
LFS C la im an t count
1989:1-2008:4 1993:2-2008:4 1989:1-2008:4
Shimer F & R Shimer F & R Shimer F & R
Quarterly 0.516 0.619
Monthly 0.453 0.593 0.424 0.521 0.476 0.522
Weekly 0.429 0.582 0.384 0.475 0.439 0.482
Note: for Shimer, the value is the ratio between the standard deviation of the linearly detrended coun- 
terfactual steady-state unemployment rate u \ and the sum of the standard deviations of both u8 and u [. 
For Fujita and Ramey, the value correspond to ratio between the covariance between du88 and du8t and 
the variance of dust s . The series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X 12 Census programme.
8In terms of methodology, there are three differences of this work relative to Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2008). First they compute the transition probabilities for all people above 15, while I exclude people out 
of retirement age (60 plus for women and 65 plus for men). Because they include them, their transition 
probabilities are lower then mine, particularly out of inactivity. Second, they compute the continuous 
transition probabilities. Third, they include in the decomposition the transitions between unemployment 
and inactivity.
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6.5 O th er perspectives on the  UK  labour m arket
6.5.1 Job-to-job flows
Many economists think th a t on-the-job search and job-to-job flows are im portant ele­
ments of business cycles. For instance, Krause and Lubik (2007), building on the Pis­
sarides (1994) on-the-job search model, concluded tha t on-the-job search and job-to-job 
transitions greatly amplify shocks to the economy.
One advantage of the LFS, relative to the US surveys, is tha t it allows us to calculate 
job-to-job flows. It asks the respondent what year and month it started  the current job, 
making it possible to com pute the length of current job tenure. I count as a job-to-job 
transitions the cases where an individual is employed in the first quarter and still employed 
in the second quarter bu t with a job tenure of less than three months. We should bear in 
mind tha t this measure of job-to-job flows includes people tha t changed job directly as 
well as individuals th a t had non-measured spells of unemployment or inactivity. In other 
words, it includes individuals tha t moved out of employment and back into employment 
within the quarter.
The first graph of Figure 6.4 plots the job-to-job flows as a percentage of the working 
population. Job-to-job flows increased from 1996 to 2001, but have fallen since. As one 
expects, there are substantial differences in the transition probabilities among employees 
engaged in on-the-job search and the ones that are not searching. If a worker is searching 
for a job, the probability of changing job in any given quarter is, on average, 14%. If he 
is not searching, the probability is only 2%. Each quarter, on average, 7% of workers are 
searching for a different job. This is higher than the value of 5.2% found by Pissarides and 
Wadsworth (1994). All in all, roughly one third of all the job changers were previously 
searching for a job.
Evidence from the United States by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) suggests tha t job- 
to-job flows are procyclical. We observe the same pattern  in the United Kingdom as we
Figure 6.4: Job-to-job flows
Job -to -jo b  flows (% w orking-age population) Jo b -to -jo b  hazard rate by search sta tus Share of employed searching for a  different job
ft
200Sq4 ] 1996q4 2002q4
Note: the flows series are a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonality and high frequency 
movements.
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can see in Table 6.5. Job-to-job transition probabilities are strongly procyclical as well 
as actual job-to-job flows.
Some on-the-job search theories have different predictions for the cyclicality of the 
number of employees searching for a different job. For instance, the stylised model pre­
sented in Pissarides (2000) predicts that increasing productivity leads to more people 
searching for jobs. Conversely, Nagypal (2008) argues tha t workers undertake less on- 
the-job search when they face lower unemployment risk, as is the case of expansions. In 
the United Kingdom, these effects seem to cancel out such tha t the number of employees 
searching for a different job is not related to the business cycle.
Table 6.5: Cyclical variation of job-to-job flows
Job-to-job flows -0.103* (-8.50)
Job-to-job hazard rate if searching -0.069* (-5.81)
Job-to-job hazard rate if not searching -0.111* (-8.39)
Employees searching -0.008 (1.22)
Note: the cyclicality o f the series is the coefficient on unem ploym ent rate in  a regression of the series 
in logs on season quarter dummies, tim e trend and unemploym ent rate. T -sta tistics are in brackets. * 
denotes significant at 1%.
6.5.2 O utflows from em ploym ent by reason
Are separations from employment driven by firms or workers? The LFS allows us to 
split the cause of employment separations into three categories: involuntary separations, 
resignations, or other reasons. The first category includes dismissals, termination of tem­
porary employment contracts or redundancies, which are involuntary from the worker’s 
point of view. Resignations include cases where the worker resigned, and also where they 
took voluntary redundancy. Finally, other reasons encompasses giving up work for health, 
family or personal reasons or taking early retirement. Roughly half of total separations 
from employment are due to other reasons and the other half is due to resignations and 
involuntary separations in equal shares.
The graphs in Figure 6.5 plot, for the three types of job separations, the share caused 
by each reason. The flows from employment to unemployment are dominated by invol­
untary separations. They account between 40% and 45% of total employment to unem­
ployment flows. In the beginning of the sample resignations only accounted for 20% of 
total employment to unemployment flows, in 2007 tha t value was close to 30% but it has 
fallen sharply since.
As expected, other reasons accounts for more than 70% of the employment to inac­
tivity flows, with the remaining being split equally between involuntary separations and
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Figure 6.5: Employment outflows by reason
Employment to Unemployment flows by reason (% of total) Employment to Inactivity flows by reason (% of total) Job to job flows by reason (% of total)
8 -
     8
8
?
8
8
200Sq4
Resignations 
Other reasons
Resignations 
Other reasons
Resignations 
Other reasons
Note: the flows series are a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonality and high frequency 
movements.
resignations. Finally, only a minority of the job-to-job flows are caused by involuntary 
separations. Around 50% of job-to-job flows are due to other reasons and 35% are due 
to resignations.
Table 6.6 shows that, as expected, involuntary separations are strongly countercycli­
cal, while resignations are very procyclical. In economic slowdowns less people quit, 
which partially counterbalances the fact the more people lose their jobs. Separations by 
other reasons are acyclical which is consistent with the incidence of personal reasons hav­
ing a weaker relationship with the business cycle. When we disaggregate the separations 
even more, we see tha t the counter-cyclicality of the involuntary separations is mainly 
driven by the employment-unemployment flows while the procyclicality of resignations is 
much stronger in the job-to-job transitions.
 Table 6.6: Cyclical variation of employment outflows hazard rates by reason______
Total Employment to Employment to Job-to-job
separations unemployment inactivity
Involuntary separations 0.046* (3.58) 0.128* (5.70) 0.021 (1.13) -0.040** (-2.42)
Resignations -0.116* (-7.65) -0.006 (-0.37) -0.082* (-3.61) -0.169* (-8.20)
Other reasons_________ -0.005 (-0.37) 0.111* (6.67) 0.003 (0.13) -0.050* (-3.06)
Note: the cyclicality of the series is the coefficient on unemployment rate in a regression of the series 
in logs on season quarter dummies, tim e trend and unemployment rate. T-statistics are in brackets.*  
denotes significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%.
6.5.3 D isaggregating inactivity
Given the magnitude of the flows in and out of inactivity, researchers have asked if 
some of the inactive should be considered as unemployed. Flinn and Heckman (1983) 
analysed conditional and unconditional transition probabilities between the two states 
and concluded th a t they are essentially different. In the United Kingdom, however, 
Joyce, Jones, and Thomas (2003) found that many subgroups of the inactive have the 
same transition probability to employment as the unemployed. Blanchard and Diamond
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(1990) disaggregate the pool of inactive into two well-defined sub-groups: those tha t want 
a job (I w) and those th a t do not want a job (7°). The inactive tha t want a job can be 
considered marginally close to the labour market, and consequently more likely to go into 
the labour force. The LFS also allows for this distinction.
The first graph in Figure 6.6 shows the two series as a percentage of the working-age 
population. It is evident tha t the relative size of the two groups has changed over the 
sample. While the pool of inactive th a t want a job have a negative trend similar to the 
unemployment rate, the pool of inactive tha t do not want a job has increased over the 
sample period. On average, the number of inactive tha t do not want a job is almost three 
times higher than the number of inactive tha t want a job.
Figure 6.6: Inactivity by sub-groups
Inactivity ra te  by objective (% o f w o rk in g -ag e  population) H azard  ra te s  from Labour force to  Inactivity by ob jective H azard  ra te s  from Inactivity to Labour force by objectiveS-
!
2002q4 2005q4 2008q41996q4
----------  Inactive - want a job
------------Inactive - do not want a job
----------  Labour force to inactive (want)
----------- Labour force to Inactive (out)
----------  Inactive (want) lo Labour force
------------Inactive (out) lo Labour force
Note: the flows series are a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonality and high frequency 
movements.
Table 6.7 reports the transition probabilities between the four groups. The inactive 
tha t want a job are twice as likely to join the labour force, and almost four times more 
likely to join the pool of unemployed than the inactive th a t do not want a job. Addi­
tionally, every quarter, 11% of the unemployed move into inactivity but still want a job 
while only 6% move to inactivity and do not want a job. There are also relatively high 
transition probabilities between the two groups of inactive. Around 21% of the inactive 
tha t want a job abandon their intentions by the following quarter. It seems tha t this 
state is a limbo between inactivity and the labour force.
Table 6.7: Transition matrix, Labour Force Survey (% per quarter)
From:
To:
Employment U nemploy ment Inactive
(want)
Inactive
(out)
Employment 96.7 26.8 8.4 5.5
Unemployment 1.4 55.8 10.1 2.9
Inactive (want) 0.7 11.3 60.6 10.8
Inactive (out) 1.2 6.2 20.9 80.8
Note: averages between 1993:1 to 2008:4■
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Table 6.8 exhibits the cyclical properties of the gross flows and hazard rates between 
the two groups of the inactive and the labour force. The outflows from inactivity to the 
labour force are countercyclical, independent of the subgroup of inactive we consider. 
However the converse is not true. Whereas the flows from the labour force to inactivity 
(out) are not related to the cycle, the flows between the labour force and the inactive 
that want a job are countercyclical. In recessions, more people leave the labour force but 
still want a job.
Taking the evidence as a whole, there seems to exist a closer link between the pool of 
the inactive that want a job and the labour force, particularly unemployment.
Table 6.8: Cyclical variation of flows in and out of inactivity
G ross flows H aza rd  ra te s
J W 0.081* (6.80) 0.045* (3.84)
L  —►1° 0.000 (0.02) -0.001 (-0.06)
J W  __► L 0.057* (4.14) 0.058* (4.21)
1° —i> L 0.031 (1.70) 0.038** (2.21)
J W  __ J- 1° 0.020 (1.66) 0.021** (2.34)
1° -> J W 0.050 (3.64) 0.057* (3.99)
Note: the cyclicality of the series is the coefficient on unemployment rate in a regression of the series 
in logs on season quarter dummies, tim e trend and unemployment rate. T -sta tistics are in brackets.* 
denotes significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%.
6.5.4 Flow s by education
Previous studies on labour market flows have paid relatively little attention to differences 
by levels of education. To explore such differences, I divide the working-age population 
into three groups depending on the level of education: higher education (Education 1), 
A-levels and GCSE or equivalent (Education 2) and below GCSE (Education 3). There 
has been a significant change in the UK economy over the past decade, with the share of 
working-age population with higher education increasing from 20% in 1997 to above 30% 
in 2008. Over the same period, the share of the working-age population in the lowest 
education category fell from around 30% to below 20%.
There are striking differences across the three education groups with respect to em­
ployment, unemployment and inactivity rates, as one can see in the first row of Figure 
6.7. The average employment rate among the most educated is 89%, as opposed to 56% 
for individuals in the lowest education category. Both the unemployment rate and in­
activity rate are monotonically decreasing in the level of education. Individuals in the 
lowest education category face an average unemployment rate of 11%, almost four times 
higher than the average unemployment rate of those with higher education. The average 
inactivity rates are, in increasing order of level of education, 37%, 19% and 10%.
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Figure 6.7: Labour market stocks and hazard rates by education
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Note: the flows series are a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonality and high frequency 
movements.
The difference between education categories extends to transition probabilities, as 
shown in the remaining figures of Figure 6.7. For example, the average separation rates 
from employment to unemployment are 0.9%, 1.4% and 1.9% as we go down the education 
ranking. The job-finding rate also presents significant differences. By the end of the 
sample, individuals in the highest education category are twice as likely to find a job 
than individuals in the lowest education group.
Another interesting fact is that, after 2001, the employment rate has fallen for all 
groups, with the exception of the more educated. In other words, it has fallen for 70% of 
the working-age population. The aggregate employment rate has, therefore, been largely 
supported by the increase in the share of the working-age population in the highest 
education category.
Table 6.9 presents the coefficient of the regression of each transition probability with 
the unemployment rate. The cyclical properties of most transition probabilities are quite 
robust across levels of education. The job-finding rate is highly procyclical and the 
separation rate from employment to unemployment is countercyclical. The probability
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of moving from inactivity to unemployment is countercyclical at all levels of education. 
Prom the magnitude of the coefficients we can see that individuals with higher education 
face less cyclical fluctuations in transition probabilities, than the individuals with lower 
education.
Table 6.9: Cyclical variation of labour market hazard rates by education
Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
E -+ u 0.082* (2.71) 0.101* (6.20) 0.103* (4.86)
E -* >1 0.026 (1.18) -0.002 (-0.10) -0.018 (-0.82)
U -►E -0.071* (-3.66) -0.110* (-7.29) -0.096* (-5.09)
U-H>1 -0.036 (-1.13) -0.017 (-1.12) -0.042** (-2.25)
I -+ E 0.016 (0.66) -0.025 (-1.19) -0.040 (-1.47)
/ - > U 0.089* (2.88) 0.133* (5.64) 0.149* (8.21)
Note: the cyclicality of the series is the coefficient on unemploym ent rate in a regression of the series 
in logs on season quarter dummies, tim e trend and the unemploym ent rate o f the respective category. 
T-statistics are in brackets.* denotes significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%.
6.5.5 P ublic and private sector em ploym ent
LFS employment can be decomposed into public and private sector. Public sector em­
ployment is composed mainly of employment from local and central government and 
health authorities, but it also includes employment by public companies, universities, 
armed forces, charities and other organizations.9 As in other OECD countries, the level 
of public employment in the United Kingdom is quite high at around 25% of total employ­
ment. Figure 6.8 shows the public and private sector employment rates and the different 
transition probabilities.
The behaviour of the two employment rates differ significantly. The private sector 
employment rate grew from 53% of the working age population in 1996 to just under 
57% in 2002 before falling back somewhat. By contrast, the public sector employment 
rate was relatively stable until 2002, at around 17% of the working age population, but 
had risen close to 19% by the end of the sample.
On average, the separation rate to unemployment is 2.5 times higher in the private 
sector than in the public sector. If one is unemployed, the average probability of finding 
a public sector job is 3.6%, while for a private sector job it is 22% - six times higher. The 
probability of moving from inactivity to private sector employment is also, roughly, six 
times higher than for the public sector.
9As the LFS is a household survey, the split is based on individuals self reporting whether they work 
in the public sector and is therefore they are prone to misclassification error.
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Figure 6.8: Employment and hazard rates of the public and private sector
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• Private ------------Public
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Pnvate  Public
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Table 6.10 summarises the cyclical properties of private and public sector employment 
rates and their transition probabilities. While private sector employment is naturally pro­
cyclical, public sector employment is countercyclical. Previous studies, for instance Al- 
gan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002), have also identified this positive correlation between 
public sector employment and the unemployment rate in several OECD economies.
The most puzzling element of Table 6.10 is the fact that we cannot identify why 
private and public sector employment rates have opposite cyclical behaviours. Job sepa­
ration rates are strongly countercyclical for both sectors. Moreover, job finding rates go 
up in expansions for both sectors although the cyclicality is stronger for private sector 
employment. This dual behaviour of private and public sector employment cannot also be 
explained by flows between the two sectors or with inactivity, as they all seem unrelated 
to the business cycle.
Table 6.10: Cyclical variation of labour market flows and hazard rates
P riv a te  sector P u b lic  sec to r
Gross flow Hazard rate Gross flow Hazard rate
E p -0.013* (-10.58) E 9 0.005 (1.47)
Ep - ■+ u 0.067* (6.09) 0.080* (7.67) E 9 - U 0.122* (4.57) 0.116* ( 4.53)
Ep - -> I -0.020 (-1.25) -0.006 (-0.41) E 9 ■-> I 0.044 (2.11) 0.037 (1.81)
U —►E p 0.048* (3.80) -0.091* (-10.59) U - > E 9 0.027 (0.90) -0.112* (-3.91)
I-> E p -0.013 (-0.76) -0.008 (-0.48) I  -H■ E 9 0.003 (0.15) 0.008 (0.37)
Ep -h► E 9 0.008 (0.44) 0.021 (1.21) E 9 - -> E p 0.026 (1.15) 0.020 (0.88)
Note: * denotes significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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6.6 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to describe the main developments in, and establish a 
number of key facts about, the recent history of the UK worker gross flows. It provided 
a picture of a wide range of information about worker gross flows from different angles, 
which is essential to understand the UK labour market.
The findings of this paper can be summarised as follows:
• In each quarter, 7% of the working-age population change status between inactivity, 
employment and unemployment and 2.1% of the working-age population change 
their employer.
• Gross flows in and out of the three pools are countercyclical. In expansions, as the 
labour market becomes tighter there are fewer movements between the three pools.
• Employment to unemployment flows are countercyclical, as well as the job-separation 
rate. Unemployment to employment flows are countercyclical too, but the job- 
finding rate is procyclical.
• The job-finding rate and job-separation rate are equally important determinants 
of unemployment fluctuations. Job-separation rate is particularly relevant during 
recessions.
• Every quarter, 7% of all employees are searching for a different job. They are seven 
times more likely to change jobs than the ones not searching. Job-to-job transition 
probability is strongly procyclical, but the number of employees searching for a 
different job is acyclical.
• Resignations are strongly procyclical, involuntary separations (layoffs) are coun­
tercyclical and separations for other reasons are acyclical. Involuntary separations 
dominate the employment to unemployment flows while 70% of all employment to 
inactivity flows occur because of other reasons. Only 15% of the job-to-job flows 
are driven by involuntary separations.
• The inactive that want a job are twice as likely to move into the labour force and 
four times more likely to move into unemployment than the inactive that do not 
want a job.
• There are substantial differences in the employment, unemployment and inactivity 
rates of different education categories, as well as in transition probabilities. Indi­
viduals in the lowest education category face a three times higher unemployment 
and inactivity rate, twice as high separation rate and half the job-finding rate, than 
individuals in the highest education category.
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• Close to 25% of total employment is public sector employment which, unlike private 
sector employment, is countercyclical. The separation rate is twice as high in the 
private sector as in the public sector. In contrast, both the unemployed and inactive 
are six times more likely to find a job in the private sector than in the public sector.
In addition to these findings, the most striking aspect of the data is that condition 
transition probabilities are substantially different across different histories. Because of 
these differences, estimating annual gross flows or transition probabilities based on the 
quarterly transition probabilities overestimates the actual ones. This finding has three 
significant implications.
First, one should be cautious when comparing results from surveys carried out at 
different frequencies, which often happens between the United States, United Kingdom 
and other European economies. Having the transition probabilities at a given frequency 
is not enough to characterise a labour market. We have to know also how they change 
at different frequencies. Second, we should reassess some of numbers used in calibrating 
macroeconomic models. For instance, Blanchard and Gali (2010) calibrate the quarterly 
separation rate for the United States as 12%, which seems to be too high. We should 
not extrapolate the information from monthly to quarterly frequency and, instead, we 
should try to get these values directly. Finally, one should be careful when applying 
standard procedures like time aggregation correction, that rely on the implicit assumption 
of equality of conditional transition probabilities.
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6.7 A ppendix
M u l t ip l e  t r a n s i t i o n s  a n d  d i f f e r e n t  f r e q u e n c i e s
Suppose that we have nine transition probabilities, calculated at a given frequency i: 
A%EEi ^ eui A£/, h\jE, Ahu, A.lu r, A}e , Ajf; and A I f  we consider tha t the transition 
probabilities of each individual are constant across time, we can compute the implied 
transition probabilities at any frequency (yearly, quarterly, monthly or weekly), using 
one of the following system of equations.
At  = E E E A^ A?»A^  =  { E , U , I }  (A6.1)
k I n
A« =  £ £  ASAEA£, i ,j ,  *:,/ =  {£,£/, 7} (A6.2)
k I
As  =  £ £ £  A£ASA£A£, i , j , k , l , n  = { £ ,£ /,/}  (A6.3)
k i n
When we use LFS data we have data on quarterly flows between the three states: em­
ployment, unemployment and inactivity. To solve for the annual rates we can compute 
the value directly from equation (A6.1). To compute the monthly transition probabilities 
we need to solve the non-linear system of equation (A6.2) for the monthly rates and 
(A6.3) for the weakly rates. To calculate the gross flows, we just multiply the transition 
probabilities by the stocks of employment, unemployment or inactivity.
When we use the claimant count data, there are only the transition rates between 
employment and unemployment, so we get a 4 equations system instead of 9.
186
Chapter 7 
Short and long-run determ inants of 
sovereign credit ratings1
7.1 Introduction
Sovereign credit ratings are a condensed assessment of a government’s ability and will­
ingness to repay its public debt on time. Such measures of the probability of default 
are particularly relevant for international financial markets, economic agents and gov­
ernments. First, sovereign ratings are a key determinant of the interest rates a country 
faces in the international financial market and therefore of its borrowing costs. Second, 
sovereign ratings may have a constraining impact on the ratings assigned to domestic 
banks or companies. Third, some institutional investors have lower bounds for the risk 
they can assume in their investments. Consequently, they choose their bond portfo­
lio composition taking into account the credit risk perceived by the rating notations.2 
Therefore, it is important, both for governments and for financial markets, to understand 
what factors rating agencies put more emphasis on, when attributing a rating score.
We perform an empirical analysis of foreign currency sovereign debt ratings, using data 
from the three main rating agencies: Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard Sz Poor’s 
(S&P). We have compiled a panel data set on sovereign debt ratings, macroeconomic 
data and qualitative variables for a wide range of countries starting in 1995. The use of 
panel data is appealing because it allows examining not only how the agencies attribute 
a rating, but also how they decide on upgrades and downgrades.
Our main contribution to the existing literature is methodological. The fact that a 
country’s rating does not vary much across time raises some econometric problems. On
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Antonio Afonso and Philipp Rother from the Euro­
pean Central Bank.
2For instance, the European Central Bank when conducting open market operations can only take 
as collateral bonds that have at least a single A rating, attributed by at least one rating agency.
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the one hand, fixed effects estimation only informs us on how the agency decides on up­
grades and downgrades, because the country dummy captures the average rating. On the 
other hand, random effects estimation is inadequate because of the correlation between 
the country specific error and the regressors. We salvage the random effects approach by 
modelling the country specific error, which in practical terms implies adding time-averages 
of the explanatory variables as additional time-invariant regressors. This setting allows 
us to make a distinction between short and long-run determinants of sovereign ratings.
Regarding the empirical modelling strategy, we follow the two main strands in the 
literature. We use linear regression methods on a linear transformation of the ratings 
and we also estimate our specification using both ordered probit and random effects 
ordered probit methods. The latter is the best procedure for panel data as it considers 
the existence of an additional normally distributed cross-section error. This approach 
allows us to determine the cut-off points throughout the rating scale, as well as to test 
whether a linear quantitative transformation of the ratings is a good approximation.
The results show that four core variables have a consistent short-run impact on 
sovereign ratings: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, the public debt level 
and the government balance. Government effectiveness, as well as the level of external 
debt and external reserves are important long-run determinants. A dummy reflecting 
past sovereign defaults is also found significant. Fiscal variables seem more important 
determinants than previously found in the literature.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 7.2 we give an overview of the rating 
systems and review the related literature. Section 7.3 explains our methodology. In 
Section 7.4 reports the estimation and prediction results, as well as some country specific 
analysis. Section 7.5 summarises the paper’s main findings.
7.2 R ating system s and literature
Sovereign ratings are assessments of the relative likelihood of default. The rating agencies 
look at a wide range of elements, from solvency factors affecting the capacity to repay the 
debt, to socio-political factors tha t might influence the willingness to pay of the borrower, 
and assess the risk of default using a code. Although these agencies do not use the same 
qualitative codes, in general, there is a correspondence between each agency rating level 
as shown in Table 7.1.
An earlier study on the determinants of sovereign ratings by Cantor and Packer (1996) 
concluded that the ratings can be largely explained by a small set of variables: per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development, and default
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Table 7.1: SfeP, Moody’s and Fitch rating systems and linear transformations
Characterization of debt and Rating Linear transformation
issuer (source: Moody’s) S&P Moody’s Fitch Scale 21 Scale 17
Highest quality AAA Aaa AAA 2 1 17
AA+ Aal AA+ 2 0 16
High quality a> AA Aa2 AA 19 15
L*
twO AA- Aa3 AA- 18 14
a A + A 1 A + 17 13
Strong payment capacity S A A2 A 16 1 2
CO
- £ . A- A3 A- 15 1 1Gh-H BBB+ Baal BBB+ 14 1 0
Strong payment capacity BBB Baa2 BBB 13 9
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 1 2 8
Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty
BB+
BB
BB-
Bal
Ba2
Ba3
B B +
BB
BB-
1 1
1 0
9
7
6
5
B+ B1 B + 8 4
High credit risk <D'S B B2 B 7 3
t o B- B3 B- 6 2
:> CCC+ Caal CCC+ 5
Very high credit risk ■il3
8
c c c Caa2 c c c 4
c c c - Caa3 c c c - 3
Near default with possibility 
of recovery
■ cx ■
CO c c Ca c c
c
2 1
SD C DDD
Default D DD
D
1
history. Further studies incorporated, for instance, macroeconomic variables like the 
unemployment rate or the investment-to-GDP ratio (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005)). In 
papers focussing on currency crises, several external indicators such as foreign reserves, 
current account balance, exports or terms of trade seem to play an important role (Mulder 
and Montfort (2000)). Indicators of how the government conducts its fiscal policy, in 
particular budget balance and government debt, can also be relevant, as well as variables 
that assess political risk, like corruption or social indexes (Depken, LaFountain, and 
Butters (2006)).
Regarding the econometric approach, there are two strands in the literature. The first 
uses linear regression methods on a numerical representation of the ratings. The study 
by Cantor and Packer, applies OLS regressions to a linear representation of the ratings, 
on a cross section of 45 countries. This methodology was also pursued by Afonso (2003) 
and Butler and Fauver (2006). Using OLS on a numerical representation of the ratings is 
quite simple and allows for a straightforward generalization to panel data by doing fixed 
or random effects estimation (Mora (2006); Mulder and Montfort (2000)).
Although estimating the determinants of ratings using these approaches has, in gen­
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eral, a good predictive power, it faces some critiques. As ratings are a qualitative ordinal 
measure, traditional estimation techniques on a linear representation of the ratings are 
not adequate. First, they implicitly assume that the difference between any two adjacent 
categories is always equal. Besides, even if this is true, in the presence of elements in the 
top and bottom category, the coefficient estimates are still biased, even in large samples.
To overcome this critique, another strand of the literature uses ordered response 
models, for instance, Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin (2002), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) and 
Depken, LaFountain, and Butters (2006). Although ordered probit should be considered 
the preferred estimation procedure, it is not entirely satisfying. The ordered probit 
asymptotic properties do not generalise for small samples, so it is problematic to estimate 
it using only a cross-section of countries. It is, therefore, imperative to maximize the 
number of observation by having a panel data, but when doing so, one has to be careful. 
Indeed, the generalization of ordered probit to panel data is not simple, because of the 
country specific effect. Furthermore, within this framework, the need to have many 
observations makes it harder to perform robustness analysis by, for instance, partitioning 
the sample.
7.3 M ethodology
7.3.1 Linear regression framework
Our starting point is the straightforward generalization of the a cross-section specification 
to panel data,
Rit = (3Xu +  A Za +  ai +  fin, (7-1)
where we have: Ru - quantitative variable, obtained by a linear transformation; X u  and 
Zi are vectors of explanatory variables. The index i (i = 1,..., N )  denotes the country, 
the index t (t = 1, ...,T) indicates the period and a* stands for the individual effects for 
each country i. Additionally, we assume that the disturbances (in are independent across 
countries and across time.
There are three ways to estimate this equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or ran­
dom effects estimation. Under standard conditions all estimators are consistent and the 
ranking of the three methods in terms of efficiency is clear: a random effects approach 
is preferable to the fixed effects, which is preferable to pooled OLS. W hat we mean by 
standard conditions is whether or not the country specific error is uncorrelated with the 
regressors E { a i \ X it , Zi) =  0. If this is the case one should opt for the random effects 
estimation, while if this condition does not hold, both the pooled OLS and the random 
effects estimation give inconsistent estimates and fixed effects estimation is preferable.
190
CHAPTER 7. DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS
In our case, it seems natural that the country specific effect is correlated with the 
regressors, so one may be tempted to say that the “fixed effects estimation” is the best 
strategy.3 This conclusion is flawed. As there is not much variation of a country’s rating 
over time, the dummies included in the regression capture the country’s average rating, 
while the other variables only capture movements in the ratings across time. Although 
statistically correct, a fixed effects regression is partially stripped of meaning.
There are two ways of rescuing a random effects approach when there is correlation 
between the country specific error and the regressors. One is to do the Hausman-Taylor 
IV estimation, but we would need instruments that are uncorrelated with c^, which are 
not easy to find. We opt for a different approach that consists on modelling the error term 
Q!j. This approach, introduced by Mundlak (1978) and described in Wooldridge (2002), 
is usually applied when estimating non-linear models, as IV estimation proves to be a
herculean task. As we shall see, the application to our case is quite successful. The idea
is to give an explicit expression for the correlation between the error and the regressors, 
stating tha t the expected value of the country specific error is a linear combination of 
time-averages of the regressors AT
E(oii\Xit ,  Zi) =  rjXi, (7.2)
If we modify our initial equation (7.1), with oti = rfXi we get
Rit = P X h + A Zi + r]Xi + €i + fin, (7-3)
where e* is an error term by definition uncorrelated with the regressors. In practical 
terms, we eliminate the problem by including a time-average of the explanatory variables 
as additional time-invariant regressors. We can rewrite (7.3) as:
Rit — (3(Xit — X i )  + (7 7 + (3)Xi + A Zi + €i + fin• (7-4)
This expression is quite intuitive. 8 = rj +  /3 can be interpreted as a long-term effect (e. 
g. if a country has a permanent high inflation what is the effect on the rating), while (3 is 
a short-term effect (e. g. if a country manages to reduce inflation this year by one point 
what is the impact on the rating). This intuitive distinction is useful for policy purposes 
as it can tell what a country can do to improve its rating in the short to medium-term. 
Alternatively, we can interpret 8 as the coefficient of the cross-country determinants of 
the credit rating. We estimate equation (7.4) by random effects. The way we modelled
3In several studies, like Depken, LaFountain, and Butters (2006) and Mora (2006), the random effects 
estimator is rejected by the Hausman test. We confirm this result by doing some exploratory regressions. 
We estimated equation (7.1) using random effects and performed the Hausman test: the Chi-Square 
statistic is very high and the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected with p-value of 0 .0 0 0 .
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the error term can be considered successful if the coefficients rj are significant and if the 
Hausman test indicates no correlation between the regressors and the new error term.4
7.3.2 Ordered response framework
We also estimate the determinants of sovereign debt ratings under a limited dependent 
variable framework. The ordered probit is a natural approach for this type of problem, 
because the rating is a discrete variable and reflects an order in terms of probability 
of default. Each rating agency makes a continuous evaluation of a country’s credit­
worthiness, embodied in an unobserved latent variable R*it. The latent variable has a 
linear form and depends on the same set of variables as before,
R*t =  P { X it -  X i )  + (7 7 + (3)Xi + AZi + Ci + int. (7.5)
Because there is a limited number of rating categories, there are several cut-off points to 
draw up their boundaries. The final rating is given by
AAA(AAa) if 0 *^it > ci6
A A  +  (Aal) if Ci6 > R l > C15
Rit ~  < AA(AA2) if C15 > Ru > cu
< < C C C + (C a a l) if Ci > R l
The parameters of equation (7.5) and (7.6), notably /?, 8, A and the cut-off points c\ to 
Ci6 are estimated using maximum likelihood. As we are working with panel data, the 
generalization of ordered probit is not straightforward, because instead of having one 
error term, we now have two. Wooldridge (2002) describes two approaches to estimate 
the parameters. One “quick and dirty” possibility is to assume we only have one error 
term that is serially correlated within countries. We can then do the standard ordered 
probit estimation and use a robust variance-covariance matrix to account for the se­
rial correlation. The second possibility is a random effects ordered probit estimation, 
which considers both errors e* and //# to be normally distributed, and maximizes the 
log-likelihood accordingly. The second approach should be considered the best one, but 
it has as a drawback the quite cumbersome calculations involved.5
4An alternative way would be to estimate f3 using fixed effects and regress the country dummies on 
the time averages of the regressors to estimate 77. We do not follow such method because it cannot be 
generalized to ordered response models.
5In STATA, this procedure was created by Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, and Taylor (2000) and substantially 
improved by Frechette (2001a) and Frechette (2001b). We use such procedures in our calculations.
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7.3.3 E xplanatory variables
Building on the evidence from the existing literature, we identify a set of variables that 
may determine sovereign ratings, aggregated in four main areas.
Macroeconomic variables
GDP per capita (+): richer economies are expected to have more stable institutions 
to prevent government over-borrowing and to be less vulnerable to exogenous shocks.
Real GDP growth (+): higher real growth strengthens the government’s ability to 
repay outstanding obligations.
Unemployment (-): a country with lower unemployment tends to have more flexible 
labour markets. In addition, lower unemployment reduces the fiscal burden of unemploy­
ment and social benefits while broadening the base for labour taxation.
Inflation (+ /-): on the one hand, it reduces the real stock of outstanding government 
debt in domestic currency, leaving more resources to cover foreign debt obligations. On 
the other hand, it is symptomatic of problems at the macroeconomic level.
Government variables
Government debt (-): a higher stock of outstanding government debt implies a higher 
interest burden and should correspond to a higher risk of default.
Fiscal balance (+): large fiscal deficits absorb domestic savings and also suggest 
macroeconomic disequilibria. Persistent deficits may signal problems with the institu­
tional environment for policy makers.
Government effectiveness (+): high quality of public service delivery, competence of 
bureaucracy and lower corruption should improve the ability to service debt obligations.
External variables
External debt (-): the higher the external indebtedness, the higher the risk for addi­
tional fiscal burden, either directly due to a sell-off of foreign government debt or indirectly 
because of the need to support over-indebted domestic borrowers.
Foreign reserves (+): higher (official) foreign reserves should shield the government 
from having to default on its foreign currency obligations.
Current account balance (+ /-): a higher current account deficit could signal an econ­
omy’s tendency to over-consume, undermining long-term sustainability. Alternatively, it 
could reflect rapid accumulation of investment, which should lead to higher growth and 
improved sustainability over the medium term.
Other variables
Default history (-): past sovereign defaults may indicate a great acceptance of reducing 
the outstanding debt burden via a default.
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European Union (+): countries that join the European Union (EU) improve their 
credibility as their economic policy is restricted and monitored by other member states.
Regional dummies (+ /-): some groups of countries of the same geographical location 
may have common characteristics that affect their rating.
7.4 Empirical analysis
7.4.1 D ata
We build a ratings database with sovereign foreign currency rating, attributed by the 
three main rating agencies, S&;P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. We cover a period 1970- 
2005. The rating of a particular year is the rating attributed at 31st of December. We 
group the ratings in 17 categories by putting together the few observations below B-, 
which are given the value one, while AAA observations receive the value 17. In 2005, 
there are 130 countries with a rating, though only 78 have a rating attributed by all three 
agencies.
Given data availability for the explanatory variables, our estimations only cover the 
period 1995-2005. Fiscal balance, current account and government debt are in percentage 
of GDP, foreign reserves enter as percentage of imports and external debt as percentage of 
exports. The variables inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, fiscal balance and current 
account enter as a 3-year average, reflecting the agencies’ approach to take out the effect 
of the business cycle when deciding on a sovereign rating. The external debt variable 
is taken from the World Bank and is only available for non-industrialised countries, so 
for industrialised countries we attribute the value zero, which is equivalent to having a 
multiplicative dummy. We include a dummy variable indicating a past default and a 
variable measuring the number of years since it last occurrence. This variable captures 
the recovery of credibility after a default. As for the dummy variable for EU, we consider 
that the rating agencies anticipated the EU accession. Thus we test the contempora­
neous variable, as well as up to three leads. We find that for Moody’s and S&P the 
variable enters with two leads, while for Fitch we find no anticipation of EU accession. 
Regarding the regional dummies, only the dummies for Industrialised countries and for 
Latin America and Caribbean countries were significant. Overall, we have an unbalanced 
panel with 66 countries for Moody’s, 65 for S&P and 58 for Fitch, with an average of 8 
yearly observations per country. Each country experienced, on average, either one or two 
changes in its rating.6
6  See appendix for a full list of variables used in the estimations as well as their specification and data 
sources.
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7.4.2 Linear panel results
We focus the discussion on the random effects estimations (see Table 7.2). We report 
the results for each rating agency of a restricted and an unrestricted model. While 
the unrestricted model incorporates all variables, the restricted model contains only the 
variables which have a statistically significant impact. The restricted models are quite 
robust to alternative exclusion procedures. The explanatory power of the models is very 
high with R-square values around 0.95 in both restricted and unrestricted versions. We 
can also assess how successful our specification is. First, in most of the cases, the short 
and long-run coefficients of the explanatory variables are quite different, which implies 
that, if we did not include the additional regressors, we would be mispecifying the model.7 
Second, the models pass the Hausman test, which suggests tha t the country specific error 
is now uncorrelated with the regressors. In other words, if we do not include the time 
averages the model would suffer from an omitted variables problem, which would make 
OLS and random effects inconsistent.
The restricted models (columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 7.2) reveal a homogenous set of 
explanatory variables across agencies. On the real side, the short-run coefficients of GDP 
per capita and GDP growth rates are significant for all three companies, but do not seem 
to have a long-run effect. An increase of 2 percentage points of GDP growth improves 
the rating by around 0.17 notches for Moody’s and S&;P, while an increase of 6 percent 
of GDP per capita improves the rating by 0.1 notches.
Regarding the fiscal variables, the coefficient of the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
as a difference from the average is significant for all three agencies. S&;P and Fitch put 
more emphasis on this variable: a 10 percentage point decline improves the rating by 0.3 
notches (0.15 notches for Moody’s). On the other hand, Moody’s puts more emphasis on 
the the government balance: a 3 percentage point decrease in the deficit raises its rating 
by 0.2, compared to 0.1 in the other two agencies. Given their interdependence, one 
should not see these effects in isolation but rather together, which implies a high overall 
effect of fiscal policies on the ratings. Finally, the government effectiveness indicator is an 
important determinant of the rating in the long run. An improvement of 1 point in the 
World Bank indicator translates into an improvement of 2 notches. The cross-country 
difference between the 10th and 90th percentile of the average government effectiveness 
indicator between countries is 2.5 points. Thus, it captures elements tha t account for 5 
notches difference between ratings.
7We perform the formal significance test of the coefficients of the time averages of the explanatory 
variables by estimating equation (7.3). Average per capita GDP and government effectiveness are allways 
significant at 5% for all agencies. In addition, average unemployment is significant for Moodys, average 
government debt is significant for S&iP and the average reserves-to-imports is significant for S&P and 
Fitch. If we exclude all the time invariant regressors the remaining coefficients change slightly and some 
lose their significance. None of the models without the additional variables pass the Hausman test.
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Table 7.2: Random effects estimation
Moody’s S&P Fitch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.431 8.291 4.347 7.421*** 4.409 7.179***(0.95) (12.49) (1.25) (15.11) (1.19) (13.16)
GDP per capita 1.779*** 1.789*** 1.411*** 1.403*** 1.697*** 1.667***(7.61) (8.03) (7.12) (7.67) (8.83) (9.51)
GDP per capita Avg. 0.650(1.46)
0.450
(1.05)
0.375
(0.87)
GDP growth 8.643*** 8.768*** 8.125*** 8.256*** 3.385 4.110*(3.07) (3.26) (3.50) (3.72) (1.39) (1.74)
GDP growth Avg. 5.237(0.46)
-1.907
(-0.20)
3.220
(0.26)
Unemployment 0.014(0.52)
0.055**
(2.53)
0.056***
(2.73)
0.017
(0.61)
Unemployment Avg. -0.072*(-1.78)
-0.073*
(-1.70)
-0.018
(-0.45)
0.027
(0.50)
Inflation -0.124* -0.145** -0.235*** -0.229*** -0.107(-1.79) (-2.11) (-6.17) (-6.13) (-1.24)
Inflation Avg. -0.360*(-1.84)
-0.347**
(-2.00)
-0.427***
(-2.65)
-0.353**
(-2.44)
-0.150
(-0.66)
Gov Debt -0.014** -0.014** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.027***(-2.38) (-2.53) (-6.61) (-7.22) (-3.82) (-7.30)
Gov Debt Avg. -0.011(-1.49)
-0.014**
(-2.24)
-0.010
(-1.34)
-0.012**
(-1.97)
-0.007
(-0.69)
Gov Balance 7.740***(2.77)
6.991***
(2.54)
4.387**
(1.97)
4.411**
(2.01)
4.371
(1.37)
Gov Balance Avg. 7.893(0.80)
5.144
(0.59)
5.220
(0.69)
Gov Effectiveness 0.242(1.18)
0.370**
(2.36)
0.362**
(2.47)
0.787**
(4.54)
0.887**
(5.34)
Gov Effectiveness Avg. 1.906***(4.06)
2.470***
(6.80)
2.370***
(4.91)
2.758***
(7.75)
2.155**
(4.23)
2.741**
(7.47)
External Debt -0.004*(-1.79)
-0.004*
(-1.95)
-0.003*
(-1.68)
-0.003
(-1.51)
-0.005***
(-2.97)
-0.005***
(-2.76)
External Debt Avg. -0.004**(-2.20)
-0.004**
(-2.47)
-0.006*
(-1.81)
-0.007**
(-2.18)
-0.010**
(-2.53)
-0.011***
(-3.34)
Current Account -7.246***(-3.67)
-8.760***
(-4.84)
-3.700**
(-2.18)
-3.586**
(-2.18)
-3.137
(-1.16)
Current Account Avg. -3.321(-0.78)
0.123
(0.03)
2.955
(0.63)
Reserves 1.423** 1.710*** 0.064 -0.100(3.63) (4.61) (0.19) (-0.23)
Reserves Avg. 1.475 1.254 1.909** 1.988** 3.090*** 2.987***(1.60) (1.43) (2.06) (2.28) (3.59) (3.78)
Def 1 -1.998*** -2.075*** -1.307*** -1.337*** -1.523*** -1.331***(-6.87) (-8.11) (-5.23) (-6.74) (-4.13) (-4.60)
Def 2 -0.015 -0.018 0.075(-0.32) (-0.33) (1.15)
EU (2) 1.598*** 1.650*** 0.415** 0.418** 0.507** 0.554**(6.63) (6.69) (2.41) (2.48) (2.03) (2.40)
IND 2.289*** 3.157*** 2.831*** 3.438*** 2.781*** 2.634***(2.89) (4.61) (3.03) (4.69) (2.61) (3.55)
LAC -0.903* -0.459 -0.718(-1.93) (-0.94) (-1.29)
R* 0.945 0.940 0.948 0.946 0.947 0.944
Obs. (Countries) 551 (66) 557 (66) 564 (65) 565 (65) 480 (58) 481 (58)
Hausman Test* 21.93 (0.06) 14.30 (0.160) 16.77 (0.210) 10.73 (0.467) 12.68 (0.473) 3.68 (0.816)
Notes: The coefficient of the variable with Avg. corresponds to the long-run coefficient ((3 +  r}) while
the one without Avg. corresponds to the short-run coefficient (3. White diagonal standard errors &
covariance (d.f. corrected). The t sta tistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. $ The null is that R E  estim ation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed 
effects. The test sta tistic  is to be compared to a Chi-Square with 13 and 11 degrees of freedom respectively 
(the number of tim e-varying regressors). The p-value is in brackets.
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The external debt-to-exports ratio and the reserves-to-imports ratio are also signifi­
cant. Increases in external debt drive the rating down in the short and long run. The 
difference between the 10t/l and 90th percentile of the cross-country average external debt 
ratio is around 300, which corresponds to a cross-country difference of 3 notches for Fitch, 
2 notches for S&P, and 1.2 notches for Moody’s. External reserves are significantly posi­
tive, in the long-run for S&P and Fitch and in the short-run for Moody’s. The difference 
between the 10^ and 90th percentile of the average reserves-to-import ratio is 0.4, so they 
account for a 1.2 notch cross-country difference for Fitch and a 0.8 notches for S&P. The 
current account balance has a negative impact in the short run. A current account deficit 
seems to be an indicator for the willingness of foreigners to cover the current account 
gap through loans and foreign investment. In this situation, a higher current account 
deficit is associated with either higher credit-worthiness or good economic prospects of 
the economy and consequently a higher sovereign rating.
EU and industrialised country dummies are also significant for all agencies. If a coun­
try has previously defaulted on its debt, it is permanently penalized by 1 to 2 notches. 
Beyond the set of core variables, the agencies appear to employ a limited number of 
additional variables. Fitch relies on the smallest set of additional variables, comprising 
government effectiveness and foreign currency reserves as deviation from the average. By 
contrast, Moody’s and S&P look at more factors, with a large degree of homogeneity be­
tween these two agencies. In particular, inflation is found to have a significantly negative 
impact, although to a relatively small extent.
Finally, the impact of the unemployment on the rating illustrates the importance 
of distinguishing between short and long-run impacts. While the average (structural) 
level of unemployment has a significant negative impact on the rating by Moody’s, the 
short-run deviation from the average enters positively and significantly in the S&P model. 
Unemployment in the short run can be driven by re-adjustments of economic activity that 
might improve economic performance in the future. Also, structural reforms that raise 
unemployment in the short run but improve fiscal sustainability or economic prospects 
in the long run could explain this finding.
Differentiation across sub-periods and ratings levels8
The separation of the overall sample into different sub-samples allows to assess broadly 
the robustness of the empirical models. The results for the sub-periods 1996-2000 and 
2001-2005 are in line with those for the full estimation period, although the significance
8We performed additional analysis from different perspectives. For instance, we used the information 
on credit rating outlooks but no relevant improvement on the fit of the models occurred. In addition, 
we assessed whether different exchange rate regimes added information to the rating determination, 
estimated the model with the average rating of the three agencies, and also pooled the data for the three 
agencies, but the results where quite similar.
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level of the individual coefficients is lower. The most noteworthy element is that the 
current account balance was more important for the early period, while external reserves 
were more important in the later.
As a further test of the robustness of the results, the sample was split into two groups 
according to the ratings level: regressions were run separately for high-rated countries 
with grades BBB+ and below and those above this grade.9 The results for the separate 
regressions according to ratings levels again confirm the overall results from the full 
sample. Still, low rating levels are more affected by external debt and external reserves 
while inflation plays a bigger role for high rating levels. The short-run coefficient of 
inflation is bigger for the high ratings group, where an increase of 5 percentage points in 
inflation reduce the rating by 0.2 notches.
7.4.3 Ordered probit results
Ordered probit models should give additional insight into the determinants of sovereign 
ratings. As discussed, they generate estimates of the threshold values between rating 
notches allowing an assessment of the shape of the ratings curve. Given the data require­
ments, we only apply them to the full sample, which appears appropriate in view of the 
overall robustness of the empirical results to the use of sub-samples.
The results from the ordered probit estimations validate the findings highlighted above 
(see Table 7.3 for the random effects ordered probit). The core variables identified in the 
linear regressions also show up with the same sign. In addition, the ordered probit models 
suggest the significance of more explanatory variables, particularly for Fitch. Finally, for 
the current account variable, the restricted specification for Moody’s shows a negative 
sign for deviations from the average, but a positive sign for the average. Similar sign 
switches also come out for S&P. This result confirms our priors. In the short run, a 
higher current account deficit is associated with either higher credit-worthiness or good 
economic prospects of the economy, but if the countries run permanent current account 
deficits, it negatively affects their ratings.
The estimated threshold coefficients reported in the second part of Table 7.3 suggest 
that the linear specification, assumed for the panel regression, is broadly acceptable. 
Nevertheless, the econometric tests at the bottom of the tables reveal additional insights. 
For the restricted model of Moody’s, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
equal distances between thresholds, but the significance level is close to 10%. Indeed 
the estimated thresholds point to a relatively large jump between the ratings for BBB-
9The choice of the threshold reflects practical considerations. While market participants generally 
divide bond issuers into investment-grade and non-investment grade at the threshold of BBB-, this 
threshold would result in a relatively small number of observations for low ratings.
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and BBB. Countries close to the non-investment grade rating are given a wider range 
before they actually cross that threshold. For Fitch, the hypothesis of equal distances 
is rejected, as the thresholds for higher ratings are further apart than those of the lower 
ratings. In this case the kink lies at the A rating. For S&P, above investment grade, the 
distances between thresholds first decline and then increase, making the transition to the 
highest grades more difficult.
Table 7.3: Random effects ordered probit estimation
Moody’s S&P Fitch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 3.422*** 3.349*** 3.246*** 2.686*** 4.087*** 4.160***(9.40) (9.14) (9.02) (8.12) (12.15) (13.12)
GDP per capita Avg. 0.478*** 0.562*** 1.117*** 0.614*** 1.132*** 0.913***(2.75) (3.84) (6.03) (3.94) (7.81) (5.45)
GDP growth 6.464** 7.852** 5.979* 7.729*** -5.119*(2.06) (2.30) (1.93) (2.60) (-1.73)
GDP growth Avg. -9.387**(-2.04)
-8.43*
(-1.79)
-6.083
(-1.31)
Unemployment 0.016(0.50)
0.152***
(4.57)
0.135***
(3.01)
0.012
(0.36)
Unemployment Avg. -0.078***(-4.40)
-0.085***
(-5.18)
0.002
(0.10)
-0.073***
(-4.40)
-0.033**
(-2.09)
Inflation -0.199 -0.214 -0.353** -0.418*** -0.273** -0.245*(-1.41) (-1.51) (-2.53) (-2.93) (-1.96) (-1.79)
Inflation Avg. -0.623*** -0.939*** -0.532*** -0.949*** -0.713*** -0.272*(-4.01) (-6.11) (-3.41) (-6.08) (-4.62) (-1.84)
Gov Debt -0.03*** -0.032*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.043*** -0.051***(-4.61) (-4.94) (-11.90) (-12.41) (-7.24) (-9.07)
Gov Debt Avg. -0.026***(-6.99)
-0.028***
(-8.80)
-0.027***
(-8.77)
-0.031***
(-10.47)
0.001
(0.26)
Gov Balance 13.898***(3.74)
10.937***
(2.77)
10.187***
(3.07)
11.559***
(3.32)
9.487***
(3.00)
Gov Balance Avg. 6.757*(1.84)
8.873**
(2.40)
22.304***
(6.18)
21.812***
(5.83)
Gov Effectiveness 0.223(0.64)
0.707**
(2.08)
0.794**
(2.42)
1.761***
(4.86)
1.838***
(5.17)
Gov Effectiveness Avg. 3.679***(13.46)
3.547***
(15.44)
4.606***
(16.30)
3.752***
(15.62)
2.722***
(11.37)
3.104***
(12.28)
External Debt -0.004**(-2.29)
-0.002**
(-2.21)
-0.002
(-0.79)
External Debt Avg. -0.004***(-3.11)
-0.008***
(-6.40) (-10.39)
-0.014***
Current Account -8.57***(-3.62)
-12.863***
(-5.94)
-4.899**
(-2.04)
2.772
(1.23)
Current Account Avg. 5.24**(2.21)
3.723*
(1.73)
18.39***
(7.21)
5.769**
(2.54)
18.993***
(7.89)
26.980***
(11.27)
Reserves 2.246*** 2.952*** 0.205 -0.549(4.37) (5.82) (0.42) (-1.14)
Reserves Avg. 0.416 3.365*** 2.520*** 0.876*(0.88) (6.94) (5.57) (1.83)
Def 1 -3.101*** -2.936*** -1.789*** -2.077*** -2.176*** -1.266***(-12.18) (-11.95) (-8.05) (-9.25) (-9.33) (-6.03)
EU 2.197*** 2.237*** 0.324 0.336(9.04) (8.90) (1.55) (1.57)
IND 3.554*** 3.626*** 3.923*** 5.848*** 4.982*** 6.163***(7.71) (9.08) (8.18) (11.38) (13.24) (15.54)
LAC -1.766*** -1.711*** -1.485*** -0.901*** -2.570*** -3.165***(-7.08) (-8.86) (-6.38) (-4.34) (-11.08) (-13.78)
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Table 7.3 (cont.): Random effects ordered probit estimation
Moody’s S&P Fitch
(1) (2) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6)
Constant 8.13 7.00 3.22 7.63 2.46 3.71
Cutl 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cut2 2.00 2.06 2.19 2.16 2.35 2.38
Cut3 3.40 3.36 4.12 4.07 3.33 3.43
Cut4 4.94 5.01 5.34 5.34 4.64 4.82
Cut5 5.94 6.14 7.11 7.19 5.77 5.93
Cut6 7.09 7.35 9.15 9.32 7.51 7.54
Cut7 8.65 8.92 10.75 10.80 9.13 9.02
Cut8 10.72 10.75 13.11 12.92 10.80 10.81
Cut9 11.76 11.82 14.59 14.30 11.82 12.02
Cut 10 12.97 13.13 15.46 14.99 12.92 13.10
Cut 11 14.25 14.49 17.49 16.59 15.30 15.42
Cut 12 15.50 15.72 18.96 18.00 16.99 17.52
Cut 13 17.62 17.50 21.51 19.99 17.63 18.42
Cutl4 19.11 18.86 22.72 21.07 19.85 20.87
Cut 15 20.60 20.26 24.54 23.00 22.11 23.07
Cut 16 21.64 21.26 27.07 25.69 24.06 25.04
LogLik -566.33 -578.24 -514.45 -531.22 -537.09 -533.09
Observations 551 557 564 565 553 564
Equal differences8 29.26 (0.009) 19.91 (0.133) 52.21 (0.000) 59.68 (0.000) 68.57 (0.000) 70.23 (0.000) 
Jump& [7-8] [7-8] [9-10] [12-13]
Different Slopes# [2-3 ,5-6, 7-8, [2-3, 5-6, 7-8, [10-11, 13-14, [10-11, 11-12,
10-11,12-13, 12-13, 14-15, 14-15,15-16] 13-14,14-15,
14-15, 15-16] 15-16] 15-16]
Test*____________ 18.22 (0.149) 12.22 (0.510) 19.23 (0.116) 14.02 (0.300) 22.03 (0.037) 16.69 (0.214)
Notes: The coefficient of the variable with Avg. corresponds to the long-run coefficient (fi +  p ), while the 
one without corresponds to the short-run coefficient ft. The t sta tistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - 
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 8 The null is that the differences between categories 
is equal fo r  all categories. The test sta tistic is to be compared to a Chi-Square with 14 degrees of freedom. 
& Identifies two cut points that have a irregular difference. #  Identifies a cluster o f categories that seem  
to have a higher slope (increase difficulty in transition between adjacent notches). #  The null is that, 
excluding the jum p point, within the two identified clusters the slopes are equal. The test sta tistic  is 
to be compared to a Chi-Square with either 13 degrees of freedom (if only a jum p or different slopes 
was identified) or 12 degrees of freedom (if  both where identified). The p-value is in brackets. The 
correspondence between the ratings and the cut-off points is specified in (7.6).
7.4.4 P rediction  analysis
Our prediction analysis focuses on two elements: the prediction for the rating of each 
individual observation in the sample, as well as the prediction of movements in the ratings 
through time. For the random effects estimations we can have two predictions, with or 
without the country specific effect, e*, and we can write the corresponding estimated 
versions of (7.4) as:
Rit =  K X i t  ~  X i )  + 5X{ + AZn +
Rit =  P ( X u  ~  X{)  + 6X i  + AZn.
We can then estimate each country specific effect by taking the time average of the 
estimated residual for each country. As a result we can include or exclude this additional 
information that comes out of the estimation. We also present the predicting results using 
OLS estimation. For the linear models we compute the fitted value and then rounded it 
to the closest integer between 1 and 17. For both ordered probit and the random effects
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Table 7.4: Summary of prediction errors
Estimation Obs. Prediction error (notches) % Correctly % Within 1 % Within 2
procedure 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 predicted notch* notches*
W OLS 557 0 5 12 42 88 209 141 58 2 0 0 37.5% 78.6% 96.6%
RE with €i 557 0 0 1 17 78 361 91 8 1 0 0 64.8% 95.2% 99.6%
0 RE without 557 0 6 15 49 92 188 141 53 12 1 0 33.8% 75.6% 93.9%
Ordered Probit 557 4 4 14 35 99 259 86 46 10 0 0 46.5% 79.7% 94.3%
RE Ordered Probit 557 0 8 23 59 106 244 71 34 11 1 0 43.8% 75.6% 92.3%
OLS 568 0 3 15 34 104 218 147 41 6 0 0 38.4% 82.6% 95.8%
n, RE with Cj 565 0 0 1 6 80 392 83 2 1 0 0 69.4% 98.2% 99.6%
3 RE without ti 565 0 5 12 39 98 216 133 52 10 0 0 38.2% 79.1% 95.2%
Ordered Probit 565 0 10 14 28 99 262 118 23 10 1 0 46.4% 84.8% 93.8%
RE Ordered Probit 565 1 12 13 41 115 218 130 29 6 0 0 38.6% 81.9% 94.3%
OLS 481 1 3 6 32 87 196 113 43 0 0 0 40.7% 82.3% 97.9%
RE with ti 481 0 1 2 4 63 339 71 1 0 0 0 70.5% 98.3% 99.4%
4-? RE without €i 481 1 3 7 39 93 174 106 57 1 0 0 36.2% 77.5% 97.5%
E Ordered Probit 481 1 0 16 32 91 209 95 31 6 0 0 43.5% 82.1% 95.2%
RE Ordered Probit 553 1 3 25 53 115 191 121 36 8 0 0 34.5% 77.2% 93.3%
Note: * prediction error within + / -  1 notch. ** prediction error within + / -  2 notches.
ordered probit we fit the value of the latent variable, by setting the error term to zero, and 
match it up to the cut-off points to determine the predicted rating. Table 7.4 presents 
an overall summary of the prediction errors, using the restricted specifications.
The random effects model including the estimated country effect is the method with 
the best fit. On average for the three agencies, it correctly predicts 70 per cent of all 
observations and more than 95 per cent of the predicted ratings lie within one notch (99 
per cent within two notches). This is expected, as the estimated country errors capture 
factors like political risk, geopolitical uncertainty and social tensions that are likely to 
systematically affect the ratings, therefore, they act as a correction for these factors.
This additional information cropping up from the random effects estimation with the 
country specific effect can be useful if we want to work with countries that belong to 
our sample. But if we want to make an out-of-sample prediction we do not have this 
information. In tha t case, only the random effects estimation excluding the country error 
is comparable to the other specifications. We can see that, in general, both ordered probit 
and random effects ordered probit have a better fit than the pooled OLS and random 
effects. Overall, the simple ordered probit seems the best method as far as prediction 
in levels is concerned as it predicts correctly around 45 per cent of all observations and 
more then 80 per cent within one notch.
Let us now turn to how the models perform in predicting changes in ratings. Table 
7.5 presents the total number of sample upgrades (downgrades), the predicted number of 
upgrades (downgrades) and the number of upgrades (downgrades) that where correctly 
predicted by the several models. Over the sample period, on average, there was a change 
of rating every six years for Moody’s and every five years for S&;P and Fitch. A country 
was twice more likely to be upgraded than downgraded.10
10This analysis is, in a way, limited as it does not capture upgrades/downgrades across multiple grades
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Table 7.5: Prediction of rating changes
Sample Predicted Upgrades correctly Sample Predicted Downgrades correctly
Upgrades Upgrades predicted at time Downgrades Downgrades predicted at time
t t +  1 t t +  1
* 0LS 60 95 23 20 34 55 20 10
RE with et 60 87 28 17 34 51 16 12
o RE without et 60 89 23 16 34 51 17 8
3^ Ordered Probit 60 127 31 25 34 72 20 8
RE Ordered Probit 60 101 23 23 34 65 18 8
OLS 79 79 32 17 41 50 16 15
RE with et 79 79 31 14 41 52 18 12
RE without et 79 90 34 15 41 61 19 14
W Ordered Probit 79 102 38 14 41 64 20 13
RE Ordered Probit 79 90 31 15 41 68 20 12
OLS 68 74 28 19 25 35 13 3
js RE with et 68 67 25 19 25 34 15 7
+S RE with et 68 89 24 20 25 53 15 5
^  Ordered Probit 69 115 30 24 25 71 15 5
RE Ordered Probit 89 154 43 29 26 77 13 7
The models correctly predict between one third and one half of both upgrades and 
downgrades. This is quite satisfactory for two reasons: first, the rating agencies also have 
a forward looking behaviour that is absent from our models and second, other qualitative 
factors not captured in our variables may play an important role.
The most noticeable difference between the models is not the number of corrected 
predicted changes, but the total number of predicted changes. In fact, the ordered probit 
and random effects ordered probit predict substantially more changes than the OLS and 
random effects counterparts. For instance, for S&;P, while both OLS and random effects 
predict around 79 upgrades and 50 downgrades, the ordered probit model predicts 102 
upgrades and 64 downgrades. This gives strength to the idea that rating agencies smooth 
the ratings, along the lines discussed in Altman and Rijken (2004). It also suggests that 
linear methods might be better in capturing the inertia of rating agencies than ordered 
response models.
7.4.5 E xam ples o f specific country analysis
In Table 7.6 we show the rating for some European and emerging countries in 1998 and 
2005. Then, we use the estimated short-run coefficients of the random effects ordered 
probit, together with the values for the relevant variables to disaggregate the overall 
prediction change in the rating of each agency into the contributions of the different 
blocks of explanatory variables: macroeconomic performance, government performance, 
external elements and the EU. The upper and lower bounds are computed by adding and 
subtracting one standard deviation to the point estimate of the coefficients.
or multiple upgrades/downgrades within a year. Although this could be important to analyse particular 
cases, such as, for instance, currency crises, the cases of multiple upgades/downgrades are relatively 
small compared to the full sample.
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Table 7.6: Case studies
Portugal
E urop ean  U i
Spain
lio n  co u n tr ies
Greece Italy Ireland
bOc Moody’s 
J  S&P 
Fitch
1998 2005
A a 2  (1 5 )  A a 2  (1 5 ) 
A A  (1 5 ) A A - (14) 
A A  (1 5 ) A A  (15)
1998 2005
A a 2  (1 5 ) A a a  (17) 
A A  (1 5 ) A A A  (17) 
A A  (1 5 ) A A A  (1 7 )
1998 2005
B a a l  (1 0 ) A l  (1 3 ) 
B B B  (9) A  (1 2 ) 
B B B  (9 ) A  (1 2 )
1998 2005
A a 3  (1 4 ) A a 2  (15) 
A A  (1 5 ) A A - (1 4 ) 
A A - (1 4 ) A A  (15)
1998 2005
A a a  (1 7 ) A a a  (17) 
A A +  (1 6 ) A A A  (1 7 ) 
A A A  (1 7 ) A A A  (1 7 )
Macro 
73 Government 
o External 
^  Overall change
0.53 0 .7 3  0.93 
-0.69 -0 .4 6  -0.23 
0.09 0 .1 2  0.15 
-0.07 0 .3 9  0.86
1.69 1 .98 2.28 
0.27 0 .65  1.03 
0.22 0 .31 0.39 
2.19 2 .95  3.70
1.33 1 .52 1.70 
-0.05 -0 .01  0.02 
0.18 0 .24  0.31 
1.46 1.75 2.03
0.91 1 .08  1.26 
-0.03 0 .1 4  0.31 
0.17 0 .2 4  0.30 
1.05 1 .46  1.87
1.46 1 .83  2.20 
0.20 0 .3 9  0.58 
0.15 0 .21  0.26 
1.81 2 .43  3.05
Macro 
^  Government 
co External
Overall change
0.42 0 .5 7  0.73 
-1.06 -0 .8 8  -0.70 
0.03 0 .0 5  0.08 
-0.61 -0 .2 5  0.11
0.94 1 .07  1.20 
0.48 0 .7 7  1.06 
0.07 0 .14  0.21 
1.49 1 .98  2.47
0.99 1.13 1.27 
-0.13 -0 .1 0  -0.08 
0.06 0 .11 0.16 
0.91 1 .14 1.36
0.56 0 .6 7  0.77 
0.07 0 .21  0.34 
0.05 0 .11  0.16 
0.69 0 .9 8  1.26
0.91 1 .15 1.38 
0.83 0 .9 8  1.14 
0.05 0 .0 9  0.14 
1.78 2 .22  2.66
Macro 
"y Government 
£  External
Overall change
0.90 0 .9 9  1.08 
-1.26 -1 .0 5  -0.85 
-0.06 -0 .0 3  -0.01 
-0.42 -0 .1 0  0.23
1.78 2 .01 2.25 
-0.46 -0 .1 3  0.19 
-0.16 -0 .0 9  -0.02 
1.16 1 .79 2.42
1.43 1.56 1.69 
-0.11 -0 .0 8  -0.06 
-0.13 -0 .0 7  -0.01 
1.19 1 .40 1.62
1.06 1 .18 1.30 
-0.45 -0 .2 9  -0.14 
-0.12 -0 .0 7  -0.01 
0.49 0 .81  1.14
1.92 2 .14  2.35 
0.15 0 .31  0.47 
-0.11 -0 .0 6  -0.01 
1.97 2 .39  2.81
Czech Republic
E a stern  E uro
Hungary
Dean co u n tr ies  
Poland Slovakia Slovenia
€*
bOc Moody’s 
J  S&P 
“  Fitch
1998 2005
B a a l  (1 0 )  A 1 (1 3 ) 
A - (1 1 ) A- (1 1 ) 
B B B +  (1 0 )  A  (12)
1998 2005
B a a 3  (1 0 ) A 1 (13) 
B B B  (9 ) A - (11) 
B B B  (9 ) B B B +  (10)
1998 2005
B a a 3  (1 0 ) A 2  (1 2 ) 
B B B - (8 ) B B B +  (10) 
B B B +  (1 0 ) B B B +  (1 0 )
1998 2005
B a l  (7 )  A 2 (12) 
B B +  (7 ) A (12) 
B B + ( 7 )  A (1 2 )
1998 2005
A 3 (1 1 ) A a3  (1 4 ) 
A (1 2 ) A A - (1 4 ) 
A - (1 1 ) A A - (1 4 )
Macro 
•o Government 
o External 
^  European Union 
Overall change
1.43 1 .76  2.08 
-0.75 -0 .5 9  -0.43 
-0.08 -0 .0 5  -0.01 
1.42 1 .60  1.77 
2.03 2 .7 2  3.41
2.08 2 .36  2.65 
-0.39 -0 .2 9  -0.19 
0.00 0 .0 9  0.17 
1.42 1 .60 1.77 
3.11 3 .7 6  4.41
0.59 0 .90  1.21 
-0.61 -0 .4 2  -0.23 
-0.34 -0 .2 3  -0.13 
1.42 1 .60 1.77 
1.06 1.85 2.63
1.30 1 .57  1.84 
-0.32 -0 .1 1  0.10 
-0.04 0 .2 6  0.56 
1.42 1 .60  1.77 
2.37 3 .3 2  4.28
1.07 1 .22 1.38 
-0.23 -0 .1 0  0.02 
0.13 0 .1 7  0.22 
1.42 1 .60  1.77 
2.39 2 .89  3.39
Macro 
^  Government 
co External
European Union 
Overall change
1.24 1 .46  1.68 
-1.05 -0 .9 3  -0.80 
-0.02 0 .0 0  0.03 
0.07 0 .1 9  0.31 
0.23 0 .7 3  1.22
1.48 1 .69 1.89 
-0.25 -0 .1 8  -0.11 
0.02 0 .08  0.15 
0.07 0 .19  0.31 
1.31 1 .77  2.24
0.86 1.03 1.19 
-0.63 -0 .4 9  -0.35 
-0.09 -0 .01  0.07 
0.07 0 .19  0.31 
0.20 0 .72  1.23
1.23 1 .39  1.55 
-0.45 -0 .2 8  -0.11 
-0.28 -0 .0 2  0.23 
0.07 0 .1 9  0.31 
0.58 1 .28  1.97
0.76 0 .8 7  0.99 
-0.18 -0 .0 8  0.02 
0.01 0 .04  0.07 
0.07 0 .19  0.31 
0.66 1 .02 1.38
Macro
"u Government +2
E External
European Union 
Overall change
1.53 1 .73  1.92 
-0.80 -0 .6 7  -0.54 
0.05 0 .1 0  0.15 
0.08 0 .2 2  0.36 
0.86 1 .3 7  1.89
2.24 2 .48  2.71 
-0.35 -0 .2 7  -0.19 
-0.10 -0 .0 2  0.05 
0.08 0 .22  0.36 
1.88 2 .40  2.93
0.95 1 .17 1.39 
-0.88 -0 .7 2  -0.55 
0.11 0 .24  0.38 
0.08 0 .22  0.36 
0.26 0 .92  1.58
1.51 1 .73  1.95 
0.20 0 .3 8  0.57 
0.27 0 .73  1.19 
0.08 0 .22  0.36 
2.06 3 .0 6  4.07
1.20 1 .32 1.44 
0.13 0 .24  0.35 
-0.08 -0 .0 4  -0.01 
0.08 0 .22  0.36 
1.33 1 .73 2.14
Brazil
E m erging
Malaysia
eco n o m ies
Mexico South Africa Thailand
ee
bOg Moody’s 
|  S&P 
“  Fitch
1998 2005
B 2 (3 ) B a 3  (5) 
B B - (5 )  B B - (5 ) 
B +  (4 )  B B - (5 )
1998 2005
B a a 3  (8) A 3  (11) 
B B B - (8 ) A- (11 ) 
B B  (6 ) A - (11)
1998 2005
B a 2  (7 ) B a a l  (1 0 ) 
B B  (6 ) B B B  (9) 
B B  (6 ) B B B  (9)
1998 2005
B a l  (7 ) B a a l  (1 0 ) 
B B B - (8 ) B B B +  (1 0 ) 
B B +  (7 ) B B B +  (1 0 )
1998 2005
B a a 3  (8 ) B a a l  (1 0 ) 
B B +  (7 ) B B B +  (1 0 ) 
B B  (6 ) B B B +  (1 0 )
Macro 
73 Government 
o External 
^  Overall change
-0.59 -0 .4 9  -0.39 
-0.37 -0 .1 6  0.06 
-0.15 0 .1 8  0.50 
-1.11 -0 .4 7  0.17
1.00 1 .19 1.37 
-1.06 -0 .7 9  -0.53 
-0.70 -0 .3 5  -0.01 
-0.76 0 .0 4  0.83
0.95 1 .17  1.39 
0.26 0 .45  0.64 
0.13 0 .26  0.38 
1.34 1.88 2.42
0.79 1 .03 1.27 
0.34 0 .61  0.88 
0.28 0 .38  0.48 
1.41 2 .02  2.64
0.91 1 .19  1.47 
-0.31 -0 .1 4  0.04 
-0.36 -0 .1 2  0.12 
0.24 0 .9 4  1.64
Macro 
Rg Government 
co External
Overall change
-0.19 -0 .1 6  -0.13 
-1.01 -0 .8 4  -0.67 
-0.22 0 .0 6  0.34 
-1.42 -0 .9 4  -0.45
0.77 0 .91  1.05 
-0.93 -0 .7 3  -0.53 
-0.56 -0 .2 8  0.00 
-0.71 -0 .1 0  0.52
0.71 0 .88  1.05 
0.25 0 .4 0  0.54 
-0.06 0 .0 4  0.15 
0.90 1 .32 1.73
0.86 0 .99  1.13 
0.75 0 .9 6  1.17 
0.00 0 .0 8  0.17 
1.61 2 .0 4  2.46
0.70 0 .92  1.13 
-0.68 -0 .5 4  -0.40 
-0.15 0 .0 6  0.26 
-0.13 0 .4 3  0.99
Macro 
'y Government 
E External
Overall change
-0.56 -0 .4 9  -0.41 
-0.46 -0 .2 8  -0.11 
0.72 1 .3 6  2.01 
-0.30 0 .6 0  1.49
1.04 1 .14 1.25 
-0.61 -0 .4 0  -0.18 
0.12 0 .52  0.91 
0.55 1 .26  1.97
1.26 1 .39 1.52 
-0.08 0 .08  0.24 
0.13 0 .35  0.56 
1.31 1.82 2.32
0.92 1 .09  1.25 
0.91 1 .14  1.37 
-0.06 0 .0 7  0.20 
1.76 2 .3 0  2.83
0.80 0 .8 9  0.97 
-0.18 -0 .0 3  0.12 
0.43 0 .8 6  1.28 
1.06 1 .72  2.38
Note: The block contributions were calculated using the changes in the variables multiplied by the short-
run coefficients estim ated by random effects ordered probit, and then aggregated. The only exception was 
unemployment, fo r  which we used the long-run coefficient. The upper and lower bounds where calculated 
using plus and minus one standard deviation .$ The quantitative rating scale is in brackets.
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Let us compare, for instance, Portugal and Spain. In 1998 they both had an AA 
(Aa2) rating but in 2005 while Spain had been upgraded to AAA (Aaa) by all agen­
cies, Portugal had been downgraded by S&P. For Portugal, the positive contribution of 
the macroeconomic performance was overshadowed by the negative government develop­
ments: the worsening of the budget deficit since 2000, the upward trend in government 
debt and the decline in the World Bank government effectiveness indicator. As for Spain, 
the good macroeconomic performance was the main cause of the upgrade, especially the 
reduction of structural unemployment since the mid nineties and the increase of GDP 
per capita due to the persistent high growth.
The new European Union member states Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Poland, have been upgraded, in some cases more than two notches. The 
good macroeconomic performance, especially in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, plays 
a major role, but there was also an important credibility effect of joining the European 
Union, mostly visible for Moody’s.
As a final example we report the results for five emerging economies that have also 
been upgraded: Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa. For Brazil, 
Malaysia and Thailand the main positive contribution came from the external area spe­
cially the reduction of external debt and the increase in foreign reserves. This effect is 
stronger for Fitch. For Mexico and South Africa the contributions are balanced.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the determinants of global sovereign debt ratings using 
ratings from the three main international rating agencies for the period 1995-2005. Over­
all, our results point to a good performance of the estimated models across agencies and 
across time.
Regarding the methodological approach, we have used linear regression methods and 
limited dependent variable models, by means of an ordered probit and random effects 
ordered probit estimations. The latter is the best estimation procedure using panel data, 
as it considers the existence of an additional cross-country error term. We have also 
employed a new specification tha t consists of including time averages of the explanatory 
variables as additional time-invariant regressors. On the one hand, it allows us to correct 
the problem of correlation between the country specific error and the regressors. On the 
other hand, it allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of a variable 
on the sovereign rating level, which improves the economic interpretation of the results.
Our results show that a set of core variables have a short-run impact on a country’s 
credit rating: per capita GDP, real GDP growth, government debt and government deficit.
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Government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves and sovereign default dummies 
are important determinants of the cross-country dimension of the ratings, and therefore, 
only have a long-run impact. Moreover, the importance of fiscal variables appears stronger 
than in the previous literature.
The models correctly predict the rating of 40% of the sample and more than 75% 
of the predicted ratings lie within one notch of the observed value. They also correctly 
predict between one third and one half of upgrades and downgrades. In our opinion this 
is quite satisfactory given that the empirical approach used here necessarily neglects two 
sources of information that are known to enter the decision of the rating agencies. On 
the one hand, rating agencies generally state that they cover several qualitative variables 
in addition to quantitative data in the rating process. On the other hand, rating agencies 
base their decision, to some extent, on projected economic developments. Thus, a more 
comprehensive model could also incorporate the agencies’ expectations regarding the 
relevant explanatory variables.
Although incorporating forward-looking behaviour of agencies into an econometric 
model seems important to study particular episodes of sudden and repeated changes 
in ratings, we think it is not essential for our purposes. First, because most of the 
countries do not have frequent changes in their ratings, timing is not a fundamental issue. 
Second, even if the behaviour of agencies were strictly forward-looking, they still base 
their projections on current information, which should be captured in our modelling. All 
in all, we believe tha t such attem pt to incorporate expectations would remain tentative.
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7.6 A ppendix
Table A7.1: Some previous related studies
R eference  
Cantor and 
Packer(1996)
D a ta
Cross-section, 
1995, 45 
Countries.
E x p la n a to ry  variab les
Per capita GDP, GDP growth, Inflation, 
current account surplus, government budget 
surplus, debt-to-exports, economic develop­
ment, default history.
A g en c ies
S&P
Moody’s
M eth o d o lo g y
Linear transformation of 
the data. OLS estima­
tion.
Mulder and 
Montfort 
(2000)
Panel, 1995- 
1999 (half- 
yearly), 20 
emerging 
markets.
Debt-to-GDP, debt-to-exports, debt service- 
to-exports, debt reschedule, reserves, cur­
rent account surplus, real effective exchange 
rate, export growth, short-term debt share, 
terms of trade, inflation, growth of domes­
tic credit, GDP growth, government bud­
get surplus, investment-to-GDP ratio, per 
capita GDP, US treasury bill rate, Spread 
over T-bonds, regional dummies.
S&P
Moody’s
Linear transformation of 
the data. Two specifi­
cations: static (OLS es­
timation of the pooled 
data) and dynamic (er­
ror correction specifica­
tion including as regres­
sor the previous rating 
and several variables in 
first differences).
Eliasson
(2002)
Panel, 1990- 
1999, 38 
emerging 
markets.
Per capital GDP, GDP growth, inflation, 
debt-to-exports ratio, government budget 
surplus, short-term debt to foreign reserves 
ratio, export growth, interest rate spread.
S&P Linear transformation of 
the data. Static spec­
ification and both fixed 
and random effects esti­
mation. Dynamic speci­
fication.
Hu, Kiesel, 
and Per- 
raudin (2002)
Unbalanced 
panel, 1981- 
1998, 12 to 
92 countries.
Debt service-to-exports ratio, debt-to-GNP  
ratio, reserves to debt, reserves to imports, 
GNP growth, inflation, default history, de­
fault in previous year, regional dummies, 
non-industrialised countries dummy.
S&P Ordered probit on pooled 
data. Two scales: 1-8 
and 1-14.
Afonso
(2003)
Cross-section, 
2001, 81 
countries.
Per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, 
current account surplus, government budget 
surplus, debt-to-exports ratio, economic de­
velopment, default history.
S&P
Moody’s
Linear, logistic and expo­
nential transformation of 
the data. OLS estima- 
tion.
Alexe, Ham­
mer, Kogan, 
and Lejeune 
(2003)
Cross-section 
1998, 68 
countries.
Per capita GDP, inflation, trade balance, ex­
port growth, reserves, government budget 
surplus, debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange rate, 
domestic credit-to-GDP ratio, government 
effectiveness, corruption index, political sta- 
bility.
S&P Linear transformation 
and OLS estimation.
Borio and 
Packer(2004)
Panel 1996- 
2003, 52 
countries.
Per capita GDP, GDP growth, inflation, cor­
ruption perception index, political risk in­
dex, years since default, frequency of high 
inflation periods, government debt-to-GDP  
ratio, debt-to-exports ratio, others.
S&P
Moody’s
Linear transformation of 
data. OLS regression of 
average credit rating in­
cluding year dummies as 
regressors.
Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick
(2005)
Cross-section 
2001, 60 
countries.
GDP, inflation, foreign direct investment to 
GDP, current account to GDP, trade to 
GDP, real interest rate, mobile phones.
S&P
Moody’s
Fitch
Estimate a ordered probit 
with 9 categories.
Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick
(2005)
Panel 1995- 
1999, 95 
countries.
Per capita GDP, inflation, govt financial 
balance to GDP, government debt-to-GDP  
ratio, real effective exchange rate, export 
to GDP, reserves, unemployment rate, unit 
labour cost, current account to GDP, debt- 
to-GDP ratio.
S&P
Moody’s
Estimate an ordered pro­
bit using two scales 1-21 
and 1-9 for each year in­
dividually.
Butler and 
Fauver 
(2006)
Cross-section 
2004, 93 
countries.
Per capita income, debt-to-GDP ratio, in­
flation, underdevelopment index, legal envi­
ronment index, legal origin dummies
Institutional OLS estimation. 
Investor
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Table A7.2: Data sources
V ariable D escr ip tio n Sou rce C od en am e
Per Capita GDP Per capita nominal GDP in US dollars (logs) IMF (WEO) NGDPDPC
GDP Growth Annual growth rate of real GDP IMF (WEO) NGDP.R
Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate IMF (WEO) LUR
Inflation Annual growth rate of Consumer Price Index IMF (WEO) PCPI
Government Debt Central Government Debt over GDP JP (2006)
Government balance General government balance as percentage of IMF (WEO) GGB, NGDP
Government Effective-
GDP
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2006 WB(AGI)
ness
External Debt Total debt as share of exports of goods and ser- WB (GDF)
Current Account
V1C6S
Current account balance as percentage of GDP IMF (WEO) BCA, NGDPD
Reserves Reserves to Imports ratio IMF (WEO, IFS) BM, .0.01.DSS.Z.F.
DEF 1 Dummy: 1 if country has defaulted since 1980 S&P
DEF 2 Years since last default S&P
EU
IND
Dummy: 1 If country belongs to European Union 
Dummy: 1 if Industrial Countries WB
LAC Dummy: 1 if Latin America and Caribbean WB
O ther variab les used  
Investment Gross capital formation as percentage of GDP IMF (WEO) NI_R, N G D PJl
OIL balance Oil trade balance as percentage of GDP IMF (WEO) TBO, NGDPD
Government Expendi­ General government total expenditure as percent­ IMF (WEO) GGEI, NGDP
ture
Government Interest
age of GDP
General government interest expenditure as per­ IMF (WEO) GGRG, NGDP
Expenditure 
Government Revenue
centage of GDP
General government total revenue as percentage IMF (WEO) GGENL, NGDP
Trade openness
of GDP
Total Exports plus total Imports as percentage IMF (WEO) BM, BX NGDPD
Exports Growth
of GDP
Annual growth rate of real exports IMF (WEO) NX_R
Domestic Credit Growth Annual growth rate of Domestic credit IMF (IFS) ,3.12.$$$.Z.F.$$$
Interest over Exports Interest paid as percentage of total exports of WB (GDF)
Reserves over total debt
goods and services
Reserves as percentage of total debt WB (GDF)
Short-term debt Short-term debt as percentage of total debt WB (GDF)
Total debt Total debt as share of gross national income WB (GDF)
Voice and Accountabil­
ity
Political Stability
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2004 WB(AGI)
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2005 WB(AGI)
Regulatory Quality Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2007 WB(AGI)
Rule of Law Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2008 WB(AGI)
Control of Corruption Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2009 WB(AGI)
AGI Compound index Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2010: WB(AGI)
Corruption Perception
sum of 6 categories 
Corruption Perception Index TI
EAP Dummy: 1 if East Asia and Pacific WB
ECA Dummy: 1 if Europe and Central Asia WB
MNA Dummy: 1 if Middle East and North Africa WB
SAS Dummy: 1 if South Asia WB
SSA Dummy: 1 if Sub-Saharan Africa WB
Notes: WEO - World Economic Outlook; A G I - Aggregate Governance Indicators; GDF - Global De­
velopment Finance; IFS - International Financial Statistics; W B - W orld Bank; IM F - International 
M onetary Fund; JP  - Jaimovich and Panizza (2006); T I - Transparent International.
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Figure A7.1: Number of countries rated and rating categories
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Chapter 8 
Closing Remarks
This thesis applied several research approaches to understand the effects of different 
types of government spending and their role in achieving optimality. Chapter 2 tells 
us that the government should be concerned about queues for public sector jobs, which 
can be an indicator that the wages are higher than optimal. Chapter 4 describes how 
governments should decide on the allocation of spending between general consumption 
and investment. Chapters 3 and 5 set variants of the baseline models in order to draw 
some positive conclusions and guide the empirical study.
Although the analysis contributed to overcome some of the theoretical gaps that 
exist in the literature, there are further areas where more research is needed. These are 
summarised in the subsequent paragraphs. Following Part I, several interesting exercises 
can be done:
• One could include distortionary taxation in the model with public sector employ­
ment and analyse the optimal policy. The introduction of distortionary taxes creates 
an additional cost of raising revenue, so we should expect a lower level of vacancies 
and wages, relative to the first best. It also creates a problem of time inconsistency, 
as the government can promise higher wages in the future to a ttract workers but 
it has the incentive to lower the current wage. Finally, the optimal business cycle 
policy of procyclical wages should be amplified, as it requires lower tax burden in 
recessions.
• One could also include nominal rigidities in the model with public sector employ­
ment with the objective of understanding how the government’s nominal wage can 
affect the marginal costs in the private sector and consequently the nominal private 
sector wage and inflation. In addition, one could explore the interdependencies 
between monetary and fiscal policy.
• As there are large differences in the public sector wage premium for workers with 
different education levels, it is appealing to develop a model tha t distinguishes
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between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers usually have a 
wage gap and low-skilled workers have a premium of working in the public sector, 
so there might be two types of inefficiencies: recruitment problems for high-skilled 
workers and long queues for low-skilled workers.
•  Another interesting extension would be to endogenise some of the labour market 
friction parameters, particularly the separation rate. We should expect public sector 
wage to affect negatively the separation rate in the public sector and positively in 
the private sector. This creates yet another transmission channel of public sector 
wages.
Finally, following the main hypothesis that the macroeconomic effects of government 
spending depend on the type of expenditure we are considering, two other areas seem 
important to explore:
•  Along the lines of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), to study the effects of the different 
components of spending using time series data for the United States. We can 
start by examining the size, volatility and comovement of the different types of 
expenditure, and then use a VAR approach to identify the effects of the different 
types of expenditure.
•  There were two types of spending left out in the analysis: transfers and interest 
payments. It would be interesting to analyse the different redistributive effects of 
transfers and interest payment from a theoretical point of view.
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